



The Role of Competition Law in the Telecommunications 






















DECLARATION   
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that 
this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other 





The telecommunications sector is growing at an exponential rate as technology continues 
to advance and consumer demands continue to change. However, an evolving market 
brings with it a growing national economic need for a sustainable telecommunications 
sector. For many years, Saudi Arabia’s telecommunications sector was monopolised by 
the majority state-owned Saudi Telecom Company. However, in an effort to bring 
competition to the sector and encourage privatisation, Saudi Arabia first enacted sector-
specific rules within the Telecommunications Act in 2001, followed by the broad 
Competition Law in 2004 as part of its journey to acceptance by the World Trade 
Organization. However, many of the anti-competitive practices that the laws sought to 
eliminate persist under the current framework. This study examines the state of 
competition in the telecommunications sector under Sharia, under the 
Telecommunications Act, and after the implementation of the Competition Law. The goal 
is to understand what effects, if any, each step of the legislative process has had on 
competition. Having evaluated the current state of the sector, this study then examines 
the competition models of telecommunications sectors in other jurisdictions to identify 
what lessons can be learned by Saudi Arabia and integrated into its competition model. 
Ultimately, this study argues that a harmonised framework in which both the 
Telecommunications Act and Competition Law work in concert will be the most effective 
means of increasing efficiency and creating a stable economic environment. This study 
also looks at how such a framework could be implemented within the Saudi system.  
  
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 1 
INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
1.1 BACKGROUND --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
1.1.1 The Practical Realities of Dominance vs Privatisation ------------------------------------- 3 
1.1.2 The Importance of Competition ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY --------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
1.4 RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS -------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 19 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 
CHAPTER 2 30 
THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION UNDER SHARIA GOVERNED SAUDI LAW30 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 
2.2 STRUCTURE OF THE SAUDI LEGAL SYSTEM -------------------------------------------------- 30 
2.2.1 The Executive -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
2.2.2 The Legislature ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 
2.2.3 The Judiciary --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 
2.2.3.1 Ineffectiveness of the Judicial System -------------------------------------------------------- 35 
2.3 THE SAUDI COMPETITION REGIME --------------------------------------------------------------- 36 
2.3.1 Overview --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 
2.3.2 The Influence of Sharia -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 
2.3.2.1 The Fiqh ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38 
2.3.2.2 The Suitable Method of Interpretation --------------------------------------------------------- 40 
2.3.2.3 Sharia Law Principles for Business Practices ----------------------------------------------- 41 
2.3.2.3.1 Maslahah -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42 
2.3.2.3.2 La Dhararwa La Dhirar --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44 
2.3.2.3.3 Riba --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46 
2.3.2.3.4 Ihtikar ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 
2.3.2.3.5 The Prohibition of Monopoly -------------------------------------------------------------------- 51 
2.3.2.3.6 Saddu Zarai ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52 
2.3.2.3.7 Assuf Fi Al-Isti -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53 
2.3.2.3.8 Maqasid al-Syriah --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 
2.3.2.4 Islamic Perspective on Market Abuse --------------------------------------------------------- 55 
2.3.2.4.1 Price Fixing ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55 
2.3.2.4.2 Unjust Pricing --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57 
2.3.2.5 Does the Sharia Guarantee Fair Competition? --------------------------------------------- 61 
2.3.2.5.1 Ensuring Fair Competition for Foreign Companies --------------------------------------- 62 
2.3.3 The Competition Law ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65 
2.3.3.1 State-owned Enterprises ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66 
2.3.3.2 Restrictive Agreements --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 67 
2.3.3.3 Abuse of a Dominant Position ------------------------------------------------------------------- 70 
2.3.3.4 Penalties ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70 
2.4 THE EFFECT OF THE SHARIA ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION 
LAW ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 71 
2.4.1 The Exemption of State-Owned Monopolies ----------------------------------------------- 71 
2.4.2 Lack of Objectivity --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73 
2.5 CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74 
CHAPTER 3 76 
v 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN SAUDI ARABIA 
AND ITS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ------------------------------------- 76 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 76 
3.2 EMERGENCE OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 
SECTOR ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 76 
3.2.1 The Problem of Public Monopolies ------------------------------------------------------------ 79 
3.2.1.1 Advantages of the Monopoly System --------------------------------------------------------- 80 
3.2.1.1.1 Meeting Operational and Financial Objectives --------------------------------------------- 80 
3.2.1.1.2 Meeting the Expectations of Customers ----------------------------------------------------- 81 
3.2.1.1.3 Enabling Poor Customers to Access Quality Products ---------------------------------- 82 
3.2.1.2 Disadvantages of the Monopoly System ----------------------------------------------------- 83 
3.2.1.2.1 Price Discrimination ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 83 
3.2.1.2.2 Restricting the Output of Substitute Products ---------------------------------------------- 83 
3.2.1.2.3 The Negative Impact on Consumer Welfare ----------------------------------------------- 85 
3.22 The Implementation of the Privatisation Strategy ------------------------------------------ 86 
3.3 THE REGULATIONS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK ----------------------------------------------- 89 
3.3.1 The Regulators ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89 
3.3.1.1 The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology ------------------------- 89 
3.3.1.2  The CITC -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 90 
3.3.1.2.1 Overview --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 90 
3.3.1.2.2 Functions of the CITC ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 91 
3.3.2 The Legislation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 95 
3.3.2.1 The Telecommunications Act ------------------------------------------------------------------- 95 
3.3.2.1.1 The Primacy of Public Interests ---------------------------------------------------------------- 96 
3.3.2.1.2 The Effectiveness of the Regulation by the State ----------------------------------------- 97 
3.3.2.2 The Competition Law of 2004 ------------------------------------------------------------------- 99 
3.3.2.2.1 Obstacles to the Implementation of the Competition Law ----------------------------- 100 
3.4 CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 102 
CHAPTER 4 104 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF ABUSE BY DOMINANT PLAYERS IN THE SAUDI 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR ------------------------------------------ 104 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104 
4.2 PRE-COMPETITION LAW TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET --------------------------- 105 
4.2.1 The Impact of the Free Market Economy -------------------------------------------------- 106 
4.2.1.1   Government Intervention in the Free Market -------------------------------------------- 108 
4.2.1.2   Government Intervention in Saudi Arabia ------------------------------------------------ 110 
4.3.1 Primary Types of Abuse of Dominance ---------------------------------------------------- 112 
4.3.1.1   OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OF COMPETITORS --------------------------------- 113 
4.3.1.2 LACK OF SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS --------------------------------------------------------- 114 
4.3.2  The Two Main Categories of Abuse of Dominance ------------------------------------ 115 
4.3.2.1 exclusionary Abuse ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 115 
4.3.2.1.1 Predatory Pricing -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116 
4.3.2.1.2   Margin Squeeze -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 117 
4.3.2.1.3   Tying ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 117 
4.3.2.2 EXPLOITATIVE ABUSE -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 118 
4.3.2.2.1 Price Discrimination ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 118 
4.4.3.2.2.2 Pricing ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 119 
4.4.3.3   Other Types of Abuse ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 120 
4.3.3.1   Restricting the Entry of Other Firms ------------------------------------------------------- 120 
4.3.3.2   Illegal Trade Agreements --------------------------------------------------------------------- 121 
4.4.3.3.3   Market Sharing -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 122 
4.3.3.4    Predatory Pricing ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 122 
4.3.3.5 Cross-Subsidization ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 123 
4.3.3.6 Limited Consumer Options --------------------------------------------------------------------- 123 
vi 
4.3.3.7 Pricing Tactics ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 124 
4.3.3.8 Brand Positioning --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 124 
4.4  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LACK OF A COMPETITION LAW IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR -------------------------------------------------------------- 125 
4.4.1 Restriction of Foreign Competition and Hindered Investments ---------------------- 126 
4.4.2 Slow Economic Growth ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 126 
4.4.3 Innovation and Creation of Ideas ------------------------------------------------------------ 127 
4.4.4 Corruption ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 127 
4.5 CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 128 
CHAPTER 5 131 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR ------------------------------------------ 131 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 131 
5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 131 
5.2.1 The Journey to the World Trade Organization ------------------------------------------- 133 
5.2.2 Pre-accession Regulation in the KSA ------------------------------------------------------ 138 
5.2.2.1 The Gulf Cooperation Council Unified Policy ---------------------------------------------- 138 
5.2.2.2  The Telecommunications Act ----------------------------------------------------------------- 141 
5.2.3  The Need for a Competition Law in Saudi Arabia -------------------------------------- 143 
5.3  THE COMPETITION LAW --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 148 
5.3.1   Enforcement of the Law ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 148 
5.3.1.1  The Fairness Consideration ------------------------------------------------------------------ 150 
5.3.1.2 Delineating the Scope of the Law ----------------------------------------------------------- 153 
5.3.1.3  Anti-Competitive Agreements ---------------------------------------------------------------- 155 
5.3.2  Limitations of the Law ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 157 
5.3.2.1  Vertical Agreements ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 157 
5.3.2.2  Concerted Practices ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 158 
5.3.2.3 Abuse of Dominance --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 159 
5.3.2.4  Merger Control ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 160 
5.4 REGULATING THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET ----------------------------------- 161 
5.4.1 The Centrality of Economics ------------------------------------------------------------------ 162 
5.4.2  The Competition Law Alone is Not Sufficient -------------------------------------------- 165 
5.4.2.1 The Problem of Overlapping Jurisdiction --------------------------------------------------- 165 
5.4.2.2  Resolving Jurisdictional Conflicts ------------------------------------------------------------ 166 
5.4.3  Competition Policy Coherence --------------------------------------------------------------- 167 
5.4.3.1 Streamlined Enforcement --------------------------------------------------------------------- 168 
5.7 Potential Solutions --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 168 
5.5 CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 169 
CHAPTER 6 171 
UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMPETITION LAW AND 
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS ---------------------------------------------- 171 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 171 
6.2 COMPARATIVE SELECTION CRITERIA -------------------------------------------------------- 172 
6.2.1 A Comparative Analysis of the Relationship Between Competition Laws and the 
Telecommunications Regulations in Selected Jurisdictions -------------------------- 175 
6.3 LESSONS FROM THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL ----------------------------------- 178 
6.3.1 United Arab Emirates: Exclusion of the Telecommunications Sector -------------- 179 
6.3.1.1 Scope of the UAE Competition Law --------------------------------------------------------- 180 
vii 
6.3.1.2   UAE Telecommunications Regulations --------------------------------------------------- 181 
6.3.1.3  Interaction Between the Competition Law and Telecommunications Regulations
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 181 
6.3.1.4 Evaluating the Model ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 184 
6.3.2 Qatar: Inclusion of the Telecommunications Sector ------------------------------------ 185 
6.3.2.1 Scope of the Qatar Competition Law -------------------------------------------------------- 185 
6.3.1.3 Interaction Between the Competition Law and Telecommunications Regulations
 186 
6.3.1.4 Evaluating the Model ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 189 
6.4 UNITED STATES: A MODEL FOR PROCEDURAL HARMONISATION? ---------------- 191 
6.4.1 Background --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 192 
6.4.2 Development of Telecommunications Laws in the United States ------------------- 194 
6.4.3 Interaction Between the Antitrust Laws and Telecommunications Regulations - 195 
6.4.4 Suitability of the US Model to the KSA ----------------------------------------------------- 198 
6.5   SITUATING REFORM OF THE KSA LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE BROADER DEBATE201 
6.6 BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC 
REGULATION IN KSA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 204 
6.6.1 The Impact of Sharia on Competition Law ------------------------------------------------ 205 
6.6.2 Development of the Saudi Model ------------------------------------------------------------ 207 
6.6.3  Ascertaining the Purpose of Competition Law ------------------------------------------- 208 
6.7 CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 211 
CHAPTER 7 213 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ------------------------------------------------- 213 
7.1 INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 213 
7.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 215 
7.2.1  Principles of the Sharia that Guide Competition Policy -------------------------------- 215 
7.22 How the Saudi Competition Regime Addresses the Monopoly System ------------ 217 
7.2.3 The Importance of a Separate Competition Legislation ------------------------------- 219 
7.2.4 Improving the Applicability of the Competition Policy ---------------------------------- 221 
7.3   LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE COMPARATIVE MODELS --------------------- 223 
7.3.1  Understanding Why Exclusion is Not Ideal ----------------------------------------------- 224 
7.3.2   A Harmonized Model as the Way Forward ---------------------------------------------- 225 
7.4   ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW --------------------------------- 226 
7.4.1 Establishing the Goals of Sector-Specific Regulation ---------------------------------- 228 
7.4.2 Harmonizing the Two INTO an Efficient, Complementary Regime ----------------- 229 
7.4.3  Competition Policy Coherence --------------------------------------------------------------- 230 
7.4.3.1 Procedural versus Substantive Guidance -------------------------------------------------- 232 
7.4.3.2 Ex Ante and Ex Post Enforcement ----------------------------------------------------------- 233 
7.4.3.3 Information Necessary for Enforcement ---------------------------------------------------- 234 
7.4.3.4 Nature of Enforcement Remedies ------------------------------------------------------------ 235 
7.5   CHALLENGES FOR THE SAUDI COMPETITION REGIME IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR -------------------------------------------------------------- 236 
7.5.1 Jurisdictional Conflicts -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 236 
7.5.2  Substantive Issues ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 237 
7.6 PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 238 
7.6.1 Changes to the Telecommunications Act -------------------------------------------------- 239 
7.6.2 Changes to the Competition Law ------------------------------------------------------------ 239 
7.6.3  Deregulation and Re-Regulation ----------------------------------------------------------- 242 
7.6.4 Coordinated Legislative and Enforcement Efforts --------------------------------------- 242 
7.6.5 Increased Transparency ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 243 
viii 
7.6.6 Regulatory Impact Analysis ------------------------------------------------------------------- 244 
7.7 THE FUTURE OF THE KSA’S COMPETITION POLICY IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR -------------------------------------------------------------- 245 
7.8  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ------------------------------ 246 





First and foremost, I would like to thank Allah for giving me the time, health and ability to 
accomplish this work. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Dr Jurgita Malinauskaite for 
her continuous support, dedication and her indispensable ideas, supervision and advice 
throughout this PhD. I am also grateful to Professor Abdullah Aldalbahi and Dr Abdul 
Mathker for their willingness to share their valuable knowledge with me during the time I 
spent writing, as well as supporting me during the course of the research. Finally, I owe 
genuine gratitude to my family. I would like to thank all my dear friends and colleagues 
of the School of Law for their kind support. It has been so great to know all of you during 




CITC: Communications and Information Technology Commission  
EU: European Union  
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
ITC: Information Technology Commission  
KACST: King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology  
KSA: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
MENA: Middle East North Africa  
PBUH: Peace Be Upon Him  
STC: Saudi Telecom Company  
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment   
VMMEA: Virgin Mobile Middle East & Africa   
MVNO: Mobile Virtual Network Operator   
ISP: Internet Service Providers   
SAGIA: Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority   
CMA: Capital Market Authority   
ISU: Internet Service Unit   
FTTH: Fiber to the home   
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
WTO: Wrold Trade Organization   
CCP: Council of Competition Protection   




                       INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The telecommunications sector is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (KSA) due to continuous innovation.1 It is also one of the Kingdom’s 
most valuable sectors, providing extensive support to its economic development.2 
The sector’s growth has given rise to the need for competition legislation to control 
and regulate anti-competitive practices.3 The growth may be attributed to the creation 
of a wide range of commercial opportunities.4 The KSA was compelled to widen its 
different telecommunications services to keep pace with global trends and 
technological advancements made in developed countries.5 According to the 
statistical BMI Research Data Report, the KSA incorporates a modern and 
expanding telecommunications system with over 3.6 million main line users across 
the Kingdom, which puts its growth on a par with the technological developments of 
advanced nations.6 
                                               
1See Anis Ali and Mohammed Imdadul Haque, ‘Telecommunication Sector of Saudi Arabia: Internal 
and External Analysis’ (2017) 21(3) Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal 1, 1-2; Asma 
R Al Saleh and Mohammed D Othman, ‘How Far the Saudi Telecom Companies’ Commitment to 
Marketing Ethics is and Impact of this on the Achievement of Customers’ Satisfaction?’ (2015) 3(8) 
Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management 388, 405; Nasser A Kadasah, ‘An Evaluation of 
Service Quality of Mobily and STC Telecommunication Companies in Saudi Arabia’ (2014) 4(10) British 
Journal of Economics, Management and Trade 1599, 1600. 
2Ingy Shafei and Hazem Tabaa, ‘Factors Affecting Customer Loyalty for Mobile Telecommunication 
Industry’ (2016) 11(3) EuroMed Journal of Business 347, 348. 
3Both theoretical and empirical studies have established a link between growth and competition policy. 
Growth expands the market and creates room for more participants while competition enhances 
productive and dynamic efficiency. See John Stanley Metcalfe and Ronald Ramlogan, ‘Competition and 
the Regulation of Economic Development’ in Paul Cook, Raul Fabella and Cassey Lee (eds), 
Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar 2007) 26; 
Yiuchiro Uchida and Paul Cook, ‘Domestic Competition and Technological and Trade Competitiveness’ 
in Paul Cook, Raul Fabella and Cassey Lee (eds), Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in 
Developing Countries (Edward Elgar 2007) 311; William W Lewis, The Power of Productivity: Wealth, 
Poverty and the Threat to Global Stability (University of Chicago Press 2004) 288. 
4Anastassios Gentzoglanis and Anders Henten, Regulation and the Evolution of the Global 
Telecommunication Industry (Edward Elgar 2010) 25-67. 
5This may also be explained by globalisation which has amongst other things promoted the emulation 
of Western consumerism lifestyle in the KSA. See Soraya W Assad, ‘The Rise of Consumerism in Saudi 
Arabian Society’ (2008) 17(1/2) International Journal of Commerce and Management 73, 73-104. 
6BMI Research, ‘Saudi Arabia Telecommunication Report’ (BMI, 2006) 




The cutting-edge technology in domestic lines includes a wide range of advanced 
technical equipment such as coaxial cable, microwave radio relay and fibre-optic 
cable across the whole nation. The establishment of seven earth stations linked with 
the INTELSAT Satellite System has enabled Saudi citizens to avail themselves of 
direct dialing access to more than 200 nations.7 The telecommunications service in 
the KSA includes 151 telephone mainlines per 1,000 people located across different 
parts of the nation.8 Additionally, mobile, cellular phones along with the use of 
advanced packet data have seen incessant growth over the last decade. In this 
regard, it can be stated that the telecommunications sector of the KSA has achieved 
major growth throughout its different developmental stages in recent years.9 
However, such expansion also brings challenges. Until recently, the provision of 
telecommunications services in the KSA was dominated by a few government-owned 
entities. This has changed as the telecommunications industry has become 
increasingly driven by a move towards privatisation. The entry of private entities in 
the market posed a threat to the de facto dominance of the government-owned 
entities. The latter did not take well to such changes and sought to engage in 
practices that limited competition and allowed them to maintain their positions of 
dominance. Initially, there was the impression that rapid privatisation of the nation’s 
telecommunications industry, beginning around 1998, would result in the promotion 
of self-regulation by entities operating in the sector. However, in practice this turned 
out not to be the case. The anti-competitive behaviours of dominant government-
owned entities underscored the need for both general competition laws within the 
Kingdom and, more specifically, sector-specific telecommunications regulations that 
could address these issues directly. It is the development and harmonisation of 
competition legislation and sector-specific regulations that this work critically 
                                               
7INTELSAT controls about seventy-nine per cent of international traffic. See Barney Warf, ‘Eyes in the 
Sky: Satellites and Geography’ in Barney Warf (ed), Handbook on Geographies of Technology (Edward 
Elgar 2017) 154. The carrier used by Saudi Arabia is called Arabsat. As early as 1976, Saudi Arabia 
spearheaded the Arabsat initiative that involved 18 earth stations and three satellites to be used by 
seventeen countries of the Middle East and North Africa. See Barney Warf, ‘Geopolitics of the Satellite 
Industry’ (2007) 98(3) Tijdscrhrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 385, 391. 
8In 2005, there were 164 telephone mainlines, 376 personal computers and 575 mobile telephone 
subscribers per 1,000 people. See World Bank, The Little Data Book on Information and 
Communication Technology (World Bank 2007) 179. By 2017, there were 10.99 telephone mainlines 
per 100 people. See The World Bank, ‘Fixed-Line Telephone Subscriptions (Per 100 People)’ (2019) 
The World Bank < https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.MLT.MAIN.P2> accessed 28 February 2019. 




1.1.1 THE PRACTICAL REALITIES OF DOMINANCE VS PRIVATISATION 
The formation of the Saudi Telecom Company (STC) was a prime example of 
continuous development in the communication channels across the different parts of 
the KSA by utilising a wider network. According to one report, price reforms of 
telephony services along with subscription levels of the mobile service providers led 
to significantly better market performance when compared to marketers with fixed-
line services,10 which reflects a positive change in the market trends in the 
telecommunications sector. 
The wave of privatisation in the KSA’s telecommunications sector was primarily 
driven by the increasing demand for cutting-edge telecommunications products and 
services by the population.11 Indeed, the nation’s telecommunications industry was 
one of the key recipient sectors in terms of receiving higher amounts of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into the KSA. More importantly, global changes and the Persian 
Gulf War also contributed to this change as the outside influence of global forces on 
the KSA imprinted their positive effects on a number of sectors,12 including the 
telecommunications sector, and helped the KSA develop. It has also been contended 
that this growth was mainly due to the attack on the telecommunications installations 
in the KSA during this conflict.13 
From 1996 to 1998, the telecommunications sector was the major commercial sector 
of the KSA with 58 per cent of operations receiving FDI.14 Food and beverages and 
tourism stood at 55 per cent of FDI during the same period.15 This clearly indicates 
the telecommunications sector’s fast economic development and strong economic 
                                               
10Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Saudi Arabia (Library of Congress 2009) 1-9. 
11Faisal A Alroqy, ‘The Impact of Privatisation on Management Accounting Control Systems: A Case 
Study of Two Saudi Arabian Privatised Companies’ (PhD thesis, Newcastle University, 2011) 52-89. 
12See Zeechan Javed Hafeez, Islamic Commercial Law and Economic Development (Heliographica 
2005) 28-29. 
13See Joseph Mann, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Economic Needs and the Price of Oil’ (Rubin Center, 6 December 
2010) 
<http://www.rubincenter.org/2010/12/mann-2010-12-06/> accessed 10 October 2017. 
14 OECD, ‘Telecom Privatization and Learnings in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (OECD Global 
Conference on Telecommunication Policy for the Digital Economy 2002) 3-




position in the Saudi market. Prior to the period of privatisation, the STC was the only 
telecommunications firm and so enjoyed the full benefit in terms of extending its 
exceptional range of telecommunications products and services across the Kingdom 
and ensuring customer loyalty.16 
It should be noted that the STC was the only telecommunications provider in the 
country until the Saudi Arabian Communications Commission made it possible for 
other companies to compete in 2004 under the newly established Competition Law. 
This development effectively meant that before 2004 the STC had an absolute 
monopoly with regard to the provision of telecommunications services in the KSA for 
individual citizens, business enterprises and other organisations.17 
Given that the KSA is an absolute monarchy, most of the important government posts 
are held by key members of the royal family. This influences the different policies 
and mindsets of those in charge of the sector’s regulations and was certainly one of 
the reasons for the monopoly of the STC.18 Due to this monopoly, it was possible for 
the STC to set the prices for telecommunications services the way they saw fit and 
without having any concerns about competition. If an individual or business wanted 
a telephone service, they had no other option but to go with the STC.19 This state of 
affairs continued until Etisalat and Kuwait Telecommunications Company were 
granted licenses and a small share of the STC’s market was lost to these 
competitors. 
During its period of dominance, the STC sought to take advantage of consumers’ 
lack of options as evidenced by the level of customer service and price and quality 
of the products they provided. The lack of competition meant that it was possible for 
the company to pay less attention to customer service than it otherwise would have 
if there had been more competition. This is supported by the fact that at the time the 
                                               
16 Tariq Khizndar, Abdel Fattah M Al-Azam and Iyad A Khanfar, ‘An Empirical Study of Factors Affecting 
Customer Loyalty of Telecommunication Industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (2015) 3(5) British 
Journal of Marketing Studies 98, 99. 
17 See Chapter Three. 
18 Global Comms Database, ‘Saudi Telecom Company’ (Teleography, 30 September 2014) 
<https://www.telegeography.com/page_attachments/products/website/research-services/globalcomms-
database- service/0005/5890/gcd-saudi-telecom-company-stc.pdf> accessed 10 October 2017. 
19 AS Al Aklabi and B Al-Allak, ‘Saudi Telecommunication Company: A Strategy for Sustainable 
Competitive Advantage’ (2011) Journal of Advanced Social Research 1, 76. 
 
5 
KSA was found to lack an extensive landline network because it did not experience 
the telephony revolution common in more mature economies. 
However, since 2004, the general population in the KSA has not only been able to 
access both mobile services and the internet but the telecommunications sector has 
also been opened up to private industry with a view to moving away from the STC’s 
absolute domination.20 As a result of opening the sector to private industry 
development, there are now five key companies working in this industry: STC Mobile, 
Integrated Telecom Company, Mobily, ZIN Zain and GO ATHEEB. 
Such an increase in privatisation caught the attention of globally renowned 
telecommunications companies that sought to establish their subsidiaries in the 
emerging market of the KSA. In this regard, Virgin Mobile MEA (VMMEA) in 
association with the STC entered into the market as a Mobile Virtual Network 
Operator (MVNO) mid-2013. The company was awarded an operating license during 
the first quarter of 2014 and introduced its VMMEA services during early October 
2014. It became another private participant in the market. 
1.1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION 
The competition law that seek to stimulate market rivalry do not always make a useful 
contribution to the economic development of less developed countries, whilst global 
economies benefit when competition is healthy.21 However, where competition laws 
enhance economic performance in a given sector, the lives of consumers are 
affected in observable ways. This is because the level of customer service, 
innovation, and price and quality of the product or service improve throughout the 
whole country as a result of private entities gaining a place in the market.22 This 
understanding is supported by the observations that as new companies are 
introduced into the sector, they begin to provide a higher level of quality in services 
                                               
20 Badr Alharbi, ‘Customer Choice in Mobile Service Providers in Saudi Arabia’ (2012) 3(18) 
International Journal of Business and Social Science 283. 
21William E Kovacic, ‘Competition Policy, Consumer Protection and Economic Disadvantage’ (2007) 25 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 101, 104-114. See also Eleanor M Fox, ‘Economic 
Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path’ (2007) 13 Southwestern Journal of Law and 
Trade in the Americas 101, 101-125 (examining the fundamental perspective of competition law in 
developing countries). 
22See Nasser A Kadash, ‘An Evaluation of Service Quality of Mobily and STC Telecommunication 




across the market at significantly more affordable prices than when one company 
has an absolute monopoly across the whole industry. In other words, the organisation 
of a market or industry affects the quality and durability of its products; profit-
maximising monopolies prefer lower durability of products while perfectly competitive 
firms choose higher durability in order to ensure constant returns to scale.23  
As the sector continues to grow and develop, additional regulations have been 
enacted to enhance mobility and access and produce efficiencies. The KSA has seen 
a sharp decrease in the mobile and cellular services price rates because of new 
legislation and competition regulations introduced by the government in the 
telecommunications sector. The Communications and Information Technology 
Commission (CITC), established in May 2001 as an independent committee 
overseeing the KSA telecommunications services, has observed that there has been 
a phenomenal increase in mobile phone users and data consumption by individual 
users over the last decade.24 
Even with this, the price rates of these telecommunications services have continued 
to decrease while innovation and the quality of the services have improved due to 
the government’s encouragement of new companies to enter the market, creating 
better regulatory structures, and establishing the foundation of a very competitive 
market in the Saudi telecommunications sector.25 This was coupled with a shift in the 
mindset of the people tasked with making these policies. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the recent shift to open up the telecommunications industry 
to additional players in the wake of the STC’s establishment in the country through 
the implementation of the Ministry of Economy and Planning’s ‘Eighth Development 
Plan’, the STC still retains a significant share of the market and may still exercise 
monopoly power over much of the industry. In practice, it continues to place certain 
limitations upon consumer choice. One of the reasons for this is government 
                                               
23Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz, ‘Product Durability under Monopoly and Competition’ (1974) 
42(2) Econometrica 289, 289-301. However, see Maurice E Stucke, ‘Is Competition Always Good?’ 
(2013) 1(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 162, 163-197 (who argues that competition is not always 
beneficial to society and discusses four scenarios where competition yields suboptimal outcomes). 
24 See Chapter Four. 
25 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and 
Challenges (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007) 96. 
 
7 
ownership and control of the company.26 
By way of illustration of these limitations, since the internet first became available in 
the country in 2001, the STC has been recognised as the only complete provider of 
internet services. There are only a few companies operating in the country as internet 
service providers largely because the STC was also the country’s only provider of 
telephone lines. As a result, this meant that all customers had to pay two amounts, 
one to the STC to provide them with the ability to pick up an internet service and a 
second amount to their chosen ISP to then provide them with their internet service.27 
However, along with having to make two payments to be able to access the internet, 
the current state of the telecommunications industry has led to much criticism of the 
STC’s monopoly. In fact, some customers have had to wait many months to be given 
the opportunity to access the internet in the first place despite significant investment 
in the industry to reduce waiting times.28 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The telecommunications sector in the KSA has grown quite significantly in the recent 
past. As a result, the level of competition in the industry has also continued to rise 
over the years. Al Aklabi and Al-Allak employed a descriptive approach to discussing 
the developmental journey of the telecommunications industry in the KSA.29 The STC 
was the centre of interest for their study. The study revealed that strategic planning 
is an essential component for the success of any firm in the telecommunications 
industry. In addition, the study proved that diversification of service and the provision 
of products that meet customer demand are important aspects to consider in a 
competitive industry,30 as well as for healthy competition to exist. 
In comparison, Zhaojing conducted extensive research on the abuse of 
administrative powers to restrict the scope of the implementation of competition law 
in China.31 After providing background information on the Anti-Monopoly Law of 
                                               
26 See Chapter Three. 
27 Raj B Sharma, ‘Customers Satisfaction in Telecom Sector in Saudi Arabia: An Empirical Investigation’ 
(2014) 10(13) European Scientific Journal 354, 354. 
28 MM Hossain and N Suchy, ‘Influence of Customer Satisfaction on Loyalty: A Study on Mobile 
Telecommunication Industry’ (2013) Journal of Social Sciences 9, 73. 
29 Al Aklabi and Al-Allak (n 19) 76. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Luo Zhaojing, ‘Development of Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
 
8 
China, Zhaojing focused his research on the causes of abuse of administrative 
powers and compared these with those of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to suggest the amendments required in the Chinese 
competition law. He used the telecommunications sector as a case study to provide 
evidence of abuse of administrative power provisions through three areas of the 
telecommunications sectors of developing countries. He argued that the Anti-
Monopoly Law of China should be amended so that the abuse of administrative 
power provisions can serve the purpose of fair competition in the Chinese market. 
This serves as a useful benchmark in determining whether similar abuses of 
administrative power are occurring within the Saudi system. While this thesis will not 
explicitly address the EU framework in its comparative analysis, and instead focuses 
more specifically on the US and GCC approaches, certain aspects of the EU 
framework, particularly the issues relating to state monopolies, will be alluded to in 
the course of the discussion and analysis. 
Looking specifically at the telecommunications sector, it is a rapidly changing 
environment where innovation is of utmost importance for it to keep pace with 
demand and the market. Fiske conducted research on a rapidly changing 
telecommunications sector and concluded that the similarly paced development of 
legislation was necessary for the positive growth of the sector.32 He used the 
qualitative approach to point out the underlying problems in competition laws that are 
not resolved and due to which market dominance poses a threat to fair competition 
in the telecommunications market. He focused on EU competition law policies but 
suggested that these problems are also prevalent in other systems. Fiske 
conducted his research in the early years of the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector in the EU, that is before 1998. He strongly argued that 
competition law policies should be re-assessed to keep them in line with the changes 
in the telecommunications sector in order to achieve its purpose. This lends support 
to the need for continuous review, development and amendment of competition law 
                                               
in the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Impact of Article 106 of EU 
Competition Law and Free Movement Rules’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow 
2013)<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4045/1/2012luophd.pdf> accessed 10 October 2017. 
32 Jonathan Fiske, ‘E.C. Competition Law in the Era of Modern Telecommunication’ (PhD 




regimes to reflect changes in the sectors to which they apply. 
For his part, Alharbi conducted a comprehensive study on customer choice and 
found that Saudi Arabian mobile customers valued quality over all else.33 In essence, 
the study revealed that telecommunications firms that have established reliable 
product brands have a broader customer base than those that do not value product 
branding. Alharbi adopted the quantitative methodology in the study to assess the 
choice of mobile service providers among Saudi Arabian customers. The research 
showed that the name of the firm influenced customer choice, with preference being 
given to big companies. Essentially, the study showed that competition in the 
telecommunications industry is controlled by quality, brand and company name.34 
Alsuraihi and Bashraheel also conducted a quantitative analysis of the use of 
information and communications technology by households in the KSA.35 Their 
research established that households moved several miles on matters of ICT. They 
found that the use of ICT had improved over the past decade as people have become 
more informed about it. In this regard, they suggested that the Saudi Arabian 
government should pursue full implementation of ICT in the education system to 
facilitate its effective use. In essence, this study demonstrated that the ICT sector 
requires continued funding to facilitate future developments. 
Hossain and Suchy conducted a descriptive analysis of the influence of satisfaction 
on consumer loyalty in the telecommunications sector.36 They divided satisfaction 
into two areas—psychological and physical comfort. They described psychological 
satisfaction as the fulfilment that occurs once the emotional needs have been taken 
care of. Physical satisfaction, on the other hand, is expressed as the fulfilment 
attained due to the value of the product bought. This study revealed that customers 
develop loyalty to the company whose services and products satisfy their intended 
needs. Some of the factors that develop customers’ loyalty include attractive calling 
rates, price schedule variations and internet browsing fees. In essence, consumer 
loyalty and a company’s total sales go hand-in-hand. As consumer loyalty increases, 
                                               
33 Alharbi (n 20) 283. 
34 Ibid. 
35 MD Alsuraihi and HO Bashraheel, ‘Information and Communication Technologies, ICTS in the Saudi 
Household’ (2013) 3(3) Journal of Asian Scientific Research 286. 
36 Hossain and Suchy (28) 73. 
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the number of sales increases as well. 
Sharma conducted an investigative research into the factors that influence consumer 
satisfaction in the KSA’s telecommunications sector.37 He describes satisfaction as 
the outcome of mental peace and points out that the STC and Mobily are the two 
largest firms in the KSA’s telecommunications industry. This study revealed that 
there are several common factors that affect consumer satisfaction including network 
coverage, internet browsing rate, call charges and messaging services. The study 
noted that the government has established some control measures to protect the 
customers’ interests and eliminate unhealthy competition among the top firms in the 
industry 
Other studies have shown that modern technology has brought diverse 
transformation in the field of knowledge management. Al Rowaily and Al Sadhan for 
example present a case study of the integration of knowledge management in 
telecommunications in the KSA.38 They used both quantitative and qualitative 
research tools. Some of the research instruments for the study were interviews and 
observations. The study revealed that the upsurge in business growth has obliged 
telecommunications companies in the KSA to institute knowledge management 
systems for systematic monitoring of knowledge built by the companies. In addition, 
the researchers noted that knowledge management is the core parameter for 
industry growth in modern times. In essence, effective knowledge management 
facilitates the smooth relations between the business and its clients and also with the 
corporate world.39  
Looking at the primary telecommunications provider within the KSA, El Emary, et al 
critically examined knowledge management implementation at the STC.40 They 
established that knowledge management implementation is one of the most 
important aspects that can give a company a competitive advantage over its rivals. 
                                               
37 Sharma (n 27) 354. 
38 K Al Rowaily and A Al Sadhan, ‘Integration of Knowledge Management System in 
Telecommunication: A Case Study of Saudi Telecom’ (2012) 12(11) International Journal of Computer 
Science and Network Security 42. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibrahiem MM El Emary, Hassan A Alsereihy and Adel A Alyoubi, ‘Towards Improving the Performance 




The study deduced that the STC has established an effective structure for proper 
knowledge management. However, it was noted that the STC had to make changes 
in some of its management techniques. The company was advised to embrace 
modern technology to aid in knowledge management implementation.41 Thus, it is 
imperative to recognise that knowledge is the most valuable tool that a company can 
use to succeed in a competitive environment. 
With regard to the quality and durability of products in a competitive market, Kadash 
conducted a qualitative analysis of the services provided by Mobily and the STC in 
telecommunications industries of the KSA.42 The data from the study were collected 
through interviewing customers and administering questionnaires. The study 
revealed that the STC is more popular than Mobily among customers the 
respondents based their answers on the nature of services provided by the two 
companies as well as convenience. A further examination of the responses revealed 
that the STC was also more popular because it had been providing services for a 
long time. In addition, the company has always been up-to-date on market trends 
and technological changes. 
Expanding beyond the sector’s workings and into its impact on the overall economic 
health of the nation, Gawad and Muramalla evaluated the evolution of 
telecommunications in the KSA and its impact on economic development.43 They 
revealed that the telecommunications sector has undergone massive transformation 
over the past two decades. The use of mobile phones in the KSA has increased 
significantly in the recent past. In this regard, the market has diversified as well as 
become more competitive. The study also revealed that the revolution in the 
telecommunications sector has contributed positively to the economic development 
of the KSA. By 2012, the number of mobile phone subscriptions was in excess of 53 
million and continued to rise.44 This indicates that the telecommunications industry 
can have a significant influence on the economic growth of the KSA.  
                                               
41 Ibid, 240-241. 
42 Kadash (n 22) 1599. 
43 GM Gawad and VS Muramalla, ‘Telecommunication Revolution and Its Effects on Economic 
Development: An Applied Study of Developing Economies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and India’ 
(2013) 7(2) British Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences 203. 
44 Ibid, 204. 
 
12 
An increase in competition also brings with it the possibility of disputes. In this light, 
Bruce et al analysed primary data and earlier studies to investigate the issue of 
dispute resolution in the telecommunications sector.45 They established that the 
telecommunications sector is at peak transformation, as are dispute resolution 
strategies. They observed that traditional practices have been bypassed by the new 
developments in the sector. The major observation throughout the study was that the 
court has taken a central position in dispute resolutions in the telecommunications 
sector. With the rapid developments in the KSA’s telecommunications sector, 
disputes are likely to emerge frequently. In this regard, the judicial system has turned 
out to be an important dispute resolution centre. 
Finally, in assessing the Saudi Competition Law, Alotaibi focused on the applicability 
of the Law and the regulations surrounding it.46 His research put a question mark on 
the fairness of competition law in the KSA. He applied the black letter approach and 
socio-legal model to tackle the research questions. His research was primarily based 
on primary research methods as he used interviews and case studies to answer the 
questions. The study revealed that the Saudi Competition Law contains twenty-one 
articles that regulate competition in all sectors of the economy. The study is important 
because it facilitates the understanding of how the Saudi Competition Law tackles 
monopoly and other anti-competitive behaviour in the marketplace. Alotaibi identified 
flaws in four main areas, namely anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant 
powers, mergers and enforcement. He then suggested policy reforms for the 
modernisation of the Law.  
Esan used a diverse model to study competition law in Middle Eastern countries, as 
well as the EU and the US.47 He collected the data for the study from secondary 
resources. The study established that some countries neighbouring the KSA have 
adopted competition regulation policies similar to those employed by the government 
of the KSA. This indicates that competition law in the KSA has undergone massive 
                                               
45 Robert Bruce and others, ‘Dispute Resolution in the Telecommunication Sector: Current Practices 
and Future Directions’ (ITU, 2013) <https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/ITU_WB_Dispute_Res-
E.pdf> accessed 10 October 2017. 
46 Alotaibi MN, Does the Saudi Competition Law Guarantee Protection to Fair Competition? A Critical 
Assessment (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Central Lancashire 2010) 51 
47 Adenike Esan, ‘Competition Law the Legality of OPEC under US Antitrust Law and EC Competition 
Law’ (2012) <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/?news=28006> accessed 10 October 2017. 
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improvements over the years to the point of influencing other states. Esan argues 
that governments of these countries, including the KSA, should pursue full 
implementation of competition law in the telecommunications sector to promote 
future growth. In addition, the governments should be neutral parties in matters of 
competition in order to enhance equality in court proceedings. 
Finally, Cave, Corkery and Tice conducted research on competition in the mobile 
sector in developed and developing countries.48 They made substantial use of data 
from secondary sources such as business journals and world business reports. The 
research revealed that the use of mobile phones has been on the rise in both 
developed and developing countries in the past decade. As a result, the number of 
telecommunications service providers has increased significantly. Moreover, the 
number of investors entering the telecommunications sector every year has been 
increasing. As a result, the need for competition regulation has risen and the 
governments of various nations have employed different measures that suit their 
countries. Their conclusion was that governments should make great efforts to 
provide a level ground for all players in the industry. 
The present study is different from those discussed above because it examines the 
KSA’s telecommunications market before and after the implementation of the 
Competition Law and discusses the influence of the competition law regimes and 
policies of comparative and developed states. Further, it situates the Saudi approach 
within the global competition law environment by engaging in a comparative analysis 
of the Saudi and US competition regimes and primary telecommunications 
competition law models used by these nations. Through such an analysis, one can 
draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of the Saudi Competition Law, identify flaws 
and make suggestions for further improvement. 
Some unique aspects of this work that further differentiate it from the previous studies 
                                               
48 Martin Cave, Matthew Corkery and Julian Tice, ‘Competition and the Mobile Sector in Developed and 








are that this study covers not only the enactment of the Competition Law but also the 
amendments made to the Competition Law in 2014. It seeks to draw clear 
conclusions on the relative success of its implementation in the KSA before pointing 
out areas of concern that need attention and propose suggestions for the effective 
resolution of these problems. This study also considers how these suggestions could 
be successfully implemented in the telecommunications sector. Further, this study 
differs from Alotaibi’s study in that the latter focuses on the fairness of competition 
law whereas this study focuses on the functional and regulatory role of competition 
in the KSA’s telecommunications sector. This research is also different from the 
research done by Esan because he focused only on the mobile sector whereas this 
research covers the telecommunications sector as a whole in the KSA. Finally, this 
study is original because it evaluates the telecommunications sector of the KSA 
under both monopolistic and liberalised market structures –corresponding to the 
state of the telecommunications sector before and after the implementation of the 
Telecommunications Act and Competition Law in the KSA. 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
As mentioned above, the telecommunications sector of any growing economy is 
considered to be one of the most valuable and diversified resources; the KSA is no 
exception. In light of the issues identified above, it is important to not only understand 
the history of the telecommunications sector development in the KSA and the 
introduction of its governing legislation but also its attempts at introducing an 
overarching competition law regime that applies to all sectors of the Saudi market, 
including the telecommunications sector. For the KSA to continue to strengthen its 
economic and social modernisation, it must also streamline and harmonise its 
approach to managing competition in this sector. Healthy competition will allow the 
sector to achieve optimum growth while permitting the Saudi economy to make 
progress toward its ultimate goals. 
Therefore, this study undertakes to perform an in-depth analysis of the changes 
introduced by the competition law in the telecommunications sector. First of all, this 
research will analyse the development of competition law in the Saudi 
telecommunications sector from a historical perspective. It then will discuss different 
models and approaches in countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar 
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and the United States. Finally, this research will explore the impact of the competition 
law on the telecommunications sector of the KSA and propose recommendations for 
further development. 
The Competition Law in the KSA has undergone massive improvements over the 
years since its introduction in 2004. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the only 
study that is close to this research is one conducted by Alotaibi, who also examined 
the Competition Law in the telecommunications sector in the KSA but focused on 
critically assessing its fairness.49 This has forced the researcher to rely more heavily 
on doctrinal analyses and empirical observations to help this thesis fill a needed gap 
in addressing competition issues within the Kingdom’s telecommunications sector. 
This is the first comprehensive study that examines the KSA’s telecommunications 
market before and after the implementation of the Competition Law. It also covers 
the amendments made to the Competition Law in 2014 and determines both the 
successes and failures of its implementation. Actionable suggestions for addressing 
these problems to ensure the successful implementation of the Competition Law in 
the telecommunications sector are made. Further, this study is unique because it 
evaluates the telecommunications sector of the KSA under polar market structures— 
monopoly and liberalised or competitive markets—which was the experience of the 
telecommunications sector before and after the implementation of the Competition 
Law. This study also attempts to examine the two primary competition law models, 
those that include the telecommunications sector within the competition law’s 
purview and those that specifically exclude it, to identify the most appropriate model 
for use within the Saudi system.50 
The results of this research will contribute to the knowledge and understanding of 
the subject of competition law and its application in the KSA telecommunications 
sector, as well as the relationship between competition law and sector-specific 
regulation in general. It therefore supports and enriches the theory and model of 
                                               
49 Musased N Alotaibi, Does the Saudi Competition Law Guarantee Protection to Fair Competition? A 
Critical Assessment (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Central Lancashire 2010). 
50 Sahin Ardiyok and Dilara Yesilyaprak, ‘Saudi Arabia: Spotlight on Saudi Arabia’s Competition Rules’ 
(Mondaq, 19 June 2015) 
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competition law in the telecommunications sector in the KSA by creating better 
awareness about the significance of competition law and the practical 
implementation of regulations in the telecommunications sector. This study also 
provides useful knowledge on factors that impact on the successful adoption of the 
Competition Law in the telecommunications sector in the KSA. 
The intended outcome of this thesis is to promote a consideration and evaluation of 
the role of competition law in telecommunication sectors. This thesis focuses on the 
KSA’s telecommunications market, but its findings can be applied to other countries 
as well. This thesis aims to bring to the fore the problems that require attention and 
will suggest solutions to overcome them. It does not aim to cover global competition 
law because it would cause it to lose its focus. Neither does this research intend to 
explain the long-term effects of mobile virtual networks in the KSA 
telecommunications sector or the future of a saturated telecommunications industry 
with decreasing revenues or with companies entering the telecommunications 
industry with motives other than profits. It will also not discuss topics like 
telecommunications providers mergers to increase market share and gain a 
dominant position in the market. Including all these topics would detract from the 
original course of this research; each of these topics is a thesis topic in itself. 
Therefore, this thesis is focused on the role of competition law in the KSA 
telecommunications market and covers the period before the introduction of the 
Competition Law in 2004 and the changes and developments in the market after 
2004. 
1.4 RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS 
This study attempts to investigate the changes that appear in the 
telecommunications sector due to the introduction and development of the 
competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act and the Competition Law in 
the KSA. To comprehensively explore this area, it is imperative to examine the 
history and development of the sector prior to the introduction of these laws. This is 
then compared with the state of the sector after the introduction and implementation 
of these laws. 
The goal of this study is to provide a foundational piece of research that provides 
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customers, businesses, organisations and the government with the necessary 
information to understand the development of competition in the telecommunications 
sector and the impact of the current Saudi competition regime. Further, the author 
hopes that this research will serve as a basis for evaluating the need for and impact 
of future competition policies to further the Kingdom’s goal of fair competition in the 
telecommunications market. The insights provided in this study also serve to suggest 
areas in which the laws can be further developed to deter and restrict anti-
competitive practices within the telecommunications sector. 
To achieve these goals, this study undertakes an in-depth exploration of the interplay 
between competition laws and the telecommunications sector within the KSA. This 
research charts the development of competition law principles in Saudi society both 
informally through cultural practices and Sharia principles, and formally through 
incorporation into legislative regulations. By identifying the role that competition 
principles have played in the telecommunications sector, the impact that the 
formalisation of these provisions has had on the market is measured. Consideration 
is also given to the factors that have inspired the Kingdom to enact such laws. 
This research also looks at the recent amendments to the Competition Law, in order 
to chart the evolution of the law and assess its effectiveness in its current state. The 
goal of this analysis is to understand how the initial Competition Law was 
implemented in the KSA’s telecommunications sector, how it has evolved, how the 
current law operates from a regulatory perspective in practice, and how successful 
the law has been in achieving its stated goals. Therefore, this study is based on a 
number of research questions which are outlined below.  
The primary objective of this study is to determine to what extent the Competition 
Law has affected the telecommunications sector in the KSA. This can be further 
broken down into a number of key questions: 
1. What are the underlying principles of Sharia that serve as guide to competition 
policy in the KSA? 
2. How does the Saudi competition regime address the monopoly system? 
3. Why is separate competition legislation important given that it overlaps with 
sector-specific legislation and the Sharia? 
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4. How can the applicability of the competition law and policy to the 
telecommunications sector in the KSA be improved? 
The first research question is important because the Saudi legal system is based on 
the Sharia. Thus, prior to the enactment of the main competition statute and 
implementation regulation, Sharia maintained market competition and regulated anti-
competitive conduct by businesses. Moreover, all laws and regulations enacted in 
the KSA must be aligned with the Sharia. Understanding Sharia law is therefore an 
essential aspect to understanding the implementation of any law or regulation in the 
KSA. 
The second research question is important because the main impediment to 
competition in the KSA’s telecommunications sector is the monopoly system 
established by the government under the previous regime. It must be determined 
whether the Telecommunications Act and Competition Law create a balance 
between the advantages and disadvantages of monopoly or they simply perpetuate 
the monopoly system by allowing the government to indirectly retain a dominant 
control in the market. 
The third research question is important because prior to the enactment of the 
Competition Law there were laws and policies providing different levels of protection 
to investors and the public, especially consumers. Also, the government’s 
privatisation policy enhances the participation of the private sector in the domestic 
economy. Hence, it may be argued that what was needed was more clarity regarding 
the regulatory framework rather than a separate competition legislation. 
The fourth research question is important because proposals for the reform of 
competition policy require an examination of the relationship between competition 
law and sector-specific regulation. This also helps to identify ways in which the Saudi 
legislative structure can be improved through a balance of the considerations specific 
to the KSA while also learning from the experience of more sophisticated competition 
law systems that have withstood the challenges of time and technological 
advancement. 
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
There are a number of limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, one 
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should note the relative resistance of the Saudi Arabian legislature to codifying its 
laws.51 In fact, it was not until King Abdullah initiated judicial reorganization in 2007 
that the KSA began to focus on expanding the scope of its legislative provisions.52 
Both the Telecommunications Act and the Competition Law addressed by this study 
were promulgated prior to this shift in legislative drafting. As a result, these laws do 
not reflect the attempts at more comprehensive legislation embodied in more recent 
laws. In practice, this means that the provisions are minimalist in nature and often 
uncover as many questions as they provide clarifications. One of the crucial 
arguments in this study is that these laws should be revisited for clarity and 
consistency in order to align them with more recent Saudi legislative drafting trends.53 
Second, as a result of the lack of clarity within the Saudi legislative enactments and 
the civil law nature of the KSA, there is little in the way of interpretative precedent to 
inform the understanding of the relevant laws. Saudi courts do not utilize a 
precedential approach which means that judicial rulings and regulatory authority 
interpretations often differ.54 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research employs a number of key methods to collect and analyse data. First, 
it employs doctrinal research employing in-depth analyses of both primary and 
secondary sources.55 in order to generate original conclusions and reconcile them 
with the research already in existence.56 Use of research tools such as relevant 
journals, analysis of telecommunications laws and online sources facilitated the 
process of conducting this research. The primary data included the laws and 
regulations governing the telecommunications sector in the KSA. The secondary 
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data included analyses and findings of previous peer-reviewed studies. 
Second, the doctrinal method was used due to this study’s grounding in a particular 
set of legislative provisions. Doctrinal research can be pure or applied research and 
is the most suitable method for this study because it is concerned with the 
development of legal principles to answer questions related to the legalities of a 
particular issue.57 Also, the method enables the researcher to determine how 
knowledge is developed and applied by legislators and judges. Hence, this is 
theoretical work undertaken with the primary goal of obtaining new knowledge with 
specific practical application.58 This study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of legal 
reasoning related to the development of competition law in the telecommunications 
sector of the KSA59 According to Pearce, Campbell and Harding, this type of research 
‘provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, 
analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, 
predicts future developments’.60 Therefore, the researcher took the legal propositions 
from the Competition Law related to the telecommunications sector as a starting 
point and as the focus of the research. 
Finally, given that the researcher could not find a wealth of peer-reviewed research 
on the application of competition law in the telecommunications sector of the KSA, 
this research also employs comparative elements where it compares different 
models for competition regulation of the telecommunications sector. The broader 
worldview inspired by the comparative research enabled the researcher to confront 
‘the non-inevitability of the law of [his] own country’.61 Specific countries were chosen 
as examples based on a set of selection criteria that aim to represent distinct 
competition law models. The countries include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
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Qatar and the US. 
The UAE and Qatar have been selected for comparison due to the religious, 
geographical, cultural and historical linkages that exist between these Arab nations 
and the KSA.62 Crucially, these countries also share a common legal heritage. The 
UAE and Qatar, similar to the KSA, have Sharia-based systems and are members 
of the regional intergovernmental political and economic union called the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).63 It is worth noting, however, that the role and application 
of Sharia under the legal systems of the Arab world will vary, depending on the social 
structures and religious traditions of each country.64 More critically, from the 
standpoint of the lawyer, the application of Sharia is often dependent on the 
relationship between civil and common law provisions within the relevant legal 
system.65 
Depending on the provisions of their Constitutions, Islamic countries will typically 
identify sources of Sharia (primarily the Quran and Sunnah) as either: a primary 
source of law (to be weighed and balanced against other secular sources of 
legislation) or as the singular and therefore most authoritative source of all law.66 
Consequently, Sharia is incorporated into a national legal order in one of two ways. 
Firstly, Sharia may have direct application and effect through its judicial enforcement 
as the common law of a country. Direct application of Sharia is typically associated 
with countries lacking a comprehensive Civil Law Code or developed system of 
statutory law.67 In the second instance, Sharia has indirect application and is 
supplementary to the statutory law, either through its full or partial codification as a 
set of principles that judges rely upon to ‘fill in gaps’ in legislation.68  
The KSA lacks a comprehensive civil law code. 69The Basic Law of KSA, a set of 
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laws that is functionally equivalent to a constitutional document, identifies the Quran 
and Hadith (the reported teaching and practices of the Prophet Mohammed) as the 
primary source of all laws.70 Accordingly, the Sharia operates as the common law of 
the land and is directly applied to matters of public as well as private law. It should 
be noted, however, that the direct applicability of Sharia is limited to areas that are 
not explicitly regulated by the enacted law known as regulations.71 All proposed 
regulation must, however, conform to general principles of Sharia. Correspondingly, 
no foreign judgment or contractual undertaking deemed contrary to Sharia may be 
enforced in the KSA.72A further distinguishing `characteristic of KSA legislation is its 
customary (and historically strict) adherence to Hanbali fiqh (Islamic schools of 
jurisprudence).73 While KSA authorities are not prohibited from applying the 
teachings of the other main schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Shafi and Maliki) under 
the existing law,74 Hanbali fiqh is regarded as the official fiqh of the KSA.75 Courts and 
other authorities are therefore encouraged to give preference to rulings and opinions 
associated with Hanbali scholars before considering or giving effect to judgments 
associated with other fiqh schools. 76 
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Sharia plays a less prominent role in Arab countries with a mixed legal character, 
sometimes referred to as a dualistic legal system.77 This typically occurs in a legal 
system that has adopted a civil law code whilst retaining a Sharia based system of 
common law.78 The UAE represents one such example of a mixed legal system. On 
the one hand, the UAE has adopted parts of a civil code borrowed from the French-
Anglo system.79 At the same time, Sharia is recognised as a primary source of law. 
In this regard, Article 1 of the UAE Civil Law Code stipulates that on any given matter 
on which the Civil Law Code is silent, the court must issue a ruling that conforms to 
requirements of the Sharia, giving preference to the Maliki and Hanbali schools.80 
Qatar is closely aligned to the KSA with regard to the legal operation and application 
of Sharia. The Hanbali school of Sunni jurisprudence is the official fiqh of the Qatari 
legal system, a legal tradition it shares with the KSA.81In this regard, Article 1 of 
Qatar’s Provisional Constitution of 19 April 1972 stipulates that Islamic Sharia is the 
main source of legislation’.82 Unlike the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, however, which 
makes several references to the Islamic foundations of the KSA legal system, Article 
1 of Qatar’s Provisional Constitution is the only provision that directly references 
Sharia.83 Notably, Article 65 of Qatar’s Constitution states that '[J]udges shall be 
independent in the exercise of their power and that there shall be no interference in 
the administration of justice by any one’.84 It should be emphasised, however, that all 
Qatari nationals and Muslims from other countries remain subject to the jurisdiction 
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of Sharia courts.85  
As outlined above, there are differences of a more or less subtle nature between 
KSA and the other Arab jurisdictions selected for comparison in this thesis, namely 
Qatar and UAE. Provisions of the UAE’s Civil Law Code have been partially codified, 
suggesting that courts have less latitude to apply principles of Sharia. Where no 
existing legal provision exists, scholars may also give more customary weight to the 
Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence. 86 By contrast, the KSA may be said to fall at 
the extreme end of the civil-to-common law continuum. 87As the KSA has not adopted 
a comprehensive civil law code, local courts play a more significant role in judicial 
interpretation (and creation) of the law in the absence of detailed regulations.88 
Moreover, all enacted laws and provision must be reviewed to determine their 
compliance with Hanbali fiqh first, before other fiqh schools can be considered. Qatar 
is more closely aligned to KSA and follows a Sharia-based common law system 
based on Hanbali fiqh, in contrast with other Arab countries under which Sharia is 
afforded less importance in the hierarchy of legal sources.89 
The above notwithstanding, all countries share a common legal tradition in the 
broadest sense: Qatar and the UAE continue to apply the Hanbali school of Sharia 
as a primary source of law and are therefore broadly comparable with the KSA in 
most fundamental respects. In all countries, for instance, no law may expressly 
contradict mandatory aspects of Sharia.90 Moreover, all three countries have 
established Sharia courts with jurisdiction over matters expressly regulated under 
the Quran and Sunnah.91  
As suggested above, the comparative aspects of this thesis are focused primarily on 
key differences in regulatory approach implemented by the KSA as compared with 
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other Gulf economies (Qatar and the UAE) in response to common economic 
challenges.92 As major oil producing economies, the selected countries have 
introduced significant structural economic reforms. In its 2030 Vision, the Saudi 
government announced plans to diversify its economy away from oil dependency.93  
Qatar and the UAE have introduced similar legislative steps to promote trade and 
increase market access in and outside of state borders.94 In common with the KSA, 
these countries have witnessed a shift away from state ownership of public utilities 
to the partial privatisation of emerging sectors such as construction, energy and 
telecommunications.95 National regulators have acknowledged the need to combat 
barriers to market access and entry and to mitigate against anti-competitive practices 
such as monopolies and state dominance.96 Suffice to say these regulatory objectives 
will only be effectively achieved with clearly defined and robustly enforced 
competition rules. 97 
In the above regard, Qatar and the UAE offer a useful point of comparison with 
legislative developments taking place in the KSA. This thesis will consider the value 
gained from the enforcement of specific pro-competitive rules under the powers 
conferred by domestic laws to general competition authorities. Applying the doctrinal 
method outlined above, the thesis will assess the relevant merits of a harmonised 
approach to competition law, focusing on contemporary efforts to further consolidate 
the powers of Saudi competition authorities to monitor market conduct with the aim 
of promoting consumer welfare and eliminating anti-competitive behaviours across 
different economic sectors. It will then go on to contrast and compare the regulatory 
approach of the KSA with the implementation of competition regimes in relation to 
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the telecommunications sector in Qatar and the UAE.98 In particular, this thesis draws 
scholarly attention to the fact that the UAE specifically excludes telecommunications 
from the scope of its competition legislation whereas Qatar employs both a 
competition law and sector-specific regulations.  
The analysis of the Gulf country competition regimes will demonstrate that the KSA 
has yet to effectively achieve and enforce the aims of its competition laws and policy. 
One reason for this is that the KSA’s competition regime is still relatively embryonic 
and underdeveloped, particularly in respect of the formally stated controlled 
telecommunications sectors. In this light, the US was chosen as a third template, 
representing the longest-standing competition law regime in one of the world’s most 
developed nations. 99 It reflects an established harmonised approach that mirrors the 
Qatari and Saudi approaches while allowing for a degree of flexibility in regulations 
that can adjust to industry developments without undermining the core policy aims 
of free and fair competition. While this thesis briefly reflects on the EU experience of 
competition regulation, in addition to examining the impact of the WTO rules on the 
KSA’s competition policy, it proposes that the US approach provides a more 
appropriate model of comparison and model of reform. It is suggested that the aims 
underpinning US competition legislation are more closely aligned with the goals and 
structure of the KSA regime and provides possible lessons on how sector-specific 
telecommunications regulation can be more effectively embedded in an antitrust 
framework towards improved market efficiency and consumer protection. 
These models are, in the final analysis, independently evaluated to draw conclusions 
about their format, structure and effectiveness. They are then compared with each 
other and with the approach taken by the KSA to highlight the similarities and 
differences between them. This comparative analysis then forms the basis for a 
suggestion of the most appropriate model for the KSA and what lessons can be 
learned from the other models.  
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1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The main focus of this research is on competition law in the telecommunications 
sector of the KSA. It has been undertaken with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations for the improvement of the Competition Law within the 
telecommunications sector. In order to achieve this goal, there are a number of 
concepts which have been addressed, including competition and fairness under the 
Sharia, dominance and abuse of dominance, and monopoly. Also, selected 
comparable jurisdictions in the GCC are examined as well as the US in order to use 
the knowledge of the laws of these other jurisdictions to better interpret and 
understand the laws of the KSA and make suitable recommendations.100 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter Two explores the role of Sharia, which is the fundamental law according to 
which the KSA is governed. Hence, understanding Sharia is essential to analysing 
the implementation of competition law in the KSA. Chapter Two determines the 
extent to which anti-competitive practices are prohibited under Sharia. It identifies 
the underlying Islamic principles for business practices and shows how they guide 
competition policy. It therefore answers the first research question. It argues that the 
effective implementation of competition law in the KSA is a function of how it is 
aligned to Sharia. 
Chapter Three examines the background of the regulation of the telecommunications 
sector in the KSA. It looks at the development of the CITC and the relevant legislative 
provisions governing the sector within the KSA, specifically the Telecommunications 
Act and the Competition Law. This chapter therefore discusses the history and 
development of the Saudi telecommunications market prior to the implementation of 
the Competition Law. It identifies the monopoly system as the main anti-competitive 
behaviour in the market before the enactment of the Competition Law. It then 
determines whether the Competition Law and the Telecommunications Act create a 
balance between the advantages and disadvantages of monopoly. It therefore 
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addresses the second research question. In this light, it argues that these statutes 
have perpetuated the monopoly system. 
Chapter Four examines the telecommunications sector prior to the promulgation of 
the Competition Law. Specifically, it looks at the anti-competitive practices 
perpetrated by the largely state-owned STC, which consistently took advantage of 
its dominant market position in the KSA telecommunications sector. It shows how 
this company acted in clear contravention of the competition provisions of Sharia and 
the Telecommunications Act. It seeks to determine whether the coming into force of 
the competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act resulted in any significant 
changes. It places emphasis on the effects-based approach adopted by the Saudi 
legislator. It answers the third research question and argues that although a free 
market economy is beneficial to the telecommunications sector, government 
intervention remains essential. 
Chapter Five examines how the KSA addresses competition concerns through the 
Competition Law and its subsequent amendments. It looks at how the need for a 
stand-alone competition law arose, including how the KSA sought to bring its 
legislation in line with global standards, how the Competition Law was implemented, 
and how it has evolved over time to meet the Kingdom’s needs. It also answers the 
third research question. It argues that the main objective of enacting the Competition 
Law was to offer a transparent environment for foreign investment in accordance with 
the WTO rules. In this way, the Law advances goals beyond the competitive process 
as understood by local undertakings. It also shows that the Law is susceptible to a 
multitude of considerations that impact on the transparency and certainty of the 
process of implementation. It then notes that it is unclear what role the Law plays in 
the KSA’s competition policy given that it overlaps with Sharia and sector-specific 
legislation such as the Telecommunications Act. 
Chapter Six conducts a comparative analysis of three jurisdictional models. The 
objective is to better understand how the KSA can improve the applicability of 
competition policy to the telecommunications sector. Thus, it answers the fourth 
research question by identifying ways in which the Saudi legislative structure can be 
improved through a balance of the considerations specific to the KSA while also 
learning from the experience of more sophisticated competition law systems that 
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have withstood the challenges of time and technological advancement. The 
comparison also helps to explore the relationship between competition law and 
sector-specific regulation, as well as ascertain the position of the current Saudi 
competition law regime in relation to the global trends in competition culture. 
Finally, Chapter Seven concludes by showing how the research aim was achieved 
and the research questions answered. It makes suggestions for further 
improvements to the system and identifies the potential way forward for the sector. 





THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION UNDER 
SHARIA GOVERNED SAUDI LAW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to determine the extent to which anti-competitive business 
practices are prohibited under Sharia. Understanding Sharia is an essential aspect to 
understanding the Saudi Arabian implementation of competition law given that the 
Saudi legal system is based on Sharia. Hence, many underlying principles of Sharia 
serve as a guide to competition policy. In fact, prior to the enactment of the main 
competition statute and implementation regulation, Sharia maintained market 
competition and regulated anti-competitive conduct by businesses. This chapter 
analyses six cardinal Sharia principles for business practices and shows the extent to 
which they guarantee fair competition. It also critically examines the competition 
regime in the KSA and determines the extent to which the requirement to align positive 
law with Sharia may explain the poor implementation of the main competition 
legislation. It begins with a brief discussion of the Saudi legal system in order to 
understand how this system works especially in the context of Sharia.  
2.2 STRUCTURE OF THE SAUDI LEGAL SYSTEM 
On 1 March 1992, King Fahad enacted Royal Orders that established three 
fundamental laws of the KSA. These were the Basic System of Governance or Basic 
Law, the Constitutional Council Law, and the Regional Law. Article 1 of the Basic Law 
provides that the constitution of the KSA consists of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  
Article 7 states that the government draws its authority from the Qur’an and Sunnah, 
and Article 23 provides that the state’s primary role is to enforce the Sharia. The 
combination of the Qur’an and Sunnah is often compared to that of reason and 
revelation.101 The Saudi legal system is therefore based on the Sharia which serves as 
the guideline for all legal matters. It is important to note that although Sharia is derived 
essentially from the Qur’an and Sunnah, the application of the legal rules enshrined in 
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these sources requires interpretation.102 Diverse interpretations therefore logically led 
to the emergence of several schools of thought (madhhab) within the Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh). Amongst the four recognised Sunni schools of thought, the laws 
of the KSA, including the principles, rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Basic 
Law, are applied in light of Sharia law as interpreted by the Hanbali school.  
Before analysing these principles, rights and duties, as well as their implementation 
and enforcement processes, it is important to note that Article 44 of the Basic Law 
establishes three state authorities, namely the executive, legislative and judicial 
authorities. Given that there is no provision for the separation of powers per se,103 and 
the best interpretation of the Basic Law does not require us to embrace the principle 
of the separation of powers as a background legal principle in the KSA,104 it may be 
contended that the three state authorities established by the Basic Law are tasked 
with interpreting and enforcing the Sharia.  
2.2.1 THE EXECUTIVE 
The KSA is a monarchical state and the executive branch is headed by the King. Other 
executive and administrative bodies operate under the King.105 These include the 
Council of Ministers, local governments, various ministries and their branches, and 
other independent and quasi-independent public agencies, often created by 
empowering legislative Acts.106 The King is responsible for setting the Kingdom’s 
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national public policy and ensuring that it conforms with the principles of Islam.107 The 
King also oversees other entities which fall within the executive branch tasked with 
implementing all laws, regulations, resolutions and policies within the Kingdom.108 
2.2.2 THE LEGISLATURE 
The Saudi legislative branch, otherwise referred to as the Kingdom’s legislative or 
regulatory authority, drafts and enacts all statutory laws and regulations within the 
Kingdom.109 There is some overlap between the Saudi legislature and the executive 
to the extent that the King and the Council of Ministers are involved in both.110 
Additionally, the executive also incorporates the Consultative Council (the Shura), 
which exercises oversight functions to ensure adequate citizen participation in the 
legislative process.111 Expressed succinctly, the Basic Law provides that: 
The regulatory authority shall lay down regulations and proposals to 
further the interests of the State, or remove what might be prejudicial 
thereto, in conformity with the Islamic Sharia. The said authority shall 
exercise its functions in accordance with [the Basic Law of 
Governance] and the Council of Minister and the Consultative Council 
Laws.112 
2.2.3 THE JUDICIARY 
Another important area is the active resolution and settlement of disputes since a 
competitive environment often results in disputes. Also, competition law deals with the 
investigation and punishment of infringements and does not provide compensation to 
the parties adversely affected by the infringements. Resolution of disputes in such 
circumstances has to be carried out in a timely manner to prevent loss of resources 
and any undue losses. Sharia law provides clear-cut guidance regarding the process 
of dispute settlement that can help in conflicts arising secondary to competition. The 
Settlement Regulation of the KSA consists of 25 articles and is the guiding document 
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regarding resolution of disputes based on Sharia. Sayen has asserted that the 
administration of justice in the KSA is divided between governmental boards and 
Sharia courts.113 The governmental boards have been given the responsibility of 
applying statutes and Sharia in such a way that statutes supplement Sharia instead of 
modifying it. 
Governmental boards hear disputes between different parties, including foreign 
businesses. Since the KSA is an important trading and strategic partner of the West, 
it has always worked to find appropriate dispute resolution options based on the laws 
of Sharia. This is essential to create an environment that is attractive for foreign 
businesses. Hence, between 2005 and 2010 when the KSA opened new industries, 
including the telecommunications sector, to foreign companies, the KSA became the 
eighth largest recipient of FDI in the world.114 
Also, it has been noted that telecommunications companies operating in the KSA have 
a well-developed system of arbitration available for the resolution of their disputes with 
other competitors in the same market.115 Hence, it might perhaps be argued that 
disputes are less likely to hinder their path to progress within the KSA due to the 
prevailing Sharia-based law. Hasan states that Islam and Sharia are neither simply a 
religion nor a mere ideological vision but instead a practical system on how to run 
one’s life and the principles governing life.116 Thus, Islam is a comprehensive religion 
which covers many principles such as etiquette and manners and how to live a proper 
life. Not only does it teach how to live but its teachings also apply to specific aspects 
of life such as trade and business.117  
The enforcement aspects of Saudi regulations are divided between administrative 
actions that fall within the purview of the executive and the courts within the Saudi 
judiciary. The Telecommunications Act and the subsequent Competition Law were 
implemented prior to the Kingdom’s judicial reform. At the time, the Saudi judicial 
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system was composed of the Supreme Judicial Council, the courts of appeal, and the 
general and summary courts of first instance.118 This judicial system was also 
complemented by the Board of Grievances, an administrative judicial body that 
functioned alongside the judiciary to hear both first-instance and appellate cases. The 
jurisdictions of these courts were determined by the law under which they were 
constituted or a subsequent law that expressly identified what court would have 
jurisdiction over disputes arising under its provisions.119 
In 2007, King Abdullah approved a significant reform of the Saudi judicial system. 
Under the Law of the Judiciary, the Supreme Judicial Council’s functions were 
assumed by the High Court, the Kingdom’s highest judicial authority.120 Further, 
appellate courts were established in each province along with subject matter-specific 
courts created on an as-needed basis.121 Thus, for instance, at the first-instance level 
there are labour courts, commercial courts, criminal courts, personal status courts, 
general courts and enforcement courts.122 The courts of appeal are then separated by 
dispute jurisdiction into labour circuits, commercial circuits, criminal circuits, personal 
status circuits and civil circuits.123 All appeals from the appeal courts are made to the 
High Court for a final determination.124 A hierarchy was also established for the courts 
of the Board of Grievances The highest-ranking court is the High Administrative Court, 
followed by the Administrative Courts of Appeal and then the Administrative Courts of 
first-instance.125 
Regardless of how the courts are structured, their basic mandate remains the same: 
[To] apply the rules of the Islamic Sharia in the cases that are brought 
before them, in accordance with what is prescribed in the Qur’an, the 
Sunnah and statutes decreed by the Ruler which do not contradict the 
Book or the Sunnah.126 
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Individuals or undertakings who claim to have been affected by acts or practices which 
they believe violate the Competition Law and Implementing Regulations may submit 
complaints in writing against any firm to the General Authority for Competition (GAC) 
(previously, the Council of Competition Protection(CCP)). The complaints must 
contain sufficient information for the GAC to conduct an investigation with the help of 
police officers, where necessary. The GAC may also conduct investigations even 
when it has not received any complaint. The GAC is empowered to issues orders 
requiring the prohibited practice to cease or impose financial penalties. Where a crime 
is deemed to have been committed, the accused undertaking shall be prosecuted by 
the GAC before the Board of Grievances.127 Article 15(4) of the Competition Law 
requires the GAC to refer criminal cases to the Board of Grievances for ‘ab initio 
adjudication’. This means that the Board of Grievances is the competent court to 
preside over the adjudication if the GAC establishes that there was an offence within 
the meaning of the Competition Law. 
2.2.3.1 INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
For a law to be effective, the judiciary needs to be robust and deliver speedy justice 
together with the correct interpretation of laws. This is particularly important when 
disputes arise between corporations doing business in the KSA and the government 
while the latter is attempting to enforce competition policies. It is also notable that the 
lack of effectiveness among the legal bodies and authorities dealing with competition 
law, which include the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) and the 
Capital Markets Authority (CMA), has been a major concern for potential players in the 
telecommunications sector. 
The judicial system of the KSA has not set up effective structures to empower the legal 
bodies and authorities to improve processes and mechanisms pertaining to 
competition law within the nation.128 In fact, there are no dedicated bodies to hear 
issues relating to competition law issues, with any disputes regarding such matters 
being presented before the general Sharia courts. The Sharia courts are the courts of 
first instance and are presided over by generalist judges that may not necessarily 
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understand the societal and economic implications of preserving competition and 
adequately deterring anti-competitive behaviours generally, and within the 
telecommunications sector in particular.  
The ineffectiveness of the judicial system in addressing competition issues was 
notable in the case of Al-Nasser Company129 wherein the judgement was considered 
ambiguous since it followed Sharia and was not based on any express competition 
law provision.130 In addressing these concerns, both traditionalist and progressive 
judges were in concert that withholding and buying goods in strained conditions 
contributed towards the unlawfulness of the company’s monopoly. Further, the 
restrictive agreements at play prohibited the effective implementation of competition 
law in the case. The restrictive agreements related to price discrimination and 
acquisition of competitors, among others. This illustrates the persistence of unfair 
competition practices within the KSA that spill over into other industries such as the 
telecommunications industry and which ultimately affect the business processes of 
larger organisations including the STC. 
2.3 THE SAUDI COMPETITION REGIME 
2.3.1 OVERVIEW 
The notion of a market mechanism is well established in several Islamic jurisprudential 
studies and many leading scholars are in favour of the mechanism to operating freely 
unless exceptional circumstances mandate state intervention. Since the KSA largely 
follows the interpretations of the Hanbali school, the discussion in this chapter is more 
in line with this school – specifically focusing on the views of Shaykh Al-Islam Ibn 
Taymiyyah and his prominent disciple Ibn Al-Qayyim. 
The KSA competition regime and a formal legal framework were not set up until as 
late as 2004 when the competition legislation was promulgated through royal decree 
and became effective in January 2005.131 The KSA competition regime also includes 
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other relevant regulations and bye-laws132 although the 2004 Competition Law 
remains its primary source.  
2.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF SHARIA 
This section discusses competition law only in the context of its alignment with the 
principles of Sharia. It must be noted that the link between competition and the Sharia 
may be traced to the early years of Islam.133 The right of individuals to engage in trade 
was recognised but the abuse of this right was prohibited. Thus, Sharia provided for 
public intervention in the marketplace where the right had been abused. The 
intervention was initially in the form of a market inspector or agent (Sahib al suq) who 
was director and sole member of the regulatory body called Hisba.134 It follows that 
Islamic countries have a good reason to embrace competition law although it must 
comply with Sharia and be tailored to the geographical and economic realities of each 
country. 
Sharia means ‘path’ in Arabic and guides all aspects of Muslim life, including daily 
routines, familial and religious obligations, and financial dealings. Sharia is derived 
primarily from the Qur’an and the ways of life of Muhammad (PBUH) known as the 
Sunnah, which includes the sayings, practices and teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammad.135 As noted above, these primary sources of Sharia have been subject 
to interpretation in light of the views of different Islamic scholars and schools of 
thought, and the KSA government has devised a way to run the country and develop 
its laws on the basis of Sharia. In fact, all laws within KSA are required to comply with 
Sharia law as discussed above. Beyond the text of the laws, the inherent belief is that 
Sharia originated with the Holy Book and what is written therein, and Muslims follow 
the text reverently and consider it sacred. Many Islamic legal scholars have made 
sincere attempts to interpret Sharia and to adapt it to cater to the expanding Muslim 
Empire.136 
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Sharia is also the source of law that governs all administrative regulations of the state. 
As noted above, the Basic System emphasizes that the role of the state and its 
objectives are to primarily protect the principles of Islam and to enforce Sharia. The 
document is based on and seeks guidance from Sharia when defining the nature, 
objectives and responsibilities of the state. Further reference to the Sharia is made 
when defining the relationship between the ruler and the ruled based on brotherhood, 
consultation, friendship and cooperation - the tenets on which the whole law is 
based.137 
The significance of the Basic System is important when considering its similarity to the 
Constitutions of other countries. In comparing the contents of these Constitutions, one 
can confirm that the monarchy and the system prevalent in the KSA reaffirm the 
principles of government, justice, consultation and the equality of citizens under 
Sharia, with great emphasis on the Saudi family and the importance of Islamic values, 
justice and the unity of the family. There is also a strong emphasis on individual rights 
within the system in that the state must protect human rights in accordance with Sharia 
and its principles,138 and protect the sanctity of private homes and private 
communications,139 and guarantee the protection of private property and individual 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and punishment, except in cases of legal due process.140 
2.3.2.1 THE FIQH  
Muslims believe the Qur’an to be the last and final message from Allah containing the 
complete code of life. The Qur’an is hence a primary source of Sharia, Islamic law. 
Another primary source is the Sharia, Sunnah or Hadith, which are the sayings, actions 
and implied approvals by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Thus it is commonly 
understood that Sharia has been complete during the lifetime of the Prophet.141 About 
90 percent of the Muslims around the world are Sunnites, a sect which is divided into 
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four orthodox schools of law (Fiqh) namely - Hanafi,142 Maliki,143 Shafi’i144 and 
Hanbali.145 The schools recognise fixed principles of jurisprudence known as Usool 
Al-Fiqh which deal with the sources of Sharia and the method of juristic deduction and 
inference,146 which is designed to provide the conceptual framework by which Muslim 
scholars approach Islamic legal methodology.147 These schools of thought came into 
being to provide solutions or judgments on various religious and legal issues where 
the text in the primary sources (Qur’an and Sunnah) is ambiguous.148 
It must however be noted that Islamic law is based completely on divine origin which 
has nothing to do with the human system of law.149 Its truth and authenticity are not 
open to question or subject to critique owing to the finite nature of human wisdom and 
reasoning.150 Every Muslim, including all the schools of thought, are in agreement that 
the canons of Islamic law were fixed and laid down by God for once and for all.151 To 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the originator of the Hanbali school - which is known as the strict 
traditionalist school, “the Qur’an in its wording, without any exegetic infringements and 
correcting interpretations, was the absolute, irrefutable basis of the law.”152 He also 
maintained that the secondary source of law was attributable to the traditions of the 
Prophet.153  
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The KSA largely follows the Hanbali school of law, the strict traditional and dogmatic 
school.154 The Hanbali school stands in stark contrast with the Hanafi school which 
allows for human considerations ie ijma155 and qiyas,156 to be a part of the sources of 
law.157 It is therefore important to shed light on the views of the Hanbali school as 
regards the subject matter of this thesis owing to the fact that it determines the 
competition law framework and the telecommunications industry in the KSA. Any 
discussions, analysis and critique of the competition law regime in the KSA ought to 
be made in light of the principles of the Hanbali school and the influence it may have 
had on the drafting and framing of the law which ultimately came into being. Ibn Hanbal 
was opposed to establishing a new source of law in Islamic jurisprudence and his 
focus was primarily on attaining the authentic interpretation of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah.158 In line with this stance, Ibn Hanbal was opposed to allowing for other 
means such as ijma and qiyas to attain the status of source of law, citing deviation 
from the authentic interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah thus inviting 
arbitrariness.159  
The Hanbali school is more of a dogmatic traditionalist legal school that relies heavily 
on the text in scriptures rather than on analogy and reasoning – which are more readily 
found to be accepted in the Shafi school andeven more so in the Hanafi school. Based 
on this it may be argued that the Hanbali school lacks insight in many circumstances 
and more so from a modern context and law-making as its expertise is not on analogy 
and reasoning but on the literal meaning of texts – this is the traditional interpretation 
the Qur’an and Sunnah.  
2.3.2.2 THE SUITABLE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION 
One could logically argue that such an approach to interpretation at times might fail to 
provide the desired results or  attain the objective it was meant to achieve. This is so 
because the Qur’an claims itself to be the miracle of miracles and as being relevant 
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and applicable to all societies and times – such a dogmatic approach to interpretation 
without resorting to sound reasoning and analogy to deduce the correct interpretation 
Sharia aimed to achieve might fail to achieve the very purpose the law aimed to fulfil.  
There would perhaps be instances in competition law and telecommunications law 
among others, where Islamic scholars in the early centuries failed to appreciate the 
modern context or the complexity in the financial system it currently stands – a more 
reasonable approach under such circumstances would be to correctly interpret the 
Sharia’s text sticking to the fundamental principles of the Sharia while remaining open 
to extending and modifying the interpretation to such an extent that the purpose of the 
text is served, ie by resorting to a purposive approach to interpreting the Sharia text, 
and apply them accordingly so that people from different times and ages are served 
with the true idea of justice that the religion of Islam endeavours to deliver. A failure 
on the part of current schools to interpret the Qur’an and the Sunnah using a purposive 
approach would be a blunder owing to their short-sightedness rendering a failure to 
provide correct legal meaning as demanded by the change in times and circumstances 
and so miscarriages of justice ensues. Thus, the failure of a school to enunciate the 
correct meaning and interpretation of a Sharia text should not be attributed to the 
religion of Islam but the particular school under consideration.  
2.3.2.3 SHARIA LAW PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Islam has always considered business and trade to be an important part of social 
life.160 As such, it provides sufficient guidance in the form of Islamic laws and the 
Qur’an. The teachings of Islam regarding business practices are focused on providing 
equal opportunities to all businesses while establishing an environment that promotes 
businesses without affecting the rights of other individuals in society.161 In this light, 
many principles and rules have been formulated to promote fair and just competition 
in the market. They show the extent to which anti-competitive conduct is prohibited 
under Islamic law. This section analyses some of the key principles that are relevant 
for competition in the telecommunications sector. They include, the maslahah, la 
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dhararwa la dhirar, riba, ihtikar, saddu zarai, assuf fi al-isti, and maqasid al-syriah. 
2.3.2.3.1 Maslahah  
The renowned Islamic philosopher al-Ghazali described maslahah as the rule of being 
guided by the need to preserve the goals of maqasid (goals to be achieved) with the 
interest of the general good in mind (i.e. the community as a whole). This rule is similar 
to the one discussed in the Maslaha journal162 which is reliant upon the fact that due 
to the lack of firm guidelines concerning competition and business in the Qur’an, 
maslahah as a philosophy has been applied and has becomes a key pillar in 
administering Islamic finance. 
According to maslahah principles, organisations need to ensure that they facilitate and 
protect the needs and requirements of their stakeholders as they run their businesses. 
Equally, the aforementioned stakeholders are required to adhere to Islamic axioms 
such as fard (duty to Allah). This means that the individuals have positive obligations 
to the organization. Maslahah insists that in the course of running a business, the 
owners and affiliated parties should have the public interest in mind and not individual 
gains and, therefore, the proper application of maslahah will see an efficiently running 
organization with satisfied stakeholders. 
Islam promotes the notion of maslahah, which is equivalent to the concept of bringing 
about a balance between private and public interests163 while ensuring that the 
balance is maintained and equal opportunities are guaranteed. Abbas J. Ali contends 
that the concept of maslahah distinguishes the Islamic ethical perspective from that of 
the two other monotheistic religions, namely Judaism and Christianity.164 This is 
because Islam aligns business ethics with the interests of the people. Hence, every 
human enterprise is foremost obligated to serve people.165 This explains why certain 
forms of deception or preventable ambiguity (gharar) may be excused where an 
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overriding public benefit is involved.166 Islamic law therefore emphasizes stewardship 
and trusteeship, which means that the business owner or manager is the trustee of 
the wealth that belongs to God and society.167 The concept of maslahah therefore 
mirrors that of stakeholder primacy whereby individuals are given the freedom to start, 
manage and organise business activities but are also required to think more generally 
about how the activities affect all constituencies.168 Hence, businesses are only ethical 
from an Islamic perspective where they are based on trade-offs in managing the 
different needs of the diverse stakeholders.169 It follows that monopolies and negative 
externalities are proscribed by Islamic law given that their existence may be 
interpreted as the failure to maximise social welfare.170 This may be problematic for 
industries such as the telecommunications industry that included a natural monopoly 
component since the only operator was owned and managed by the Saudi government 
for many decades until partial privatisation in 2003.171 
The improved operations brought about by maslahah in an organization will lead to 
better service to a greater part of society as argued by Hasan and Asutay.172 
Competition is experienced daily in business practices but by adhering to the 
maslahah principle, severe and detrimental competition can be managed effectively 
and lead to healthy businesses. Also, adherence to the maslahah philosophy will 
ensure that competing parties will have the public interest in mind and focus on quality 
of services rather than outdoing each other. Additionally, maslahah can be used to 
resolve issues encountered in a business administrative setting by also considering 
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the interests of others.173 
Islam also promotes the idea that when harm is inevitable every attempt should be 
made to avoid greater harm, even if society has to endure the lesser harm. As such, 
anti-competitive conduct such as exclusive dealing or the imposition of resale prices 
may be tolerated where they are crucial for the supplier’s continuous existence and an 
overriding public benefit is involved. It is important to note that Islam does not consider 
the rights of individuals or the government to be absolute in nature.174 Every right has 
to be used in a correct manner while remaining cognizant of the context of the 
situation. If a business aims to take a rightful action that can be detrimental to the 
society as a whole, Islam does not allow such actions175 despite being otherwise 
permissible.  
Although Sharia is applied in the KSA in light of the interpretation by the Hanbali 
school, it must be noted that all of the Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence regard 
any kind of anti-competitive conduct to be prima facie unlawful. This is because it is 
detrimental to social welfare. This is further supported by the different hadiths176 that 
set the foundation on which the main competition laws within the Kingdom are based. 
One such hadith says, ‘La dhararwa la dhirar’. This can be translated as ‘loss itself 
and any cause that results in loss should not exist,’177 which gives rise to the debate 
as to whether a monopoly or other anti-competitive conduct creates gain for one and 
losses for another.  
2.3.2.3.2 La Dhararwa La Dhirar  
This is a philosophy that was widely advocated by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in 
the Qur’an.178 It means that ‘one should not inflict harm to others or payback harm 
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done with harm’.179 In a contract scenario, it creates a clear guideline that a party 
engaged in a contract can opt out if the other party commits some serious injustice 
without fear of suffering unprecedented repercussions at the behest of that party.180 
To further understand this philosophy, additional guidelines are set out below. The 
philosophy adds that the lesser of two harms is to be used in settling a dispute if that 
is the only way to resolve the differences. 
For instance, in the running of a casino, if a customer loses a coin in a machine then 
it is better to lose the lesser valued coin rather than incur greater costs in trying to 
retrieve the coin and possibly damaging a machine that is worth thousands. Again, in 
a similar scenario, if a person loses a valuable item inside equipment in a shop that is 
cheaper than the item then it is acceptable to dismantle the equipment to retrieve the 
more valuable item.181 He further explains that harm cannot be set-off by harm. In a 
typical business instance, when a buyer purchases a piece of faulty equipment and 
the equipment develops an additional fault while in the possession of the buyer, the 
buyer then loses the ability to claim compensation. This is similar to the agreement 
terms set out in warranties. 
In order to fulfil the envisaged ideas of this philosophy, firms in pursuit of proficiency 
and mastery should not bring harm to competing firms. An example of this is if a 
company is trying to advance in a certain field but does not possess the necessary 
manpower and skilled labour. It would not be prudent for the company’s owner to 
poach skilled workers from a competing company with the aim of bringing them down. 
Not only is the individual poached to bring the rival business down but also to ensure 
that the poaching business will outshine others in the similar trade. While some might 
find such a scenario sound, realistic or normal business practice, if viewed on the 
grounds of morality and the principles of Sharia it is unethical. 
Further, a final hadith that enlightens us regarding business practices relates to how 
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different businesses should interact with each other. It states that: ‘businesses should 
not attempt to cancel each other’s deals’.182 This is a common practice in today’s 
business world. Businesses will often try to affect the deals of others by offering 
competitive prices in an attempt to draw customers. Such practices can prevent other 
businesses from conducting honest and lawful transactions as they attempt to 
compete knowing that their customers are more inclined to try out the business 
offering better prices.183  As more parties enter into the telecommunications sector in 
the KSA, it is essential to monitor their tactics to ensure that dominant players are not 
abusing their position to drive down prices and remove competitors from the market in 
a similar fashion. 
The la Dhararwa La Dhirar philosophy therefore established the legal basis of the 
prohibition of anti-competitive conduct under the Sharia.184 Any act that causes an 
unfair loss to competitors is unacceptable since the Sharia forbids acts that are 
detrimental to lawful competition. 
2.3.2.3.3 Riba  
A major extension of the Sharia principle of preventing firms from harming competitors 
can be seen in the prohibition of interest (riba). Any business deal that aligns with the 
principles of riba is considered unlawful according to Sharia and is, therefore, not 
allowed within the KSA. Riba constitutes any increment or addition which is unjustified 
according to Islamic principles. It concerns the profits received through the borrowing 
or lending of money where it is paid in kind or the money is above the amount of the 
loan being a condition imposed upon the borrower by the lender to ensure that the 
loan is given on the basis of promises of such profits or increments.185 An example of 
this prohibition can be seen in the Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA). Article 2 of this Charter states that an ‘Agency shall not pay or receive 
interest, but it shall only charge certain fees on services rendered to the public and to 
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the Government’. This provides an insight into how Sharia asserts its influence on 
business activities within the KSA.186 
This effectively means that companies working in the telecommunications sector in 
the KSA are required to consider the fact that no interest-based transactions can be 
conducted within the system. This is in sharp contrast to the business conditions and 
rules that are prevalent in most other parts of the world which follow profit-centred 
business practices in which interest-based transactions are a legitimate practice and 
businesses are officially entitled to earn interest on any investments they make. An 
example of interest as a common practice can be seen in the global banking system 
which allows for banks to pay a lower percentage of interest to those who deposit their 
earnings in the banks, while charging a higher percentage of interest to those who 
take loans from the former.187 Such practices are contrary to Islamic principles. Hence, 
the fact that interest cannot be charged becomes a challenge for the 
telecommunications sector, especially one growing in line with technological advances 
and involving players that have yet to adhere to the system prevalent within the 
Kingdom. 
Similar to the prohibition against charging more via interest, the Qur’an also advises: 
‘Give full measure and weight and do not undervalue people’s goods.’188 This is yet 
another example of how Sharia guides the process of trading in an Islamic country. 
Sharia regards such practices as unethical and also forbids them. This is an imposition 
of a moral imperative on businessmen in the Sharia system which prohibits them from 
using their position to take advantage of others. As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, this provision becomes particularly important with regard to competition 
policy. The purpose of emphasising these provisions of Sharia law is the need to find 
a fine balance between these principles and those of competition law. Such a balance 
is the only way to ensure the eradication of unfair competition between participants in 
the telecommunications sector, which is also mandated by the Sharia notion of ‘fair 
trade’ that requires the protection of the rights and privileges of all those who 
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participate in business transactions.189 
According to Islamic fiqh, riba is any unjustified additional margin over and above a 
borrowed item or loan paid back in terms specified by the affiliate parties.190 It can be 
further categorized into riba al-duyun, the classic riba described above, or riba al-buyu, 
which occurs when the lender and the borrower exchange goods of a kind at different 
proportions. For example, the exchange of two kilograms of high-quality dates in 
exchange for ten kilograms of low-quality dates. 
According to the Holy Qur’an, any form of riba is an act condemned without a shadow 
of doubt and followers are encouraged to steer clear of engaging in such practices.191 
However, the riba system was fully introduced into the Islamic way of life only at the 
beginning of the twentieth century with the emergence and spread of interest-based 
banking systems through legislations and banking practices around the world.192 To 
reconcile these practices with Islamic law, the concept of riba is explained as the 
excessive imposition of interest to the point that it is exploitative and certainly against 
the notions propagated in the Qur’an. This is an argument made by a number of 
orthodox Islamic scholars. Thus, any predetermined rate of return on funds, whether 
from a loan or financing transaction, is deemed to be riba.193 The prohibition of riba 
cannot be disputed as the Qur’an (S2: 225) clearly states that ‘God permitteth trading 
and forbideth riba.’  
However, there is less clarity regarding the meaning and scope of the concept.194 The 
lender is required to receive only the principal and no increase over and above. It is 
therefore uncertain whether interest can be used as a reward for the time-value of 
investments. Kiyi and others argue that interest on the margins close or equal to 
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inflation rates cannot be considered riba, and therefore should be treated as an 
acceptable form of trading. Nonetheless, Sole and Jobst note that ‘the general 
consensus among Islamic scholars is that riba covers not only usury but also the 
charging of interest and any positive, predetermined rate of return that is guaranteed, 
regardless of the performance of an investment or granted benefit.’195 From the 
perspective of Islamic scholars, this distinguishes Islamic finance from capitalist 
systems that allow unbridled competition, monopoly and the accumulation of wealth.196 
Although banking without interest puts Islamic banks at a serious disadvantage when 
confronted with conventional competition, it must be noted that when given the choice 
most Muslims keep away from conventional banks since they charge interest which is 
strictly prohibited by the Sharia.197 Also, the Islamic laws do not prohibit profit, or set 
limits on it.  
2.3.2.3.4 Ihtikar  
Ihtikar has been defined as ‘hoarding, being the prohibitive practice of purchasing 
essential commodities, such as food and storing them in anticipation of the price 
increase.’198 It is argued that Allah has provided the treasures of the world and no 
individual has the absolute right to withhold any of it for self-gain and from the reaches 
of others, especially in times of famine and need. 
Mawdudi, Ahmad and Hashemi further explain that people should acquire wealth 
legally and spend what they need and reintroduce the savings, if any, into the 
economic system in a legal manner. 199 Savings are what a household puts aside after 
incurring expenditure from an income and is used for various purposes. However, 
these purposes should not involve illegitimate endeavours. Hoarding consumer goods 
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is strictly prohibited by Islam and anyone perceived to be engaged in it is given the 
same standing as a bandit.200The prohibition of hoarding ensures a free market 
whereby a just price emerges from open and fair competition. 
On the same basis, an individual is not allowed to run a monopolistic business. The 
term ihtikar is also often translated as ‘monopoly’ because the prohibition may be 
traced to actions taken to prevent certain clans in Mecca in 500 CE from hoarding 
foodstuff in order to artificially increase the price.201 Thus, it is a concept that was 
analysed by classical Islamic fiqh with a hiatus of about one millennium.202 The most 
influential scholars in this regard were Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple, Ibn al-
Qayyim.203 In this context, a monopoly is a business that is the exclusive supplier or 
trader of a needed commodity or service among the masses.204 The exclusive supplier 
can therefore change the quantity of the commodity available in the market and 
manipulate the price. Competition is considered to be a healthy thing in an Islamic 
economy and businesses are discouraged from engaging in ihtikar. Islam makes it 
illegal for entities to exclusively run the source of means or opportunities, and in the 
process prohibit others from accessing the same. It can also be argued that hoarding 
of acquired expertise is in contravention of the ihtikar philosophy. Businesses can 
create a virtual shortage of their goods and services, thus driving up prices. With this 
in mind, businesses in possession of a certain proficiency in a field should share 
necessary information so as to be in line with the philosophy, that is, not to hoard 
information.205 
Looking at the business aspect of ihtikhar, it seems that competition law regimes 
around the world are broadly based on these principles in their prohibition of 
monopolistic practices. Hasan argues that ihtikar is the Islamic concept which has 
paved the way for the competition law regimes around the world and is now prevalent 
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in the Kingdom.206 
2.3.2.3.5 The Prohibition of Monopoly 
It must be noted that, unlike the other concepts discussed above, there is no 
consensus on what constitutes a monopoly, when the viewpoints of the four Sunni 
schools of thought are taken into account. The Maliki school holds that monopoly 
involves hoarding goods (excluding foodstuff) with the objective of making abnormal 
profits when the prices increase. The Hanafi School argues that monopoly involves 
the buying of goods (including foodstuff) from the market and the hoarding of the goods 
for forty days until the prices increase. The Shafi school maintains that monopoly 
involves the amassing of goods that society needs and their resale at a higher price. 
Lastly, the Hanbali School holds that monopoly involves buying and amassing goods 
needed in society to such an extent as to adversely affect the wellbeing of the entire 
society.207 Given that the interpretation by the Hanbali school is the recognised version 
of the Sharia in the KSA, it may then be contended that monopoly only involves goods 
and services that are essential to life and the consumers do not have any other 
alternative in light of the quality and price. Also, the monopolising firm or person must 
intend to accumulate a large stock of the goods in order to create artificial scarcity. All 
the concepts discussed in this chapter justify the prohibition of monopoly under Sharia. 
Maslahah, for example, condemns those who earn profit through monopolistic 
practices because they produce less output and charge prices that are higher than the 
public would pay in a competitive market. Also, saddu zara’I and assuf fi al-isti mal al-
haq, which are discussed below, highlight some of the activities carried out when 
misusing rights to create a monopoly. The major reason why Sharia principles forbid 
the use of monopoly, assuf fi al-isti’ mal al-haq claim, is that it leads to damage to 
economy and harm to society,208 which will have an adverse effect more broadly. 
Moreover, maqasid al-syariah which is discussed below, holds that the main objective 
of Sharia is to maintain prosperity, which will be damaged by the practice of monopoly 
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– a claim supported by tauhid. 
According to Sharia, monopolistic and other unethical practices including anti-
competitive practices and agreements should be completely banned in order to restrict 
companies from maximizing profits through unconscionable means. As is the case 
with laws regulating monopolies, certain agreements and actions are set aside for 
special attention because they are presumed to be anti-competitive. Examples include 
complicity in tenders and price fixing. 
Nonetheless, a monopoly granted and protected by the state is not necessarily 
unethical and contrary to Sharia. This is common with regard to public utilities. As 
noted above, monopoly is outlawed because of the tangible harm it causes or potential 
harm it may cause to the general public. Thus, where the state-run monopoly does not 
reduce output or hoard products (that constitute a necessity) in order to artificially raise 
the prices, the existence of such a monopoly is not contrary to Sharia. The state may 
also be justified in buying the patent of a new drug that cures an epidemic in order to 
ensure that the drug is sold to the public at a reasonable price. 
2.3.2.3.6 Saddu Zarai  
This philosophy suggests that it is prudent to intervene and prohibit a means through 
which a foreseen or expected, mostly evil, outcome may occur if no action is taken.209 
In a business setting, those running the businesses are in a position to foresee certain 
trends and possible outcomes if certain actions are taken. It is therefore in their 
mandate to make sure that the outcomes are not detrimental toward their competitors 
or their clients regardless of the possibility of earning more revenue. 
The principle of saddu zarai can be applied in a scenario where a deliberate action is 
taken which, in the perception of many, is morally wrong but causes no harm to 
anyone. In this case, the perceived wrongdoer cannot be considered to be at fault. 
This point of view can be elaborated by considering a scenario where two businesses 
(business A and business B) share a common entrance or access road to their 
premises but one business has no use for the said entrance because it has a better 
access to its premises. 
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Business A then decides to use the entrance for individual use and puts up a structure. 
Though this action is perceived as wrong, it causes no harm to the other business. In 
that case, business A is not at fault. It is in the philosophy’s spirit that a deed or action 
that may lead to an illegal action should be avoided. In business terms, any means of 
attaining a goal or success that may drag the business down into illegal or immoral 
deeds should be avoided.210 
Within the telecommunications setting, it is important that businesses do not engage 
in anti-competitive practices that will intentionally harm consumers or other 
businesses. Telecommunications companies are often in a position to understand how 
certain choices made at any given time will affect the future of the sector within the 
Kingdom. To comply with Sharia principles, they must not make decisions to the 
detriment of the general public regardless of what profits they may obtain from such a 
decision. 
2.3.2.3.7 Assuf Fi Al-Isti  
Briefly described, assuf fi al-isti is the misuse of rights and privileges. According to 
Johan, this philosophy can take two forms. A person or entity is not entitled to arbitrarily 
exercise their rights in a way that is detrimental to their neighbours. In business 
practice, the running of the business within the confines of its legal and rightful 
constraints should not in any way come to, or be seen to, cause undue harm to 
others.211 
Although it is the prerogative of an individual to exercise their knowledge and skills, it 
is wrong for them to cause harm in the process of enjoying these rights and privileges. 
For example, the collapse of the US housing sector was the result of individuals with 
extensive knowledge of the mortgage industry inappropriately using their right to do 
business and receive the privileges awarded by their customers to trade on their 
behalf. A gross violation of this philosophy led to the suffering of millions of clients and 
the housing and banking crises because of which, as an adverse effect of the fall in 
house prices. During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, many major banks around the 
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world went bankrupt while others were bailed-out with taxpayer’s money owing to the 
fact that debtors were unable to pay for their mortgages.212 
A second view of this philosophy is that persons should not use their rights solely for 
personal gain but for the prosperity of the society or community as a whole. This 
establishes the basis for businesses to engage in community development and 
improve the conditions of the people they interact with. Basing the argument on this 
philosophy, the use of given rights to outshine others and, in the process, cause some 
sort of harm is not allowed, which brings this doctrine in line with the anti-competition 
laws.213 
The creation of cartels to advance individual goals, and which in the process of 
achieving the goals infringe on the rights of others, is a violation of this philosophy. 
Assuf fi al-isti, as discussed above, offers a proper guideline in the exercise of proper 
business competition for the fair running of society. According to Yaacob and Azmi, 
the use of individual rights should strive to advance the greater good of society, such 
as through charitable works and developing the community’s economic strength.214 
2.3.2.3.8 Maqasid al-Syriah  
Imam Al-Ghazali, following Imam al-Haramain al-Juwaini, teaches that maqasid al-
syriah is anything that tends to enrich the faith and preserve it in its form.215 Maqasid 
can be described as the goals of Islamic law. These goals can be listed as the need 
to preserve life, wealth, progeny, religion and intellect. The use of these five goals from 
an economic point of view focuses on the individual rather than the businessman and 
highlights the necessary doctrines that govern the behaviour of these individuals and 
society.216 
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An ethical man will conduct business in an ethical way and the business will reflect his 
moral and ethical character. In this regard, it is impossible to separate an ethical 
individual from the same ethical business person. The availability and continuous 
adherence to religious virtues has been a key pillar in ensuring that businesses thrive 
and operate true to the concepts of Islam. 
It would be impossible to run a business without certain virtues such as trust, 
compliance with the obligations set by contracts and observance. With the basis set 
by the philosophical goals, faith is paramount for any individual. Running a business 
practice with faith can be the difference between a particular business and its fellow 
competitors. Hence, faith is a compulsory ingredient of all aspects of a human social 
and corporate life. 
According to Yusoff, the other goals of the philosophy—namely life, intellect, progeny 
and property—also come together to guide individuals through economic life.217 Life 
includes sustenance with proper nutrition, education on business processes, 
advances in intellect and handing over the business reins to the younger generation. 
These goals if utilized can aid in improving business practices, create healthy 
competition and advance know-how. 
2.3.2.4 ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON MARKET ABUSE 
Islam teaches and encourages altruism over self-indulgence – to act for the betterment 
of society and people. This is true in all aspects of one’s life including in family, social, 
economic and political aspects. Greed has been discouraged and even abhorred when 
it is resorted to by someone at the expense of another’s right – ie the exploitation of 
the latter by the former. Likewise, excessive profit making and withholding goods to 
render an artificial lack of supply to drive the prices up has also been prohibited by 
Islam. A fair and just market is what is advocated by the religion. This ensures choice, 
price, quality and a good deal for the consumers; while allowing for earning of just 
profits to be earned by businesses and tradesman. 
2.3.2.4.1 Price Fixing 
To begin with, issues relating to price fixing were raised during the lifetime of the 
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Prophet who declined to fix it, impliedly and through conduct which indicated his 
approval of the market mechanism and the interaction of demand and supply, to 
determine the price.218 Imam Shafi’i was quoted by Al-Kasani on the function of 
demand and supply in determining the market price. The value of a commodity 
changes each time there is change in the price, due to increase or decrease of 
people’s willingness to acquire the commodity (demand) and depending whether it is 
available in a small quantity or large quantity (supply)”219 Awareness of the market 
mechanism was clearly comprehended by early Muslim jurists. Al-Ghazali maintained 
that markets evolve in a natural order and market participants act in self-interest with 
a desire to satisfy mutual economic needs.220 This is once again indicates the 
profoundness of economic knowledge and the awareness amongst Islamic scholars 
from centuries ago regarding the nature, functions and the determinants in a freely-
operating market. 
It may also be important to consider the viewpoints of two of the most reputed 
scholars’, Shaykh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah221 and Ibn Al-Qayyim,222 as well as the 
views of the Hanbali school. Ibn Taymiyyah, a highly regarded and revered Islamic 
scholars who is largely followed in the KSA and other parts of the Arab world, had a 
greater alignment to the Hanbali school than others. He was a distinguished scholar 
with a wealth of knowledge in the legal sciences as well as in economic sciences. His 
notion of just price was that ‘the price of the equivalent where one is not already in 
place, taking into consideration the subjective value of the object to the buyer as well 
as its subjective value to the seller.’223 Ibn Taymiyyah was well versed in the free 
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market mechanism and favoured the contention that market price is determined by the 
intersection of demand and supply. However, he was in favour of price control by the 
state. He supported two forms of price control: first, unjust and invalid and second, just 
and valid.224  
2.3.2.4.2 Unjust Pricing 
Unjust pricing which is prohibited occurs when there is a price hike even when it is 
determined by market forces, increase in demand or a fall in supply.225 He 
recommended the use of just and valid price fixing at the time of war or famine or even 
market imperfection that leads to a rise in prices.226 Paul A. Samuleson is in favour of 
price fixing in times of emergency albeit for a short-period of time.227 It could be argued 
that once the state fixes the price and the tradesmen willingly restrains themselves 
from seeking excessive profits and keeps the price at a reasonable and just level, state 
intervention is not necessary to fix prices which would instead be deemed to be 
determined by the market forces and participants.   
The soundness of Ibn Taymiyyah’s economic concepts can further be evaluated from 
his response to an enquiry where he contended that price fluctuation does not always 
occur due to injustice (zulm) i.e. monopoly or market manipulation. It may be 
sometimes due to a deficit in production or inadequate importation of goods in 
demand. In a case where demand is on the rise while its availability is in decline 
leading to a rise in prices, the converse is also true. Lack of supply or increase in the 
same may not be down to the action of individuals, ie indicating individuals’ inability to 
manipulate the demand and supply artificially in a perfect market, and sometimes 
scarcity or abundance may have its roots in injustice, while at other times this may not 
be the case.228  
The views of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Sharia should be analysed by taking into account 
the Islamic philosophy of markets, the values ingrained and the objectives they seek 
to achieve. As was articulated at the outset, altruism is highly encouraged in Islam and 
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communal welfare takes precedence over self-indulgence or individual welfare. This 
is a concept that is far above and beyond the scope of principles adhered to in western 
societies where individualism is of paramount importance and individuals and 
businesses work in their self-interest rather than the interest of the wider stakeholder 
groups within the society in which they operates. As such, it is unlikely for a western 
scholar to grasp the very ideas of Islamic economic justice (here price fixing by the 
state in the best interests of all consumers leading to lower profits for the producer or 
the seller) as their notions of macroeconomics have inherent values of self-interest 
and individualism.  
Therefore, the two notions of market mechanism and hence competition law in turn 
are incongruous with each other – it would be unjust and unwise to judge one of them 
by the standards of the other. Both notions may well be just for their own societies 
taking into account the difference in the idea of justice between Islamic and western 
societies and the variance in substantive justice they attempt to achieve through their 
own means. By all means, Islamic values enjoin a welfare state whereas western 
states are essentially capitalist. These are two diverging views of economics. The 
substantive economic justice that the two systems aim to realise are unlikely to 
converge. 
Moreover, Ibn Al-Qayyim, a prominent and influential thinker, a jurist and the most 
famous student of Ibn Taymyiyah, was of the opinion that all economic activities are 
permissible except those which have been forbidden under Sharia.229 Ibn Al-Qayyim 
largely followed his teacher’s opinions and sometimes extended them in terms of 
market mechanism and price regulation.230 He even recommended state intervention 
in cases where the individual owners of property uses it against the wider interests of 
society.231 As regards market mechanism and price regulation, Ibn Al-Qayyim stressed 
that a price determined by the free play of demand and supply was a just price.232 
Absence of just price would warrant price fixing by the government wherein 
consideration must be given to the subjective value of the object to both the seller and 
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the buyer.233 It is not to say that he was of the opinion that business would be made 
burdensome for the tradesman and businessman as he also called for just profit234 
(profit maximisation is allowed so long as exploitation or wider social interests are not 
interfered with), just compensation235 (allowing for recruitment of specialists and 
experts in a field of business), just wages236 (workers would be ensured just minimum 
wages and other favourable conditions at work giving them an incentive to work to 
their full potential and thus allowing for the production of an optimum level of output).   
He believed that the central aim behind price policies in the markets is to maintain 
justice in society and provide guidelines for the regulators to protect consumers from 
being exploited.237 His position as regards price fixing is that the state should not 
intervene when a just price is produced through competitive market forces. However, 
in the absence of competition and the existence of monopoly and other market 
imperfections, the regulators should intervene and fix the price.238 The underlying 
principle was to serve the best interests of the people (of many rather than few), in 
cases market forces were enough justice in market places could be attained through 
market forces, no state intervention is recommended and vice versa.239  
The concerned regulator under Islamic rule is known as Al-hisbah which is empowered 
to oversee people do Al-Ma’ruf (good) and avoid Al-Munkar (evil). The regulator’s 
powers are not limited to economic activities only which spans between spiritual, 
moral, social and civil works.240 However, both Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim 
concentrated more on its economic role which is said to include provision of 
necessities and their supply, supervision of trade and service industries, inspection of 
weights and measures, curbing the practice of dealing in riba (interest), and other 
economic wrongdoings.241  
On fixing prices owing to monopoly or other market imperfections, Ibn Al-Qayyim 
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advised to take into account the cost of providing the product in question. He 
proscribed the fixing of a lump sum amount of profit but instead recommended a 
reasonable ratio of profit taking into consideration the cost of supply.242  
The essence of Sharia is to ensure justice in all aspects of life, including in economic 
and financial transactions. In order to secure justice any action so pursued should be 
approved by the Sharia and become imperious. Both Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-
Qayyim aegued for price fixing only when monopoly or imperfect market conditions 
lead to unjust prices so as to ensure justice in markets.243 Justice requires that 
everybody should be provided with an equal opportunity in terms of production or 
trade, and the necessity to bar a monopoly that would otherwise defeat the required 
condition for justice – the central reason as to why Ibn Al-Qayyim stood firmly against 
monopoly and recommended price fixing exceptionally.244 
However, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim’s position on price fixing by regulator may 
be seen to be in conflict with the views of Al-Maqdisi.245 According to Al-Maqdisi the 
demerits of price fixing may outweigh its merits as its results might be counter-effective 
and opposite to what was intended by the regulator.246 Al-Maqdisi illustrates this by 
stating that outside traders, ie foreign investors in the modern context, would avoid a 
market where they are forced to sell goods at a price against their will and local traders 
would have an incentive to hide their stocks.247 Consequently, deficiency of supply 
would be furthered while the demand for the product would be on the rise due to lack 
of availability of the goods.248 This would make prices soar and the situation would 
deteriorate even further.249      
Notably, Al-Maqdisi’s arguments against price fixing by authorities are sound and 
reflects his deep knowledge of economic concepts and far-sighted ideas. Even though 
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Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim attempted to resort to price fixing as an immediate 
solution to the problems of market manipulation or curtail or monopoly, it might not be 
too good a solution in the long run as foreign traders or investors would not want to 
invest in such a country where the regulator is too authoritative, lacking in autonomy 
of the market participants and also that local traders might want to shift to a foreign 
land seeking less intervention by authorities. Under such circumstances, supply of 
goods and services would dry up, lacking in consumer choice and quality of products 
– meaning that those consumers who were meant to be protected by price fixing would 
now be forced to pay even higher prices for lower quality products with limited or no 
choice. This might even give rise to an opportunity for the creation of a monopoly for 
the surviving business in such a market amidst all these state measures should all 
other tradesmen and businesses choose to move away from such a market in a 
country. As such, Al-Maqdsi’s view is also a dominant Hanbali view which is consistent 
with the free market principles as practised in the West.   
2.3.2.5 DOES THE SHARIA GUARANTEE FAIR COMPETITION?  
Bowen’s analysis of the Sharia may be summarised as follows: 
Far from being an immutable system of rules, Islamic jurisprudence 
(Fiqh) is best characterized as a human effort to resolve disputes by 
drawing on scripture, logic, the public interest, local custom, and the 
consensus of the community. In other words, it is as imbricated with 
social and cultural life as is Anglo-American law or Jewish legal 
reasoning.250 
As shown above, the Sharia is essentially a law shaped and developed by jurists and 
students of jurisprudence over many centuries.251 However, they have largely 
developed the part of the Sharia that deals with civil or legal obligations, given that the 
part that deals with religious obligations has a much narrower room for ijtihad. 
Competition law falls under the part that deals with civil or legal obligations, and it was 
shown above that there are six main principles that explain why Islam prohibits anti-
competitive conduct. These principles are fundamental principles of belief, Shalabi has 
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demonstrated that the four Sunni schools of thought agree on these principles.252 The 
differences between the schools relate to definitions such as the definition of monopoly 
as shown above. 
The analysis of the six principles above therefore shows that the Sharia prohibits anti-
competitive conduct because it requires businesses to prioritise the promotion of the 
interests of all constituencies (maslahah), refrain from inflicting harm on others (la 
dhararwa la dhirar), refrain from conducting interest-based transactions (riba), refrain 
from hoarding or limiting the output in order to artificially increase the price of products 
(ihtikar), refrain from using evasive legal devices (saddu zara’i), and refrain from 
misusing rights and privileges (assuf fi al-isti). These principles generally seek to 
prevent two things: damage to others and monopoly or hoarding. Hence, the 
prohibition of both ensures a free market whereby a just price for healthy products 
emerges from open and fair competition. 
However, it is also noted above that monopoly is not unlawful per se; monopoly that 
causes tangible harm or may cause potential harm to the general public is unlawful. 
Thus, the government may grant a company an exclusive license to operate in a 
specific market under the Saudi Competition Law of 2004.253 Nonetheless, there are 
several anti-competitive practices other than monopoly, and the Competition Law, 
inspired by Sharia, contains provisions that prohibit agreements and conduct that 
restrict competition.254  
2.3.2.5.1 Ensuring Fair Competition for Foreign Companies 
As far as Sharia is concerned, concepts like domicile or nationality are unimportant. 
The only aspect that Sharia takes into account are the notions of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Non-
Muslim’. The Holy Qur’an has a verse which says that: ‘Those who do not judge by 
what Allah has sent down—it is they who are the transgressors.’255 
Therefore, all matters related to justice should be dealt with according to what God 
has revealed through the Qur’an. As far as the application of Sharia on non- Muslims 
                                               
252 Mustafa Shalabi, Introductory in the Shari’ahh Law (Dar-Al-Nahdah Al-Arabia 1985) 209-210. 
253 Competition Law promulgated by Royal Decree No M/25 of 04/05/1425H (22 June 2004). 
254 These provisions are largely found in Article 4. 
255 Quran, 5: 47. 
 
63 
is concerned, Sharia is applicable to all non-Muslims who are operating within the 
Islamic territory. Since Sharia is not applicable to non-Muslims when they are not in 
Islamic territory, some degree of freedom is inherent within Sharia for non-Muslims. 
However, this implies that all the competitors who are operating within the KSA have 
to accept an adjudicator’s decision made according to Sharia.256 Sharia law takes 
every case on an individual basis to decide the outcome of the legal processes, with 
the ultimate aim of providing a benefit to the masses. 
In 1998, allegations were levelled against Microsoft for violating regulations regarding 
antitrust for which Islamic law removed Microsoft from the Sharia stock exchange.257 
According to Saudi law indicated that Microsoft was attempting to  use of its prodigious 
market power and huge profits to exploit any firm that insisted on pursuing initiatives 
which could enhance competition against one of their core products. Furthermore, the 
judge presiding over the case stated that, beucase Microsoft enjoyed substantial 
power in the market, this allowed it to set higher prices for its Windows software, and 
there were a number of innovations that could have benefited consumers but never 
came to fruition due to the sole fact that they clashed with Microsoft’s self-interest. As 
discussed above, Sharia requires the entrepreneur or firm to refrain from harming 
others.  Thus, what Microsoft did through its endeavours was prohibited, and for this 
reason, Microsoft was held liable for violating the laws of the Kingdom.258 
It has been shown that there are notable differences between the competition law of 
the KSA and different nations of the world. This is largely due to the fact that the KSA’s 
Competition Law has must comply with the principles of Sharia. However, it must be 
noted that the EU Competition Law also has projected some influence on the 
enactment of competition policies within the Kingdom.259 
Arguably, the Sharia elements within the law may have made foreign companies shy 
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away from investing in the country. Businesses often prefer to invest and expand into 
legal systems with which they are familiar and have favourable laws. The concept of 
a Sharia-based legal system is often difficult to comprehend for businesses based in 
secular societies. However, once a company moves into the KSA, that company must 
comply with Saudi law. The Foreign companies operating in the KSA are forced to 
obey the Saudi Competition Law, which includes some Islamic elements such as 
applying a halal business model, being forced to know the identity of your partners, 
ensuring that every partner has equal rights. Due to the fact that the abovementioned 
organisations are mostly not religious in nature, they often find it difficult to carry out 
their operations in regions where they are required to observe certain religious 
practices. 
As such, it may be argued that the KSA competition regime overlooks relevant 
international frameworks, and this in turn acts as a deterrent to foreign companies from 
investing in the KSA. This is because, unlike the KSA’s Competition Law, which is 
mainly based on the Qur’an, international competition law is derived from international 
customs, treaties, the decisions of courts, general principles of law and scholarly 
writings.260 For instance, Shell Oil entered the KSA but failed to sustain its operations 
because it could not gain a competitive advantage. The Director of International 
Business at Shell Oil claimed that it failed in its exploration campaigns in the KSA 
because prices were highly monitored so they could not raise funds for the exploration 
through the selling of oil in the KSA, thus rendering their business ineffective. Critics 
claim that the KSA competition framework has effectively discouraged both local and 
foreign companies from setting up operations in the KSA due to the economic fear that 
they might fail to reach their intended targets.261 
As such, it is important to clearly illustrate how the Sharia elements embodied in Saudi 
Competition Law correlate with the prevailing competition principles of the countries in 
which many multinational companies are headquartered. While the basis of Saudi 
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Competition Law may be in religion as opposed to business customs, the underlying 
intent and economic results are often the same. Eliminating this fear surrounding 
Sharia may help make the KSA a more attractive market for foreign investment. 
2.3.3 THE COMPETITION LAW 
Article 1 of the 2004 Law sets out its goals which include to protect and facilitate fair 
competition and prevent or eliminate private monopolies.262 Article 2 provides the 
definitions of key terms such as market, firm and the concept of domination among 
others.263 The latter concept is said to mean the ability of a firm to influence the market 
price through the control of supply of a commodity or service. This is perhaps too much 
of a simplistic definition of domination where complex markets are concerned – 
especially in the service industry such as the telecommunications industry.264 It may 
be that a firm with a good reputation, because of its higher quality or the lack thereof 
among other firm’s products, may influence the price without having to control the 
supply of a commodity or service. Under such circumstances the 2004 legislation 
would not be able to prevent such an occurrence from happening even though its 
effect might be anti-competitive.265  
                                               
262 Article 1 of Competition Law 2004: This Law aims to protect and encourage fair competition and 
combat monopolistic practices that affect lawful competition. 
263 Article 2 of Competition Law 2004: Whenever they occur in this Law, the following terms shall have 
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2.3.3.1 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
A further and more severe limitation of the 2004 legislation is that it does not apply to 
public corporations and wholly-owned state companies, as developed in subsequent 
chapters.266 This limitation would have a significant impact upon the market of 
commodities or services and more so in terms of services which might be disguised 
for state’s protectionism towards state owned or public corporations as they are 
outside the ambit of the legislation. This is rather an absurd exemption as public 
corporations and state-owned enterprises are generally the bigger entities which are 
more likely to have a dominant position in the market and a strong influence on price. 
One might ask if the law was enacted to legitimise their per-existent dominance over 
other smaller entities. In the Saudi telecommunications sector, the STC, a state-owned 
company, has long been the dominant player in the industry. Allowing for a few firms 
to dominate the industry through legal framework is dangerous and can have 
repercussions not only on one industry but across industries as the competition law 
regime is generally applicable to all industries – both commodies and services. 
Saudi authorities might justify the exemption of state-owned firms or public 
corporations on the grounds that it is consistent with the interpretation of the Qur’an 
by the Hanbali school which authorities in the KSA are required to adhere to. They 
might also justify this exemption on the basis that it would helps fix a just price as 
state-owned firms would work in the best interests of consumers. However, such a 
belief is misleading and rather ill-founded as the Hanbali school, as enunciated by two 
prominent scholars, Shakh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple Ibn Al-Qayyim, call 
for price fixing only in exceptional circumstances. Nonetheless, an exemption through 
a legislative provision would have the effect of making it the norm rather than an 
exception. The aforesaid Islamic scholars were in favour of market mechanisms to 
operate in a fair market and believed price fixing was only required where an unjust 
price prevailed. However, another revered Hanbali scholar, judge and a jurist – Al-
Maqdisi – was completely opposed to the notion of price fixing, stressing that it might 
instead be counter-effective and hence should not be practised (discussed below). 
Therefore, the Saudi competition regime does not appear to accurately reflect the 
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Hanbali school principles despite the latter’s long-standing hegemony in the country.       
2.3.3.2 RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Of great importance is Article 4 of the 2004 legislation which prohibits agreements or 
contracts among current or potential competing firms or any practice by a dominant 
firm aimed at restricting commerce or violating competition among firms.267 The 
provision further articulates the banned practices for dominant firms which include 
among others price controlling; restricting supply of goods or services causing an 
artificial deficiency in supply; abruptly contriving supply of commodities or services in 
abundance that unfairly affects other dealers; preventing or causing hindrance to a 
firm’s entry or exit to the market; depriving certain firms of goods or services otherwise 
available in the market; dividing markets in terms of geographical regions or 
distribution centres or client type or by seasons and time periods; influencing 
quotations in auctions whether governmental or not; freezing or restricting the 
distribution process and other investment aspects. Despite the detailed attempt to curb 
prohibited practices, the list outlined is not exhaustive. The list at times appears plain 
                                               
267 Article 4 of Competition Law 2004: Practices, agreements or contracts among current or potential 
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and rules in the Regulations 
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and simple, while at other times it seems to be vague and invites arbitrariness. 
Ambiguity is attracted by paragraph 6 as outlined above as it attempts to curb division 
or allocation based on the aforesaid criteria which may well be legitimately used by a 
firm as its operations, business and distribution strategy. Their mere presence 
attracting ban seems to be an arbitrary and a short-sighted measure lacking in 
thoughtful input.   
In addition, further arbitrariness is introdcued by the last paragraph of Article 4 which 
provides the GAC with the discretion not to use the provisions of Article 4 for 
agreements or practices that breach canons of competition, but the GAC believes such 
a practice or agreement would not only improve the performance of firms but also 
confer benefits to the consumers which would exceed the effects of restriction of 
freedom of competition. A provision with this effect and the discretion it affords the 
GAC might invite arbitrary practices to be regarded as within the ambit of “exceeding 
the effects of restricting competition’, and this would be exacerbated in cases where 
the members in the GAC have any conflicting interest. At the same time, it would allow 
for firms to engage in illicit activities and endeavour to attain the GAC members to 
render biased decision in their favour. Another problem with the aforementioned 
provision relates to its inability to provide the criteria upon the satisfaction of which the 
GAC may relax the provisions of Article 4 despite acting in contravention of it. Thus, it 
may well be argued that too wide a power has been conferred on the GAC which may 
suspend the application of Article 4 which it subjectively believes to be warranted 
without being provided with an appropriate objective test. This may allow for arbitrary 
decisions to be taken by the GAC which would in fact negatively affect the market 
participants including the competitors of the firm concerned, and ultimately mean that 
consumers purchase lower quality products at a higher price compared to a market 
where fair competition is established. It may ultimately have a negative impact on the 
competition regime and beat the legislation’s core purpose – encouraging competition 
and combating monopolistic practices.    
Article 4 revolves around prevention of practices, contracts or agreements that can 
restrict commerce or affect the prevailing competition between firms. Since Sharia is 
against businesses fixing prices for their own benefits, the law prohibits the creation 
of cartels by competing firms to control or establishment of a pricing system. 
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This law is not limited to such pricing agreements. Horizontal agreements between 
competitors that are meant to enhance or facilitate the division of facilities based on 
type of customers or geographic locations are also prohibited. The reason for this is 
that once companies have distributed their areas of functioning, the main player in a 
particular area achieves a monopoly while allowing the other player a similar position 
in another area. The Saudi law is clearly aligned with Sharia which is against this  and 
so acts to prevent this from happening.268 
Hence, such agreements are forbidden for companies operating in the KSA. In 
addition, the law also prohibits a company from initiating actions that can prevent the 
entry of new players in a given market. Moreover, sellers are prohibited from selling 
the same services or products for different prices at different locations. Limitation on 
price is also set, which prevents the sellers from setting prices that are predatory in 
nature.269 
Given that the Saudi government has granted licenses to a number of foreign 
operators for the provision of telecommunications services in the KSA, it is important 
to consider how the process of conflict resolution operates in this setting. A good 
example is the STC. Because of the stakeholding of the royal family, there is a high 
probability of collusion with the STC and the decision-makers for the government 
edging it out at the behest of any other competitors. It is one thing to be government-
owned and another to ensure that anti-competitive policies are not followed. As such, 
it is important to determine how much influence government policies have within the 
management of the STC and which in turn become anti-competitive and in 
contravention of the anti-competition laws enacted by the same government to keep 
a check on the monopolistic regimes. 
According to Article 4, a monopoly is a specific market situation that includes only one 
company that is associated with manufacturing products and the same are consumed 
by many consumers. This was specifically identified as a situation where there are no 
competitors in the market providing the same services or products. Thus, if a firm 
increases its prices to a much higher level than is considered reasonable or fair, it will 
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be deemed as an unlawful monopoly under Article 4. In Sharia, this is referred to as 
ihtikar as noted above.  
2.3.3.3 ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION 
Article 5 articulates the practices a firm with dominant status is banned from carrying 
out. These include selling products at a price below their cost of production; imposition 
of a restriction on the supply of goods or services aimed to create artificial shortage in 
the market; levying certain special conditions on trading or dealing with another firm 
that leave the dominant firm in a weak competitive position; and refusal to deal with 
another firm lacking in sound rationale in a bid to deter the other firm from market 
entry.270 Although the first two paragraphs of the article are somewhat straightforward, 
but the latter two paragraphs lack precision as the Article 4(3) fails to outline what 
those special conditions are which it aims to curb and yet again this would allows for 
firms to take undue advantage. It is right to be sceptical of the GAC’s ability to oversee 
such matters without any legislative guidance as many such special circumstances 
might not even hit the radar causing regulatory capture. Article 5(4) has the inherent 
weakness that firms are allowed to refuse to deal with another firm to act as entry 
barrier if they can justify such refusal, which should not be too difficult in an era when 
each firm employs a number of legal and financial experts. 
2.3.3.4 PENALTIES 
Of considerable importance are the provisions which deal with penalties that can be 
imposed by the General Authority for Competition. Article 12 provides for the 
punishment for violations of law with a maximum penalty of five million riyals271 
allowing for its multiplication in cases of recurrence.272 This penalty seems to be 
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appropriate and mostly firms will certainly not want for the violation to recur fiven its 
punitive nature. However, a grave weakness in terms of remedying the situation is 
observed in Article 16(3) which provides that once violation has been established the 
GAC may impose a fine between one thousand273 and ten thousand274 riyals daily 
upon the violator until the violation is removed.275 Such a small penalty would allow for 
a firm with market domination to rather prolong the violation as they would probably 
have less incentive to rectify the situation given that their generated income from such 
a violation might far exceed the level of the penalty they are subjected to under the 
legislation. 
2.4 THE EFFECT OF THE SHARIA ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION LAW 
Although the Competition Law of 2004 may be described as a piece of landmark 
legislation in the KSA, it has so far been poorly implemented. Besides, staff incapacity 
and lack of adequate skills among the members of the GAC, the exemption of state- 
and publicly-owned companies, and the lack of neutrality have been major contributing 
factors behind the ineffective implementation of the Law. This section seeks to 
determine the extent to which the requirement to align positive law with Sharia may 
explain these contributing factors.  
2.4.1 THE EXEMPTION OF STATE-OWNED MONOPOLIES 
The explicit exemption of state-owned and public enterprises from the competition 
regime directly reflects on the issue of the STC and other national companies including 
Al-Nasser are majority-owned by the Saudi government. In fact, their prices of their 
commodities are ascertained by the nation’s Council of Ministers.276 There is logically 
a causal link between their exemption and the establishment of their monopolistic rule. 
The privatisation policy implemented in the KSA has also been problem considering 
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the fact that it hinders the effective implementation of competition law.277 For many 
decades, the government was reluctant to privatise most government-owned 
companies in the telecommunications sector in order to keep them within its control. 
This runs contrary to the Islamic principles discussed above that prohibit monopoly 
and encourage freedom of competition. Monopoly may only be lawful where it is 
granted by the government to promote the welfare of the entire community. However, 
Saudi authorities have not established that the explicit exemption of state-owned and 
public enterprises from the competition regime confers a bigger advantage to the 
people of the KSA than free competition.  
Also, no significant changes were introduced by the Competition Law in some of the 
sectors, such as the telecommunications sector. This may be because the Competition 
Law and Telecommunications Act seem to contradict each other. The 
Telecommunications Act hinders the entry of new telecommunications operators to 
the market and so conflicts with the law which prohibits monopoly. This internal 
legislative conflict can be regarded as one of the major issues that renders the 
competition regime ineffective in the KSA.278 An example of this issue in practice 
occurred in relation to the global telecommunications giant Vodafone which was 
restricted from operating solely in the KSA and had to collaborate with Zain Saudi 
Arabia.  
Government policies in the KSA have created several legal barriers that restrict the 
entry of foreign companies into the nation’s markets. These legal barriers include the 
Commercial Agencies Law 1962 which effectively restricted the creation of a level 
playing field, with fair, open and competitive markets within the KSA. The Commercial 
Agencies Law also gives individual enterprises in the KSA the right to carry on 
monopolistic competition, such as in car trading. This law has significantly raised entry 
barriers to new enterprises and such ventures come up against red-tape in the form 
of additional costs and may even result in being denied a license to set up a business 
in the Kingdom.279 
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The inefficiency and unfair practices are also evident from the CITC in the KSA which 
is also viewed as a major concern relating to competition law. The CITC is responsible 
for resolving issues relating to unfair competition through integrating the guidelines of 
the Competition Law. It reports on a regular basis that some of its staff members 
misuse their position which hinders some organisations from entering the market. 
Therefore, they contribute to some of the alleged corruption cases in the 
telecommunications field. This has largely led to the ineffectuality of the current regime 
owing to the fact that activities of the CITC were not in favour of ensuring fair 
competition in the KSA.280 
2.4.2 LACK OF OBJECTIVITY 
The lack of objectivity stems from the fact that the government holds a majority of the 
shares in businesses like the STC that are exempt from the competition law. This 
majority stake makes it more likely that the government will have a say in the decision-
making process, which can arguably be viewed as an anti-competitive and unfair 
business practice for competitors. This is one of the central reasons the STC lacked 
competitors for so long and the situation prevails even during this period of partial 
privatisation.281 The government also continues to put up barriers to competition. For 
example, a license to provide internet services was only granted to the STC and 
no other service providers were successful with their applications until the introduction 
of the Competition Law in 2004. 
Essentially, not only are companies able to exert positions of dominance but also when 
their owner is the government itself, they use their position in an anti-competitive 
manner without the fear of repercussions because they are exempted from the purview 
of the competition regime. In theory, such situations should not arise as the 
government is bound to abide by the same principles of Sharia as private businesses. 
However, in practice, the government has been observed to engage in anti-
competitive behaviours such as restricting the issuance of licenses to create barriers 
to entry into the market, setting competitive prices and influencing legislation in such 
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a way to favour its position. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Prior to the enactment of the Competition Law in 2004, Sharia regulated anti-
competitive conduct in markets for goods and services in the KSA. All economic 
sectors were therefore subject to the underlying Sharia principles for business 
practices. This chapter analysed six key principles and demonstrated that Sharia 
prohibits anti-competitive conduct by requiring businesses to do the following: prioritise 
the promotion of the interests of all constituencies (maslahah), refrain from inflicting 
harm on others (la dhararwa la dhirar), refrain from conducting interest-based 
transactions (riba), refrain from hoarding or limiting output in order to artificially 
increase the price of products (ihtikar), refrain from using evasive legal devices (saddu 
zara’i), and refrain from misusing rights and privileges (assuf fi al-isti). It is submitted 
that these principles generally seek to prevent the monopolisation of the market and 
avoid damage to consumers. Both objectives ensure a free market whereby a just 
price for healthy products emerges from open and fair competition.  
The Competition Law of 2004 also guarantees fair competition by prohibiting practices, 
contracts or agreements that can restrict commerce or affect the prevailing competition 
between firms. The provisions prohibiting these practices are largely contained in 
Article 4 of the Law. It also prohibits actions that can prevent the entry of new players 
in a given market and sellers are prohibited from setting prices that are predatory in 
nature. However, it was shown that the Competition Law does not accurately reflect 
the Hanbali school principles. It is also the case that the requirement to align positive 
law with the Sharia cannot be blamed for the poor implementation of the Competition 
Law. The exemption of state- and publicly-owned companies and the lack of neutrality 
have been major contributing factors behind the poor implementation of the Law. 
State-owned monopolies carrying out actions that prevent the entry of new actors flout 
Sharia which prohibits monopoly except in cases where it promotes the welfare of the 
entire community.  
Sharia also guarantees fair competition by providing clear-cut guidance regarding the 
process of dispute settlement related to conflicts arising due to anti-competitive 
conduct. The Settlement Regulation of KSA consists of 25 articles and is the guiding 
document regarding the resolution of disputes based on Sharia. As such, the 
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Competition Law would be more effective if it reflected the principles of the Sharia. A 
competitive market is more attractive to foreign companies. Given that the concept of 
a Sharia-based legal system is often difficult to comprehend for businesses based in 
secular societies, it is important to clearly illustrate how the Sharia elements correlate 
with the prevailing principles of competition law. Such an illustration as shown above 
helps to demonstrate how the competition regime may be strengthened by Sharia. The 
next chapter analyses the regulation of anti-competitive conduct in the 
telecommunications sector of the KSA wherein state-owned undertakings faced no 




CHAPTER 3  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
IN SAUDI ARABIA AND ITS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
To understand the role and need for competition law in the telecommunications sector 
of the KSA, it is necessary to first understand the background of the sector and its 
regulatory framework. This chapter examines the development of the sector and seeks 
to determine whether the statute that regulates the sector, as well as the Competition 
Law, maintains market competition and minimises of the adverse effects of monopoly. 
This is important because although the telecommunications sector is said to have 
been privatised, the relevant statutes have perpetuated the monopoly system whereby 
the government indirectly maintains a large presence in the market. Therefore, 
preventing the monopolisation of the telecommunications sector by state-owned 
enterprises is the main challenge faced by the regulators in the KSA. This chapter 
critically examines how the Saudi framework addresses the monopoly system and 
shows the extent to which the government is justified in retaining dominant control in 
the market. 
3.2 EMERGENCE OF THE INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 
The telecommunications sector poses a unique challenge to the enforcement of 
competition law and policy in the KSA. The continuous expansion of the ICT 
infrastructure to meet the increasing demand for digital services is one of the key 
factors that influence the sustainable growth of the telecommunications sector.282 The 
ICT sector in the KSA is the largest across the GCC and one of the largest in the 
Middle East by both capital market and spending.283 The Internet Service Unit (ISU) 
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created by King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) in 1998 may be 
regarded as the first ISP in the KSA.284 Five years before the creation of the ISU, King 
Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFPUM) had connected to the internet 
through the College of Computer Sciences and Engineering.285 However, only email 
was provided to KFPUM due to the low internet connection speed. The ISU 
established by KACST made the Internet service available to the wider public and 
secured the cooperation of the Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC) and other 
privately held ISPs in the Kingdom.286 The STC managed and maintained the 
Kingdom’s telecommunications infrastructure and provided the linkage between 
customers, ISPs and KACST; the latter supervised the internet gateway and filtered 
the information that the public consumed.287  
It may therefore be contended that the ISU created by KACST established the 
foundation of the ICT sector in the KSA as  enabled the internet service to be available 
to the wider population,288 and also demonstrated the importance of new learning 
strategies that required the use of ICT.289 In fact, an empirical study conducted by the 
US-Saudi Arabian Business Council revealed that since the establishment of the ISU 
a large number of young people with higher purchasing power along with broader 
knowledge of information and technology have joined and expanded the 
telecommunications industry of the Kingdom. The Business Council also revealed that 
since 2000, the industry has garnered 15 per cent yearly growth, which allowed the 
KSA to increase its spending by up to US $20 billion in 2010.290 Additionally, the 
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Communications and IT Commission of the KSA (CITC) noted in 2016 that by the end 
of the year, the population penetration rate would be 74.88 per cent mobile broadband 
subscriptions would reach 23.9 million, mobile subscriptions would reach 74.9 million, 
and the fixed broadband penetration rate would be about 46.8 per cent of 
households.291  
It must be noted that although the conservative government of the KSA was relatively 
late in connecting the internet to the public, the innovation power of the internet has 
provided major support to the KSA’s telecommunications industry by expanding the 
network with strong and secure communication links.292 Thus, as noted above, the 
continuous surge of ICT may be said to be one of the major factors contributing to the 
subnormal growth of the telecommunications sector in the KSA. It is important to note 
that the sector was the first to be privatised in the KSA with the objectives of 
encouraging foreign investment and ensuring fair competition among private 
undertakings in the industry.293 This followed from a series of nine study groups 
created by the Ministerial Committee on Privatisation to delineate the appropriate 
parameters for privatising the sector.294  
However, it will be shown below that the ownership and control of the market were not 
effectively transferred from the government to the private sector. What actually 
happened was that telecommunications activity was corporatized, but it was kept 
under full public ownership. This may be referred to as pseudo-privatisation given that 
assets were de facto transferred to state-owned undertakings or quasi-state investors, 
thereby expanding state entrepreneurship.295 Pseudo-privatisation is tantamount to a 
privatised monopoly because the government reduces its direct participation in the 
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industry but increases the role of quasi-state investors in the management of the 
largest or most dominant service providers in the industry.296  
Prior to the implementation of the privatisation strategy, there was a form of coercive 
monopoly whereby a government undertaking, the STC, was the sole provider of 
internet, mobile and fixed line telephone services and competition was prohibited. The 
next subsection briefly discusses the benefits and disadvantages of public monopolies 
and then considers whether these were present in the telecommunications industry of 
the KSA and may have motivated the formulation of a privatisation strategy 
3.2.1 THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC MONOPOLIES 
The term monopoly market generally defines a particular market with only a single 
seller or selling unit with unique products or services.297 The non-appearance of 
competition in a particular market that often results in higher profits to a particular 
business unit or group with sufficient power to set the price of the products/services 
denotes a monopoly.298 A monopoly market is also considered to be an extreme 
phenomenon or form in capitalism which tends to meet the needs and demands of any 
particular customer segment for a specific product or service.299 However, the market 
system must also contend with various factors that can create major dissatisfaction 
among customers due to the availability of a single seller of a product or service or a 
seller with a dominant market position. In this regard, the monopoly system can further 
impose major risks on the marketer if there is no additional benefit or any type of 
incentive to meet the expectations of customers for the particular good or service. 
Therefore, the following discussion differentiates the primary advantages and 
disadvantages of a monopoly market for customers within the context of the provision 
of telecommunications services.300 It must be noted that governments that are not 
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financially constrained may perpetuate a public or private monopoly where 
privatisation will reduce social welfare.301  
On the other hand, monopolies may be beneficial for businesses and detrimental to 
consumers.302 A good example is where an undertaking has control over the entire 
market for the product or service. It does not have to worry about competitors, price 
shopping patrons, or about quickly adapting to market trends as they are the ones 
setting them. However, from the consumers’ perspective, monopolies are detrimental 
and leave consumers in a situation of adhesion. Given that they have no leverage in 
the transaction, they are subject to the terms set by the monopolist. This can lead to 
consumers overpaying for goods or services, receiving bad customer service and 
delayed responses to their concerns, and not being in a position where the goods or 
services provider feels that they need to earn the customers’ business. This 
entitlement of the business in a monopoly may result in its ultimate downfall. Thus, it 
is important to determine whether the term monopoly is justified in the case of the 
KSA’s telecommunications industry. 
3.2.1.1 ADVANTAGES OF THE MONOPOLY SYSTEM 
According to Albinger, a monopoly system provides a wide range of advantages to a 
single company or group of companies, especially in experiencing major growth in the 
number of target customers for a specific product or service.303 This subsection 
focuses on three advantages that are pertinent to the KSA’s telecommunications 
market which is dominated by a single (government-owned) entity. These include 
achieving operational and financial objectives, meeting the expectations of customers, 
and facilitating the access of poor customers to products and services of good quality. 
3.2.1.1.1 Meeting Operational and Financial Objectives 
From an organisational perspective, monopoly setting often helps to meet operational 
and financial objectives. Kousadikar and Singh in this context have shown that the 
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setting not only helps to acquire the powers for determining the price of a particular 
product or service but also helps reduce a major cost that is generally required for a 
company or group to introduce or promote the product or service in a particular 
market.304 Conversely, the setting is also observed as a key element that provides a 
major set of advantages to the target customers. In this context, a monopoly system 
often helps customers to obtain adequate access to the desired products or services. 
Moreover, the system also offers benefits to customers in the form of exceptional 
features than the other similar types of products in other markets that are competitive. 
A good example is the innovation of various communication services including social 
media services with a minimal or lesser amount of charges that provided a competitive 
advantage to the STC to sustain its dominant position in the telecommunications 
industry. Services by this company have also offered major opportunities to customers 
in terms of strengthening their communication process with other individuals located 
in different areas or nations. This largely contributed to the high penetration rate 
outlined above. It may also explain why since 2000 the telecommunications industry 
in the KSA has garnered 15 per cent yearly growth. The wider range of offerings for 
internet services through packet data and broadband connections have therefore 
enabled the STC to meet the desires and expectations of customers across the 
Kingdom. In addition, its feasible packet data service charges along with high speed 
internet services have secured its sustainable position in the KSA’s 
telecommunications industry. 
3.2.1.1.2 Meeting the Expectations of Customers 
Selgin observed that the monopoly system of a market enables customers to acquire 
their desired product or service in accordance with their quality expectations.305 The 
monopoly system also helps to avoid duplication or falsification of products offered in 
a particular market. Therefore, this system ensures that the product or service 
delivered meets the quality parameters as per the expectations of the customers.306 A 
prime example of this are the telecommunications services offered by STC that often 
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include quality-based communication tools in accordance with their changing 
demands. The establishment of home business units offers varied types of television 
channels by the organisation and has enabled a wide range of customer groups to 
avail themselves of quality-based television services irrespective of their income 
levels. Also, the advanced fibre optic network, fibre to the home (FTTH), enabled the 
company to extend its home-based television service for more than 18,000 kilometres 
in 2012.307 The Interactive Television Service (ITS) through FTTH achieved a growth 
rate of 88 per cent in 2013 compared to the expansion of the network in 2012.308 
3.2.1.1.3 Enabling Poor Customers to Access Quality Products 
Research conducted by Anderson and Tollison reveals that a monopoly system may 
involve price discrimination which can further provide a major benefit to an 
economically deprived group of customers.309 In this regard, an incentive or additional 
benefit may retain values of customers and increase their trust of being advantaged 
by the offering of the monopoly system. For instance, a government-owned transport 
system can provide a discount to a financially weaker segment of people, which can 
help them to meet their needs or demands.310 The example of the STC can also be 
considered in a similar context. In relation to the current internet and data service 
functions of the organisation, STC provides valuable data packages with roaming data 
services which significantly help customers to perform necessary activities irrespective 
of their primary locations. Although the current business strategies of the STC provide 
major opportunities for the company, the monopolistic nature of its activities in the 
fixed broadband market has also been recognised to be very advantageous for its 
customers as well.311 In this regard, the customers are offered advanced 
telecommunications services at an affordable cost. The strategy of maintaining 
penetrative pricing with highly competitive services has enabled the company to meet 
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the needs of the customers.312 
3.2.1.2 DISADVANTAGES OF THE MONOPOLY SYSTEM 
Although the existence of a single provider may help to meet the needs and 
expectations of customers, such a setting can also bring major disadvantages to a 
particular target group in the market. The most relevant disadvantages in the Saudi 
Arabian telecommunications industry are discussed here. 
3.2.1.2.1 Price Discrimination 
The findings of the study conducted by McKenzie reveal that price discrimination due 
to monopoly may constitute a major hurdle to a target group of customers, especially 
customers with low purchasing power.313 The system also creates a major 
disadvantage for the business in terms of setting its pricing structure for the product 
or service as a result of inadequate knowledge about its customers and the actual cost 
of the product. The monopoly system may also substantially reduce the opportunities 
of customers to consider substitute products or services. For example, the STC 
provides versatile mobile and wireless services by partnering with clients, especially 
small-and-medium-sized corporations, from different business industries. This 
strategy often reduces opportunities for the other telecommunications service 
providers to extend their business operations or achieve their desired commercial 
goals because the STC has spread its wings to such an extent that it contracts with 
other small-and-medium-sized organisations for the provision of services.  
3.2.1.2.2 Restricting the Output of Substitute Products 
Craig and Campbell also observe that a monopoly system has significant negative 
effects on the target customers because the system restricts output of substitute 
products into a particular market.314 The system often undermines the bargaining 
power of customers due to the lack of any other marketer or availability of a particular 
good or service. Price discrimination is another negative effect of monopolies given 
that the monopolist may charge different prices to different customers for the same 
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product or service.315 This enables the monopolist to generate more profits since it is 
likely to charge higher prices to customers with higher purchasing power or customers 
who need the product or service more. 
However, in the KSA, the telecommunications services of the STC may be provided 
to different customers at different prices since the Telecommunications Act requires 
the company to offer advanced communication services to customers across the 
Kingdom at an affordable rate or price. Article 3 in the general provision of the Act 
states that the national telecommunications sector is regulated to offer their public 
telecommunications network along with advanced equipment and services at an 
affordable price. What is affordable is different to different segments of customers. As 
such, price discrimination may not necessarily be considered a negative effect of 
monopoly in such markets. Nonetheless, the Telecommunications Act also seeks to 
ensure that the service providers create a favourable competitive environment by 
promoting and encouraging fair competition across each segment of communication 
services with adequate clarity and transparency. It is difficult to achieve this goal where 
a company or owner of assets has monopoly power. This is because the latter can 
control prices and also exclude competition. The main operators, STC, Mobily and 
Zain are required to adopt fair competitive practices in the mobile services market and 
promote a wide range of advanced communication services with adequate 
encouragement to all competitors in the market. Notwithstanding, it remains the case 
that the government as the majority shareholder in these companies can decide what 
is fair and appropriate in the circumstance. Moreover, the regulators, the CITC and the 
GAC, are government agencies which are likely to agree with the government’s 
determination of what is fair and appropriate.  
Thus, in the telecommunications market the government can compel the dominant 
companies to significantly increase profit levels through selling access to the network 
infrastructure to specific mobile services providers with inelastic demand. The latter 
are logically willing to pay a higher price, which can be or is agreeable due to no other 
competitor being present. The STC owns the network infrastructure over which the 
mobile service providers offer services. What this means is that although Article 1 of 
the Competition Law prohibits monopoly, it does not prevent the abuse of a state-
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owned company by controlling the market. Hence, the STC continues to exercise 
monopoly power and may adopt practices in the market that other operators do not 
consider fair. It may also decide not to promote a wide range of advanced 
communication services with adequate encouragement to all competitors in the 
market. 
3.2.1.2.3 The Negative Impact on Consumer Welfare 
Gómez-Ibáñez also demonstrated that the monopoly system is not efficient as it often 
reduces consumer surplus as well as economic welfare in a particular market or 
area.316 The monopolist may charge a higher price to customers of any segment. This 
is detrimental to the consumers who do not have the choice of an alternative product 
or service. Hence, the communication service operations of the STC include a set of 
practices that the company adopted by promoting any type of activities that reduce 
consumers’ capability for switching to any other homogeneous products or services. 
The strategy of not providing adequate opportunity to both the customers and the 
existing competitors has often helped the STC to increase its values in the markets 
and enabled it to retain its customers. In addition, a wide range of advanced 
communication services of adequate quality and affordable prices have often reduced 
the risk of the STC losing its valuable groups of customers in the KSA. 
Research by Jayaram and Kotwani also revealed that the monopoly market system 
involves a minimum or lesser number of competitors that provide major growth 
opportunities to the monopolist to increase profits.317 In this regard, the lack of 
competition in the marketplace may lead the monopolist to give less focus to 
maintaining the expected quality of the goods or services. The monopolist may focus 
on delivering outdated products or services in order to meet the demands of 
customer, which can substantially minimise the number of customers receiving goods 
that match their quality related expectations. 
Although the fewer number of competitors in the telecommunications industry in the 
KSA provides such opportunities to the STC, the company has built its strong image 
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and reputation through its enduring performance of offering innovative experiences to 
its varied customer segments, despite its monopolistic practices. In this regard, the 
quality of each telecommunications product and service has long been seen as a key 
element in the STC remaining a strong performer in this market. As such, the 
monopoly position of the company has not adversely affected its long-term strategy of 
including strong value in each of its telecommunications service. This is appropriate 
because the STC has long played a dominant role in the KSA telecommunications 
sector and acted as a pioneer for the provision of telecommunications services within 
the industry.  
It may therefore be argued that although the telecommunications industry has 
experienced partial or pseudo privatisation and the perpetuation of the monopoly 
system, the business strategies and practices of the STC have increased social 
welfare. The telecommunications service giant has garnered its strong base and 
consolidated its dominant position through not only introducing innovative products 
and services but also by incentivising each group of users through its wide-ranging 
telecommunications services. What is important is that the state-owned company 
continues to successfully meet the demands and needs of customers. 
As such, unlike claims made in previous studies about the motivation for privatisation 
in developing countries around the world,318 the government of the KSA did not 
embrace privatisation because of the poor performance and inefficient operations of 
public or state-owned companies. Privatisation was deemed to be a means by which 
the government could attract foreign investment and ensure that customers across the 
Kingdom were offered advanced telecommunications services at an affordable cost. 
The next subsection discusses the process by which the privatisation strategy was 
implemented. 
3.22 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIVATISATION STRATEGY 
The strategy was implemented in four phases: 
• Stage 1: Corporatization (1998). In this first stage the transfer of ownership and control 
of the telecommunications activity was undertaken from the state-run 
telecommunications agency to STC. This was pseudo-privatisation given that the STC, 
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although described as independent, was a joint-stock company wholly owned by the 
government at the time.319 By 2003, it had sold 30 per cent of its shares through an 
initial public offering.320 The government still owned 70 per cent  of the shares directly. 
• Stage 2: Policy and Regulatory Reform (2001). This involved the re-organization of 
the telecommunications sector and the development of a regulatory framework 
through the issuance of legislative instruments such as the Telecommunications Act in 
2001, its Bylaws in 2002 and the Ordinance of the CITC which established the CITC 
as an independent regulator. 
• Stage 3: Partial Privatisation of STC (2003). Partial privatisation of STC was 
completed in early 2003, by divesting a 30 per cent  stake in the company to the public. 
This shows that the government intended the STC to become a shareholder-owned 
public company. However, given that the strategy involved moving from pseudo-
privatisation to partial privatisation, it has been argued that the model prioritised by 
the government lacked commercial business efficiency standards.321 One-third of the 
STC’s shares were sold to two state-owned pension funds, namely the General 
Organisation for Social Insurance and the Retirement Pension Directorate, which 
already held over 65 per cent of the total government debt.322 The public offering made 
the STC the largest publicly traded company in the KSA.323 This implies that the Saudi 
government still largely controlled the activities of the STC, as well as the market in 
which it operated.324 This was not privatisation per se, given that privatisation is 
successful where it is championed by private entrepreneurs and supported by interest 
groups.325 
• Stage 4: Liberalisation. This started with the enactment of the Telecommunications 
Act in 2001, which established the CITC and tasked the Commission with 
implementing the liberalisation programme. Up until 1998, the single (state-owned) 
operator in the telecoms market was the then Ministry of Post, Telegraph and 
Telephone.326 The CITC began issuing licenses for VSAT service provisioning in 2003 
and data services provisioning in 2005. Two additional licenses were issued in 2004 
and 2008 for second-generation mobile services (GSM) provisioning, in addition to 
third-generation mobile services (3G). This followed from an invitation to bid. Etihad 
Etisalat obtained a GSM licence for 25 years for SAR 13 billion (about GBP 3.1 
billion), which at the time was the highest price paid for a mobile telecommunications 
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licence.327 In 2005, it launched its GSM mobile services, Mobily, which effectively 
broke the monopoly in wireless business held by the STC. Mobily gained over 30 per 
cent of the market in just three years. However, 72 per cent of the shares of Etihad 
Etisalat are held by government of the KSA.328 This implies that the liberalisation 
involved increasing the role of quasi-state actors. Also, in 2005, Integrated Telecom 
Company (ITC) was given a license to offer broadband, connectivity, satellite and 
internet services to businesses and consumers.329 Another mobile licensee, Zain, 
launched its commercial services in the third quarter of 2008.330 In addition, the CITC 
issued the second fixed-line telephone license for Etihad Atheeb Telecom which 
launched its commercial services in the second quarter of 2009. Then in 2012, Lebara 
Saudi Arabia (through Mobily) and Virgin Mobile Saudi Arabia were licensed as wire 
communications providers. However, they do not own the network infrastructure over 
which they provide services.  
In light of the above, it may be submitted that the privatisation strategy implemented 
in the KSA through the four stages largely involved the transfer of ownership and 
control from the government to five state-owned companies or quasi-state investors.331 
Hence, the telecommunications activities were simply corporatized and kept wholly 
under full public ownership. It is argued that this is pseudo-privatisation since it 
effectively expanded state entrepreneurship and privatised the monopoly previously 
held directly by the state. The main objective of privatisation ought to be to rectify 
market failures caused by lack of competition and deficiencies in state control of public 
companies.332 However, where the government agency holding a monopoly simply 
transfers ownership of its assets to a state-owned company, the market does not 
become more competitive since private companies cannot expand by gaining the 
market share previously held by the government agency. Also, the public is not given 
greater choice at competitive prices.333 As such, the drafters of the privatisation policy 
did not give sufficient thought to preventing or limiting the abuse of monopoly power, 
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increasing share ownership and redistributing wealth. The next section also shows 
that the regulatory environment is still tailored to the needs of state-owned companies 
or quasi-state investors in the industry. 
3.3 THE REGULATIONS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
3.3.1 THE REGULATORS  
3.3.1.1 THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
The Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone laid the foundation in this area for the 
effective regulation of the industry. The Ministry was put in place in 1976. It was 
previously a Directorate in the Ministry of Communications.334 It was mandated with 
taking over responsibility for all forms of communications in the KSA from the Ministry 
of Communications that had come into being when the current system was in its 
infancy. The reason for this is that it was recognised that the Ministry of Post, 
Telegraph and Telephone was seeking to establish what is now understood as a 
telecommunications service. The Saudi Arabian public, government and industry have 
all benefited from this in the ensuing years.335 Also, at the time, the third basic strategic 
principle of the Fifth Development Plan for the KSA (1410-1415 AH) required the 
government to reconsider some policies and regulations in order to give private 
undertakings more flexibility and freedom and ensure fairness to investors and 
consumers alike.336 
In order to regulate the telecommunications service industry in the KSA, the Ministry 
of Communications and Information Technology was put in place in 2003 to streamline 
the government’s responsibility for supervising the operation and use of modern 
telecommunications technology. It therefore replaced the Ministry of Post, Telegraph 
and Telephone. This followed from the establishment of the Standing Committee on 
e-Commerce in 1999 that was tasked with harnessing IT applications for the benefit 
of the Kingdom’s economy, and the approval of the national policy paper on science 
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and technology in 2002 by the Council of Ministers.337 The paper lists ten strategic 
principles guiding the implementation of the science and technology policy.338 
The ICT sector was looked upon as a key aspect of the KSA’s ongoing development 
in the future due to its potentially positive impact upon both individual citizens and 
enterprises.339 Thus, it became apparent that a certain degree of government 
intervention and regulation was necessary.340 Regulation in this context was motivated 
by the public interest theory which is to the effect that markets often fail when they are 
unhindered because of negative externalities and monopoly; and government 
intervention is benign and can rectify these failures.341 The government agency tasked 
with regulation is deemed to represent the interests of the society rather than the 
interests of special groups.342 This contrasts with the Chicago theory or economic 
theory of regulation that is to the effect that regulation protects special interests rather 
than the interests of the public at large.343 An assessment of the regulatory instruments 
adopted in the KSA must therefore require the determination of whether the 
instruments have protected the public at large or at least a large subclass or whether 
they are part of a political process that allows special interest groups to maximise their 
benefits. 
3.3.1.2  THE CITC 
3.3.1.2.1 Overview 
The CITC also plays an important role in the regulation of the ICT sector. As noted 
above, the CITC Ordinance established the CITC as an independent (financially and 
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administratively) regulator during the second phase of the implementation of the 
privatisation strategy: policy and regulatory reform. As the regulator of the wider ICT 
sector, the CITC took over the regulatory functions of the ISU, a department of KACST, 
which managed the internet infrastructure in the KSA and regulated the activities of 
ISPs.344 The OTC Ordinance was issued under the Council of Ministers Resolution No 
74 dated 05/03/1422H345 with a view to then defining the regulatory body’s mandate, 
functions, governance and financing as the regulator in this industry. The CITC 
Ordinance was therefore put in place by the Saudi Arabian government to specify its 
tasks and responsibilities so that it could support the further development of the 
telecommunications industry in the KSA.346 
3.3.1.2.2 Functions of the CITC 
The establishment of the CITC was geared towards opening the Saudi 
telecommunications market and creating a favourable environment for fair 
competition. As an independent regulator, the CITC is required to protect the interests 
of the public and rights of employees in the industry by securing the right to access 
the public network at reasonable prices, as well as the confidentiality of 
communications.347 The telecommunications bylaws of 2002 provide that the CITC 
must ensure the provision of quality telecommunications services and develop the 
appropriate regulatory tools for an efficient and competitive market. In this light, the 
CITC put in place an interconnection system that facilitates the interface between 
service providers. It also developed national coding and frequency plans based on 
international standards to safeguard the process of liberalizing the 
telecommunications industry.348 The CITC therefore opened the Saudi data and 
mobile market to competition in the third and fourth stages discussed above. It granted 
licenses for mobile services, including VSAT services, to public companies such as 
Etihad Etisalat and Zain as shown above.  
The CITC regulations have granted the agency oversight of the KSA’s 
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telecommunications sector and make it primarily responsible for regulating ICT-based 
products and services offered by all the telecommunications service providers in the 
KSA. The CITC as the regulator is primarily known for maintaining fairness and 
transparency along with conserving adequate openness and equality among the 
relevant parties involved in the telecommunications sector of the nation.349 In this 
regard, the principles generally guide service operators, the government, suppliers 
and investors, and each individual or groups of public and commercial users. In order 
to bring major insight on the development of the sector, the CITC further strives to 
implement relevant and effective strategies of the Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology of the KSA. 
Although the CITC enjoys administrative and financial independence, it remains a 
governmental agency. Thus, just like the Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology, the CITC is essentially an instrument that ensures government 
intervention in the market to rectify failures and ensure open and fair competition. That 
is why it is stated above that the regulation of the telecommunications industry in the 
KSA is based on the public interest theory. The CITC is held to be responsible for 
streamlining and advancing telecommunications services in the Kingdom.350 It has 
also successfully managed and controlled tariffs associated with telecommunications 
and technology-based services; protected interests and relevant rights of the 
telecommunications service users by enforcing appropriate quality standards for the 
telecommunications and technology-based services; and increased and enforced 
strong security awareness of the information in the sector.351 
The fact that the CITC took over the regulatory role of the ISU with regard to the 
internet shows that the government of the KSA is averse to the idea of private 
orderings taking care of market failures. However, it is uncertain whether the CITC 
and Ministry of Communications and Information Technology are more effective in 
rectifying market failures than private orderings, thereby justifying government 
intervention. This is because these government-controlled regulators have not always 
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prioritised the interests of the public, which may motivate the claim that the regulation 
is captured. The CITC has, for example, filtered and prevented access to websites 
that it considers ‘offensive’, which include sites that advocate for social and political 
reforms.352 Also, the websites of some human rights organisations such as October 
26 Women’s Driving Campaign have been blocked, as well as the sites of dissidents 
based outside of the KSA such as Ali Al-Demainy.353 Then, in February 2015, the CITC 
blocked the websites of 41 local news agencies for failure to obtain the relevant 
licenses and permissions from the Ministry of Communications and Information.354 
It may be argued that the CITC has been captured by a few political leaders who 
consider dissent to be offensive, as well as the promotion of certain freedoms and 
rights. In this light, regulation by the government actually increases the imperfection in 
the market. There is no doubt that regulatory instruments that are market-based and 
regulators that are completely independent would reduce the scope of such capture.355 
However, the decisions of the CITC to filter and block access to certain websites do 
not necessarily impose costs on the economy that are greater than the costs of 
allowing unfettered access to all websites. The bone of contention here is what 
constitutes ‘public interest’ and whether there is actually a public interest theory exists 
in reality.356 The CITC receives about 200 requests each day to block sites considered 
to be offensive by members of the public.357 It has blocked sites with adult content and 
also coordinated with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency to block phishing sites that 
are set up to obtain confidential financial or personal information from unwitting 
members of the public.358 In this regard, it cannot be argued that regulation by the 
CITC and Ministry of Communication and Information Technology has been captured 
by a few political leaders or that the latter have monopolised the coercive power of 
these government agencies to exploit it for their exclusive benefit. The sites of 
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dissenters that were blocked constitute a minority of sites blocked by the CITC. Thus, 
the CITC’s actions largely promote public interest. 
If we were to discard the public interest theory, which is not recommended here, it 
should be noted that there is no ‘meta-theory’ that explains in what sectors regulation 
should be put in place or dismantled and when.359 Thus, different theories may be 
used to justify the use of regulation. In this instance, given the uncertainty regarding 
what constitutes ‘public interest’ (as used within the purview of the public interest 
theory), it may be argued that the theory that best justifies regulation by the Saudi 
government in the telecommunications sector is the social choice theory. This theory 
was developed by Arrow to emphasise the indeterminacy or instability of political 
systems.360 It is therefore related to the chaos theory developed by McKelvey361 and 
Cohen and Matthews362 amongst others, which sees that any outcome can be 
obtained from any given agenda in a simple democratic process. Thus, policies are 
generally transitory. This is equally related to the theory of structure-induced 
equilibrium, developed by Shepsle and Weingast, amongst others, which sees the 
effect that given the importance of stability, participants in the political process 
generally impose constraints on policy that increase the cost of upsetting the status 
quo.363 It follows that given the propensity for chaotic behaviour in society, the CITC 
and Ministry of Communication and Information Technology interpret the relevant laws 
and impose constraints to make it more difficult to upset the status quo. Hence, they 
have adopted measures that make it difficult for undertakings and individuals to benefit 
from IT services or content that may upset the status quo in the KSA. Given the 
conservative nature of Saudi society, it may be argued that under certain 
circumstances censorship by the CITC is the efficient choice. This argument does not 
hold as regards tailoring the regulatory environment to the needs of state-owned 
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companies or quasi-state investors in the industry. This is because all participants in 
the industry are compelled to rely on the government’s arbitrary determination of what 
upsets the status quo. Thus, regulation by government agencies, whether in 
accordance with the public interest theory or social choice theory, has simply 
reinforced the process of pseudo-privatisation and sustained the monopoly of state-
owned companies which regulation ought to suppress.  
3.3.2 THE LEGISLATION 
3.3.2.1 THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 
The Telecommunications Act sets out the basis for regulating the telecommunications 
sector in the KSA. It was enacted under the Council of Ministers Resolution No 74 of 
27 May 2001 and approved following the Royal Decree No. (M/12) of 3 June 2001. 
There are a number of key provisions of the Telecommunications Act that merit 
attention in regard to the regulation of the telecommunications sector. For example, 
Article 2 vests the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology with the 
sole right to make any necessary changes or amend the policies, as well as plan 
required developments for the KSA’s telecommunications sector. The CITC is also 
accountable for performing the functions and which duties deliberated and that 
underpin the Act. Article 3 sets out the key objectives of the Telecommunications Act, 
which will be discussed in greater detail later in this study. Article 5 addresses licenses 
for fixed and mobile telephone services, and states that operators must get legal 
approval from the Council of Ministers. Article 6 contains the required fees that must 
be paid to the General Treasury for the commercial provision of telecommunications 
services. 
Article 4 restricts the provisions of fixed and mobile telephone services to joint stock 
operators. It also provides that ‘no operator may be dominant or prevent, restrict or 
distort competition.’ Article outlines the reasons why the telecommunications sector 
should be regulated which include to ensure the provision of access to the public 
networks and services at affordable prices, safeguard the public interest, and ensure 
clarity and transparency of procedures, as well as equality and non-discrimination. 
Thus, this supports the above contention that regulation in the KSA is based on the 
public interest theory. However, the Telecommunications Act seeks to prevent 
monopoly which may often result from regulation that is primarily geared towards 
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protecting the interests of the public at large.  
The bylaws of the Telecommunications Act were issued in 2002 by Ministerial 
resolution. They support the Act and provide specific procedures for the regulation by 
the CITC. For example, Chapter Two of the Bylaws outlines the procedures and rules 
for licensing telecommunications services. The Telecommunications Act and its 
bylaws therefore provide the foundation for the telecommunications sector’s regulatory 
framework through the work of the CITC. The enactment of these statutes was also 
part of the third phase of the implementation of the privatisation strategy (partial 
privatisation) discussed above. The Telecommunications Act therefore seeks to 
ensure that telecommunications services are not only advanced, adequate and 
affordable in the circumstances, but also that there is an effective climate within the 
industry for encouraging fair and significant competition. Hence, the legislation 
acknowledges the importance of competition in the market but unfortunately, it does 
not recognise the importance of empowering private orderings to tackle market failure. 
This is because it designates a government agency, albeit financially and 
administratively independent, as the sole regulator. It is this regulator, the CITC, that 
must also ensure that communication frequencies are used efficiently to reach a wide 
range of customers, advanced telecommunications technologies are transferred and 
increased efficiently, adequate transparency and clarity in different communication 
processes are realised, and valuable interests of the public are protected along with 
those of valuable stakeholders ranging from communications service users to 
investors of the companies.364  
3.3.2.1.1 The Primacy of Public Interests 
The provisions discussed above clearly demonstrate the primacy of public interests. 
The goals of the Act are to reconcile the needs of citizen consumers with a regulatory 
framework that would permit economic sustainability within the market sector and 
prohibit anti-competitive practices that could have widespread detrimental effects. 
However, the above discussion also shows that the drafters of the Act did not perceive 
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any major risk of monopoly in the sector since the Act made the sector subject to 
potential entry and competition. This may explain why following the enactment of the 
Act and its bylaws, the shareholding of the STC was diversified. As noted above, 30 
per cent of its shares was divested to the public. Nonetheless, it is uncertain why the 
drafters did not think that market failures would be better controlled by the forces of 
competition rather than a government agency. In this light, it is uncertain how the CITC 
ensures that service providers efficiently use all available frequencies and provide for 
telecommunications technologies transfer as soon as they arise. Also, it is uncertain 
how the CITC ensures the achievement of equality. 
Djankov et al argued that the strategies of control of private businesses by the state 
include public enforcement through regulation, state ownership, market discipline and 
private litigation.365 They also noted that these strategies are not mutually exclusive 
and may operate in the same market. They may be said to have aptly described the 
telecommunications market in the KSA where all four strategies operate: the regulator 
is a government agency; the majority of shares of the STC (the largest operator) are 
owned by the government and the 30 per cent stake divested in the public was actually 
given to two state-owned pension funds, namely the General Organisation for Social 
Insurance and the Retirement Pension Directorate, which already held over 65 per 
cent of the total government debt; market discipline or market-based management of 
risk and promotion of transparency366 in the sector operates in accordance with the 
wishes of the government since it owns and directs the activities of the STC; and 
private litigation in Sharia courts would no doubt reinforce the idea of social control of 
business.  
3.3.2.1.2 The Effectiveness of the Regulation by the State 
As such, it may be contended that the rules and procedures contained in the 
Telecommunications Act and its bylaws impose strategies of social control of 
businesses in the telecommunications sector and provide guidance to the service 
providers themselves and all other parties considered to be relevant in the industry to 
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make the process of regulation by the state as efficient as possible.367 Nonetheless, 
what is important is whether the regulation by the state is efficient. Shleifer argues that 
the premise of the enforcement theory of regulation (that favours public intervention in 
the market) is that all of the four strategies for social control of businesses discussed 
above are imperfect, and the government must choose between the imperfect 
alternatives.368 Hence, there must be a trade-off between disorder (caused by private 
undertakings cheating, overcharging or imposing external costs) and dictatorship by 
the government that imposes the costs on the dishonest private agents. However, the 
government should choose the strategies for social control only when it is established 
that market discipline is unable to enforce good conduct in the market. This is 
important because the cost of market discipline is very low for the public regulator. In 
the KSA, the CITC has been assessed as being effective in enforcing a number of 
different principles including openness, transparency, fairness and equality between 
the different stakeholders involved.369 It achieves these goals through its functions of 
maintaining transparency in telecommunication practices, ensuring the providers are 
compliant, protecting consumers and the public interest by enforcing the law’s anti-
competitive provisions, and subjecting all providers to the same compliance rules and 
standards. Furthermore, the CITC is also successfully playing the role of bringing 
about the effective implementation of the Saudi Arabian government’s strategies for 
regulating the telecommunications industry so as to benefit the country as a whole.370  
Thus, it may be argued that public intervention and ‘dictatorship’ seem to be effective 
in the KSA. However, it is uncertain why this approach (including the social control of 
business) was adopted without prior thought to the question of how effective market 
discipline would be in the telecommunications industry of the KSA. Surely, this 
question is important since the cost of efficient market discipline is very low for the 
state. Nonetheless, it may be said that the strategy of pseudo-privatisation and the 
public interest theory are aligned with the public enforcement of regulation that was 
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established by the Telecommunications Act and its bylaws. This is because after 
opening the market through pseudo-privatisation, the government indirectly remains 
in control of the STC, and after liberalisation by issuing licenses to quasi-state 
investors such as Mobily (Saudi Telecom Company) and Etihad Etisalat the 
government remains indirectly in control of the telecommunications market. 
3.3.2.2 THE COMPETITION LAW OF 2004 
The Competition Law of the KSA can be duly regarded as a major influence on the 
continuous pace of the nation’s telecommunications business sector growth. 
Promulgated in June 2004 through Royal Decree No M/25 and becoming effective 
from January 2005, the Competition Law along with its regulatory norms and 
competition-related rules created a strong regulatory regime for the Kingdom. The 
regulatory guidelines and rules contained in the 21 articles of this law are governed by 
the GAC. They are applicable to all business entities irrespective of whether they are 
domestic and global subsidiaries in the Kingdom. However, the Competition Law is 
not applicable to state-owned companies, although the regulatory norms in the regime 
restrict domination of any company governed by a public agency or organisation of the 
nation.371 
The Competition Law consolidates some important decrees that prohibit some 
activities for certain persons.372 The Law applies together with many laws that have 
had a major influence on the telecommunications sector in the KSA particularly those 
that aim at enhancing the quality and reliability of telecommunications services offered 
by both domestic and global service providers including the STC, Integrated Telecom 
Company, Bayanat Al Oula for Network Services and Etihad Etisalat/Mobily service 
operators. The most important of these laws is the Telecommunications Act. Given 
that the Competition Law was promulgated after the Telecommunications Act, the 
majority of its provisions are not included within the Act. As such, the Competition Law 
serves as an overarching regulation and plays a gap-filling role in regard to matters on 
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which the Telecommunications Act is silent. Nonetheless, it is uncertain which law 
should apply to govern competition issues in the telecommunications industry. Both 
laws were promulgated through a royal decree. 
In relation to the primary roles of the Competition Law, its regulatory policies include 
a strong set of core provisions that prohibit any type of agreements between 
organisations that are subject to the law that would result in a negative impact on 
commerce or reduce the business operations of other organisations in the nation. 
Restricting the ability of a large organisation to achieve a dominant position in the 
telecommunications sector can also be regarded as a key role of both the 
Telecommunications Act and the Competition Law. In this regard, by confining the 
ability of the considerably larger telecommunications operators to play a dominant role 
and undermine the services of other operators, the Competition Law may be said to 
be important in ensuring fairness and equality in the market. The provision 
underpinning the regulation plays a pervasive role for each marketer, ranging from 
small-to-medium-sized companies to get equal opportunity. With regard to the 
telecommunications sector, it is uncertain whether the above applies to the STC. It is 
also uncertain whether the Competition Law applies together with the 
Telecommunications Act to achieve the above goals or it is a question of which 
regulator is enforcing good conduct. Thus, where the CITC seeks to issue sanctions 
to ensure fairness and equality, the Telecommunications Act will apply, and where it 
is the GAC, the Competition Law will apply. 
3.3.2.2.1 Obstacles to the Implementation of the Competition Law 
The implementation of the Competition Law in the telecommunications sector faces 
some important obstacles. First, government agencies are exempt. Secondly, the 
Commercial Agencies Law adopted by Royal Decree No M/11 of 23 July 1962 allows 
private undertakings to monopolise goods through ‘exclusive agents’. Thirdly, the 
government is the majority shareholder in many dominant companies as shown above. 
Given that it is the GAC that is tasked with enforcing the law, there is a problem of 
conflict of interests since the GAC is also run by the government.  
The KSA is an example of a country whose government has implemented a wide 
privatisation programme but retains a large presence in the market. The umbilical cord 
between the state and market has not been cut, leaving sufficient room for several 
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complex problems. Some of the problems include regulatory capture, less competition, 
and inefficiency. Shleifer and Vishny noted that partial privatisation sometimes 
provides little incentive to restructure since it is easier for the state-owned company to 
extract rents from the government than carry out difficult reforms.373 Also, the 
government is under pressure to keep such companies afloat by providing subsidies 
which then shield the companies from competition. As noted above, in the KSA, it is 
more appropriate to talk of pseudo-privatisation rather than partial privatisation. This 
has led to a suboptimal level of competition where the state-owned companies that 
dominate the market are not compelled to share their gains with consumers. Moreover, 
it is shown in this section that the regulatory framework is not set up to prevent the 
dominant companies in the market from colluding with bureaucrats to serve interests 
other than those of consumers and taxpayers. 
The above problems may be said to be linked to the strategy of pseudo-privatisation, 
rather than privatisation, the public interest theory governing regulation and the public 
enforcement of regulation established both by the Telecommunications Act and the 
Competition Law. Thus, after opening the telecommunications market through 
pseudo-privatisation, the government indirectly remains in control of the market. The 
Competition Law, as well as the Telecommunications Act, has created a pseudo-
independent regulator and helped the Saudi government to privatise monopoly since 
the government has reduced its direct participation in the industry but increased the 
role of quasi-state investors in the management of the largest providers in the 
industry.374 Although it may be argued that the telecommunications market is actually 
an oligopoly since the fixed broadband and mobile services market is dominated by 
three large companies, the STC, Mobily and Zain, it is more appropriate to talk of 
monopoly since the state largely owns the three companies and retains such control 
in the market that makes possible the manipulation of prices. It follows that the main 
shortcoming of the Telecommunications Act and Competition laws is that they have 
perpetuated the problem of state and quasi-state monopoly. This is especially the case 
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in the fixed broadband market where the STC is favoured with infusions of capital that 
guarantees its monopoly status.375 With regard to the mobile services market, although 
the quasi-state investors, the STC, Mobily and Zain, have competitors such as Virgin 
Mobile and Lebara, the government still controls a large enough share of the market 
through the quasi-state investors.376 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The telecommunications sector was the first to be privatised in the KSA with the 
objectives of increasing the efficiency of and ensuring fair competition among private 
undertakings in the industry. However, it was shown above that what actually 
happened was that the telecommunications activity was corporatized, but also kept 
wholly under full public ownership. Hence, it was pseudo-privatisation given that 
assets were de facto transferred to state-owned undertakings or quasi-state investors, 
thereby expanding state entrepreneurship. For example, one-third of the STC’s shares 
were sold to two state-owned pension funds which already held over 65 per cent of 
the total government debt. Also, Etihad Etisalat obtained a GSM licence for 25 years. 
In 2005, it launched its GSM mobile services, Mobily, which effectively broke the 
monopoly in wireless business held by the STC. Mobily then gained over 30 per cent 
of the market in just three years. However, 72 per cent of the shares of Etihad Etisalat 
are held by the government of the KSA. Then subsequent mobile licensees, ITC and 
Zain, launched their commercial services in 2005 and the third quarter of 2008. 
However, the chairpersons of ITC and Zain are members of the Royal family. As such, 
the drafters of the privatisation policy did not give sufficient thought to the questions of 
preventing or limiting the abuse of public monopoly power, encouraging diverse share 
ownership and redistributing wealth. 
In the same vein, it was shown that the ICT sector was looked upon as a key aspect 
of the KSA’s ongoing development due to its potentially positive impact upon both 
individual citizens and enterprises. Thus, it became apparent that a certain degree of 
government intervention and regulation was necessary. Public enforcement of 
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regulation was therefore established by the Telecommunications Act and the 
Competition Law. It is suggested that this is based on the public interest theory, and 
to a lesser extent on the social choice theory. Hence, what is important is prioritising 
the interests of the public at large. The state largely owns the three companies that 
dominate the market and therefore retains such control that makes possible the 
manipulation of prices to ensure that they are affordable to all customers. It also 
ensures that customers acquire their desired product or service in accordance with 
their quality expectations. However, the researcher was unable to find any evidence 
that the drafters of the relevant statutes and policies have given sufficient thought to 
the question of market discipline or whether private orderings may be more efficient in 
rectifying market failures. Also, the fact that the state maintains a large presence in 
the market and controls the regulators still leaves room for complex problems such as 
conflict of interests and regulatory capture. As such, it is contended that with the 
continuous expansion of the telecommunications market and the entry of companies 
with no ties to the state, the government should consider empowering private 





DIFFERENT TYPES OF ABUSE BY DOMINANT 
PLAYERS IN THE SAUDI TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Free markets are characterized by competition between firms and products. This kind 
of competition is in theory beneficial to the consumers and the entire market because 
each company will strive to produce the best products so as to attract more customers. 
Consumers in turn have a wide range of high-quality products to choose from. This 
competition may also in theory lead to improved efficiency among firms and the better 
utilization of resources, hence avoiding unnecessary wastage. Despite these 
advantages, pure free markets rarely exist. This is because the government intervenes 
in some situations so as to regulate the distribution of goods and services.377 This 
intervention is necessary and healthy in a free market as it aims to help both the 
consumers and producers. Thus, government may regulate the objectives of firms. 
Since maximization of profits is the main objective for producers, some of them may 
feel compelled to use unscrupulous means to meet this objective. They may, for 
instance, exploit their workers and consumers by charging high prices or restricting 
competition. The government has to step in to ensure there is a level playing field for 
all producers as well as promoting and protecting the rights of consumers and 
workers.378  
In the Saudi telecommunications sector prior to the enactment of the Competition Law, 
such unsavoury practices were employed by the major market players in an attempt 
to retain their dominance and eliminate threats from competitors. In this chapter, 
emphasis will be placed on the anti-competitive practices perpetrated by the largely 
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state- owned STC, which consistently took advantage of its dominant market position 
in the Saudi Arabian telecommunications sector.  
It will be shown that the Telecommunications Act (TA) was an attempt to open up the 
Saudi market to greater privatisation379 and encourage competition within the 
sector,380 given the benefits of a free market. The statute sought ‘to ensure the creation 
of [a] favourable atmosphere to promote and encourage fair competition in all fields of 
telecommunication’. which also included providing ‘advanced and adequate 
telecommunication services at affordable prices’ and safeguarding ‘the public interest 
and user interest’,381 However, the persistence of these abusive practices by the STC 
limited the effectiveness of the Act within the Kingdom. 
This chapter therefore seeks to establish that although associating the 
telecommunications sector with the free market economy may be beneficial to society, 
government intervention is necessary, especially in a developing society such as the 
KSA. It explores the different ways in which undertakings could abuse their dominant 
power in a free market and then describes what occurred in the Saudi 
telecommunications sector prior to the introduction of an explicit competition law.382 It 
then seeks to determines whether the coming into force of the competition provisions 
of the Telecommunications Act resulted in any significant changes. In this light, it 
assesses the effects-based approach adopted by the Saudi legislator.  
4.2 PRE-COMPETITION LAW TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
MARKET 
Prior to the enactment of the Saudi Competition Law, there were two important phases 
of the telecommunications sector’s history, namely the period prior to the enactment 
of the Telecommunications Act, and the period after the Telecommunications Act 
came into force and prior to the enactment of the Competition Law. The first phase 
may generally be described as one of public monopoly in the telecommunications 
sector as shown in Chapter Three. During this period, there were no laws regulating 
anti-competitive conduct or promoting market competition. Also, there were no 
                                               
379 See Articles 12 to 23 of the Telecommunications Act. 
380 Ibid, Articles 24 to 27. 
381 Ibid, Article 3. 
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licensure provisions in place to allow new service providers to easily enter the 
market.383 Given that the state owned the STC, which had been granted the exclusive 
ownership and control of telecommunications activity, potential competitors were 
excluded from the sector. The introduction of the Telecommunications Act was an 
attempt to open the market up to private players and establish guidelines under which 
licenses could be granted. However, it was noted in Chapter Three that this attempt 
resulted only in partial privatisation. Nonetheless, it was important to address the 
practices adopted by the STC to restrict competition and maintain its relative market 
position. It is argued in this section that the most effective way of addressing anti-
competitive conduct by a state-owned enterprise is to align the telecommunications 
sector more closely with a free market economy.  
4.2.1 THE IMPACT OF THE FREE MARKET ECONOMY 
Free market economies have for a long time been associated with capitalism.384 
However, recent years have also seen socialists adopt this market structure.385 A free 
market economy is one which primarily functions according to the market forces of 
demand and supply, with little or no government control.386 Goods and services in a 
free market are distributed based on the principle that their prices should be 
determined entirely by market forces. Hence, the price of goods and services changes 
depending on the changes in supply and demand. Generally, when the supply of 
goods is high, the prices will be low.387 On the other hand, when the demand is high 
the prices of goods and services will shoot up. Proponents of the free market argue 
that the distribution of goods and services in a free market as well as the hierarchy 
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between consumers and capital are adversely affected by external factors such as 
government regulations and monopolies.388 
Free market economies are beneficial in a number of ways. Since prices are 
determined by the forces of demand and supply, they are likely to be affordable to the 
majority of consumers.389 When the prices go higher than what most consumers can 
afford, they are likely to shift their demand to other competing products. This will force 
producers to increase their supply so as to lower prices and attract more customers. 
This is advantageous because consumers can control prices so that they within 
affordable ranges.390 
The other advantage of a free market economy is the creation of employment 
opportunities. When demand for a product goes up, businesses have to employ more 
people so as to produce more goods to meet the demand. This demand may create 
employment opportunities such as bookkeeping, marketing agents and vendors. 
In such economies, consumers in theory have the freedom to either buy or reject 
products because of the wide variety of products to choose from. Also, producers 
benefit because they only need to focus on producing those goods and services which 
are in demand.391 This enables them to make maximum profits since they will only be 
producing goods and services that have a ready market. This also helps them to use 
their resources effectively. 
Free markets are also characterized by competition between firms and products.392 
This kind of competition is beneficial to consumers and the entire market because 
each company will strive to produce the best products so as to attract more customers. 
The latter in turn have a wide range of products to choose from. This competition will 
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also lead to improved efficiency among firms leading to better utilization of resources, 
hence avoiding unnecessary wastage. 
It follows from the above that associating ICT with the free market economy may be 
beneficial to society.393 This may have a positive effect on the distribution of existing 
information. Older means of distributing information are replaced by faster and more 
effective means due to competition between producers.394 However, it must be noted 
the development of ICT is a process that is often punctuated by disruptive inventions 
or infringements of intellectual property rights.395 In this light, Crowe notes that the 
policymaker must seek to achieve a balance between promoting competition in a free 
market and regulating the behaviour of producers and distributors.396 With regard to 
the promotion of competition, the policymaker must note that ICT is not a utility industry 
as well as a natural monopoly. It is ‘a leg whose development has lagged due to central 
planning, embraced and encouraged by entrenched incumbents.”397 The policymaker 
must also note that innovation is largely due to competition. Companies that dominate 
an ICT era seldom break new ground with innovative developments. Thus, de facto 
monopolies are counterproductive in the industry.398 It follows that the fact that the free 
market may be beneficial to society does not imply that the government must simply 
cut off all the fetters of regulation and let the free market work without any form of 
government supervision and control. The next section shows why regulation is 
required, even if it is in a limited form.  
4.2.1.1   GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE FREE MARKET 
There are a number of reasons why the government may need to intervene in an 
otherwise free market. A primary reason is to regulate the objectives of firms acting 
within the market sector.399 Given that firms wish to maximise their profits, they may 
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oten be tempted to engage in anti-competitive practices to achieve these goals. As a 
result, these practices can taint the economic sector and have both business and 
societal impacts. In such circumstances, the government can intervene to assess the 
objectives of the company as well as the means through which they will achieve those 
objectives in order to protect the health of the economy, other businesses and the 
company’s employees. 
A free market may also lead to strict production of only those goods that are in 
demand.400 Certain goods and services that are necessary but not in demand at 
certain points in the market may not be produced. This will lead to the destabilization 
of the economy as well as the lives of poor people who may not be able to afford the 
goods that are in high demand. The government therefore steps in to regulate the 
market so as to ensure that both highly demanded and necessary goods and services 
are produced at the same time. 
The government can also step in to advance and promote the rights of disadvantaged 
members of society such as the elderly and disabled.401 These people may be avoided 
by companies who may not feel their skills will enable their businesses to maximize 
their profits. The government aims at ensuring these people have a role to play in the 
production of goods and services. In some cases, consumers may prefer to increase 
demand for not so good products such as alcohol, cigarettes and other drugs or 
demerit goods at the expense of merit goods such as legal and healthy products. The 
government has a duty to step in to regulate supply and demand for the demerit goods 
and protect the citizens’ welfare.13 
Thus, while a free market may be ideal for promoting competition and enhancing 
efficiency, there are instances where government intervention is important to ensure 
a level playing field for all producers, as well as the protection of the rights of 
consumers and workers.402 The need for government intervention in the sector market 
is reflected by the objectives and competition provisions of the Telecommunications 
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Act as shown below. 
4.2.1.2   GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the primary objective of the Telecommunications Act 
is to provide advanced and adequate services at affordable prices that would be easily 
accessible to Saudi citizens.403 The legislature sought to do this by creating an 
environment that would encourage fair competition in the telecommunications sector 
and protect the public interest. One of the primary ways that it sought to achieve these 
objectives was through the Competition Rules set out in Chapter Six of the 
Telecommunications Act.404 
The Competition Rules provide that operators are prohibited from abusing their 
positions in the market to obtain a dominant position.405 Further, operators are 
explicitly prohibited from entering into agreements that might assist an operator in 
obtaining a dominant position or otherwise prevent, restrict or distort competition in the 
sector. In an attempt to use the government’s position to prevent anti-competitive 
behaviour on an ex ante basis, the Act requires operators to obtain the board’s 
approval for mergers or for purchasing more than 5 per cent of the ownership of 
another operator or a percentage that creates a dominant position in the sector.406 
Most importantly, the law restricts operators from undertaking any activities or actions 
that would constitute an abuse of a dominant position.407 Despite the law’s express 
condemnation of such practices, and the fact that these practices fall foul of intrinsic 
Sharia principles applicable to all businesses operating within the Kingdom, the 
telecommunications sector in the Kingdom has still witnessed significant instances of 
dominance by market players and the abuse of those dominant positions. The next 
section discusses how these dominant practices manifest themselves within the 
telecommunications sector. 
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4.3   Dominance 
Dominant power in this context refers to a position of economic strength, acquired by 
an institution or individual, which is enjoyed via the implementation of undertakings 
that enable them to thwart effective competition from being maintained in the relevant 
market.408 While Saudi law did not provide a definition of dominance prior to the 
enactment of the Competition Law,409 the Sharia principles that apply in the Kingdom 
prohibit monopoly which may lead to the abuse of a dominant position.410 As per Article 
2 of the Competition Law, dominance is defined as a state where one company 
assumes a superior role which allows it to benefit from all the advantages that are 
evident in that specific market. As such, it may be argued that when a company is able 
to dominate a market through its brand, products and/or services, as well as through 
incorporating its strategies, the company may abuse the dominant position by 
acquiring an even bigger market share.411 Article seeks to prevent this from happening. 
Further, Article 5 of the Competition Law provides that a company that dominates the 
market with its products and/or services should not influence consumers to adopt their 
beliefs. Nonetheless, having a dominant position is legal but abusing that power is 
strictly prohibited by the Competition Law. This aims to ensure the promotion of fair 
trade. Abuse, and the forms that it can take, will be explored in further detail in the next 
sections. Before that, the difference between simply obtaining a dominant position and 
abusing that position will be elaborated. If a company is popular among consumers 
either due to its longstanding history in the market or the particular level of service it 
provides but has not engaged in anti-competitive behaviour then this would be a 
permissible position of dominance. However, if a company sells its products at a lower 
cost than its production cost in order to reduce competition, this could be considered 
obtaining a position of dominance through impermissible and exploitative means. 
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Further, if the company creates a situation of artificial shortage or introduces 
conditions on selling and purchasing, such as tying,412 then the company would be 
guilty of abusing its dominant position. In other words, when a company occupies a 
dominant position in the market, it also has a duty not to exploit that position to the 
detriment of competitors or consumers. The next subsections discuss the different 
ways (primary and secondary) in which dominance may become an issue within the 
telecommunications sector. 
4.3.1 PRIMARY TYPES OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
Abuse generally refers to a form of maltreatment or an attempt by the abuser to control 
the behaviour of individuals so as to maintain power and control over them.413 It 
incorporates the manipulation of the situation by those with the capability to influence 
the rest, thus making the latter vulnerable. In most instances, those engaging in 
abusive deeds do so for their own ends, either to maintain their authority or to 
maximise personal wealth.414 The types of abuse at issue in the telecommunications 
sector encompass omissions, financial abuse, discriminatory abuse in the availability 
of products and monopoly abuse regarding businesses.26 Therefore, abuse refers to 
a wide variety of actions that involve the adoption of manipulative acts by those in 
power in a bid to maintain their power or rule over the inferior factions for their own 
benefit.415 What is important in this context is that the manipulative acts have a 
detrimental effect on competition.416 This is called the ‘effects-based approach’ and 
helps to narrow down the concept of abuse to anti-competitive behaviour that harms 
consumers.417 This implies that abuse is an objective concept and it is not important 
to establish subjective intent to restrict competition and cause detriment to 
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Regarding the telecommunications market, exclusionary conduct is common in the 
form of exclusive purchasing obligations or exclusivity rebates whereby buyers are 
required to buy all or most of their products from the dominant supplier.419 There is 
also abuse when a monopoly company influences the markets of the product as well 
as the prices so as to discourage potential investors from venturing into a similar 
business, thus evading competition.420 As noted above, abuse can manifest itself in 
numerous forms, for example, taking advantage of others or accessing confidential 
information regarding a person or industry and using it as a weapon to blackmail 
them.421 The discussion below focuses on two major ways in which a dominant 
company in the telecommunications sector can exploit its position in an abusive 
manner. 
4.3.1.1   OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OF COMPETITORS 
A company’s capability to influence market prices is frequently constrained by its rivals 
as well as customers because they seek alternative suppliers. However, if a company 
has full control over the prices without losing its clients or facing challenges from 
competitors, the company is deemed to have market power. In the case of United 
Brands v Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that 
dominance implies a position of economic strength whereby an undertaking is able ‘to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market’ because it has 
‘the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers’.422 
Significant or substantial market power may constitute a monopoly or dominant power 
by the company that has no competitive constraints.423 For example, if the competitor 
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is offering low quality products as compared to what the dominant one is offering, the 
dominant company can easily manipulate the prices because it knows that its 
customers will continue to use its products. This power is typically abused if the 
company uses it to weaken the competition, restrict potential investors from initiating 
a similar business venture by setting high standards, interfering with prices by setting 
unfavourable ones and, above all, contributing to an unconducive environment for 
rivals.424 Abuse of dominant power by dominating companies could contribute to 
adverse economic effects in a country. Thus, it is important that competition law which 
facilitates the fair running of businesses should be enforced in all markets.425 It will be 
argued in this thesis that the Telecommunication Act alone is insufficient to force 
dominant companies (mostly state-owned) from creating an inhospitable environment 
for competitors. 
4.3.1.2 LACK OF SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS 
Another way in which telecommunications service providers engage in abuse of their 
dominant positions is by exploiting the absence of substitute products and a reduced 
level of competition in the market. This is because when a market only has minimal 
players, any company that offers advanced technology or services can automatically 
assume a position of dominance with regard to that particular technology or service. 
When this situation arises, any company that attempts to follow suit may be viewed as 
disadvantaged because it will be forced to compete with the prices and market set by 
the dominant company. In this regard, it could be argued that a company that 
has a dominant position directly or indirectly discourages new entrants in the same 
market, thus having a negative impact on the market situation. Nevertheless, these 
practices are prohibited within Sharia principles as they hamper the prosperity of 
mankind by affecting the overall development of society.426 When a company becomes 
successful, which is reflected in their market share, chances are high that the company 
can manipulate the market and engage in unfair business practices just to increase 
their profits. Once, the company’s actions stop serving economic and social purposes 
while promoting excesses and arbitrariness, they may be said to be in violation of 
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It will be shown here that this is an issue that the Telecommunications Act broadly, 
and inefficiently, attempts to address. The statute aims to prohibit companies from 
taking part in unfair practices and forces them to ensure the sustainability of 
competition. However, such provisions are difficult to enforce in practice when firms 
use secondary types of abuse whereb, they reduce competition within the market by 
manipulating both the prices of products as well as their flow in the market. This takes 
the benefits away from society and creates an artificial scarcity of products which in 
turn negatively affects the economic condition of the country. The next subsection 
discusses these methods of abuse. It distinguishes between exclusionary and 
exploitative abuse. 
4.3.2  THE TWO MAIN CATEGORIES OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
Abuse of market dominance can be categorized into two secondary types of 
practices—exclusionary abuse and exploitative abuse. They represent individual, 
strategic tactics used by operators in the market to affect competition and secure their 
position of dominance in the sector. This subsection discusses both categories and 
the extent to which they are applicable in the Saudi telecommunications sector. 
4.3.2.1 EXCLUSIONARY ABUSE 
Exclusionary abuse occurs when the dominating firm has the objective to influence or 
exclude competitors from the market sector.428 To accomplish this exclusion, the 
dominant firm deploys various strategies that, once executed, ensure their competitors 
cannot survive, thereby effectively excluding them from participating in the market 
sector. The dominating firm does this without the consent of its competitors who will 
later feel the effects when the deployed mechanism begins to function in the market.429 
The goal of utilising an exclusionary abuse tactic is to force a competitor out of the 
market, thereby allowing the dominant firm to acquire their share or customers. The 
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mechanisms that can be deployed under exclusionary abuse mechanisms are 
explored below. 
4.3.2.1.1 Predatory Pricing 
In this case, the dominant firm is referred to as a predator if it sets prices for its products 
or services so low for a particular period of time that the firm’s competitors have 
difficulty matching them.430 As a result of the competitor’s small customer base, its 
attempts to match the low pricing of the dominant firm will force the competitor to suffer 
losses until ultimately it decides to leave the market. Further, this practice ensures that 
those firms that are on the brink of venturing into that industry sector are discouraged 
from doing so.431  
For example, in a situation in which the predator and its competitor are all operating 
at the same level and targeting the same customer base, and where the quality of 
services are the same and the products provided are also almost the same, or the 
predator’s products may even be of a higher quality, when the predator lowers the 
prices of its products, its competitor has no choice but to do the same. This implies 
that both the predator and the competitor will suffer significant losses. The predator 
has done this strategically, knowing that these losses will be recovered in the future. 
Meanwhile, its competitor is forced to unexpectedly lower its prices so as to react to 
the existing situation. The predator knows that it has some reasonable expectation of 
success if the gamble goes in its favour because by then it will command a large 
customer base and the profits made during that period would be sufficient to warrant 
the losses that it is incurring and foregoing the profit that it could have earned.432 
However, one should note that although the STC used this tactic, it was not necessary 
for this company in the Saudi telecommunications sector because it had already 
dominated the market and had no strong competitor to force it into engaging in 
predatory pricing.433 
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4.3.2.1.2   Margin Squeeze 
This is a type of exclusionary abuse of dominance that arises when a vertically- 
integrated monopolist sells an upstream bottleneck input to its competitors who are 
competing in a downstream market while the monopolist dominates the supply of 
downstream products. A margin squeeze is said to occur when the margin between 
the price at which the monopolist sells the same product offered by its competitor, who 
used its raw materials to make it (downstream product), and the price at which the 
monopolist sells the upstream bottleneck products to its rivals, is too small to enable 
an efficient downstream competitor to compete.434 This process weakens the position 
of the rival firm. At the same time, it limits or discourages the entry of new businesses 
by providing a conducive business environment for the dominant firm to do business 
to the detriment of those seeking to enter the market to provide similar products.435 
4.3.2.1.3   Tying 
Tying, as noted above, occurs when the supplier of a particular product sells a product 
(tying product) with the condition that the buyer should also purchase a different, 
accompanying product (tied product) from the same supplier or from someone with 
whom the supplier has a material relationship.436 If the tied product is not included in 
the agreement between the supplier and the consumer, then the entire process is an 
abuse of the supplier’s dominant position. Dominant firms achieve tying in various 
ways. For example, if the buyer enters into a contract clause with the supplier, the 
supplier may inform the customer that he/she should purchase the tied product before 
any delivery of the tying product is made. The supplier can also refuse to supply the 
tying product without the tied product. The real negative effect on rivals is that it might 
bring about the abandonment of the market for the tied product. For example, some 
machines are only able to function with spare parts from the manufacturer. 
Additionally, tying attracts economies of scale as both the tied and tying products are 
supplied just once.437 In the Saudi telecommunications sector, the STC achieved this 
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by offering its internet services and television signal through a cable. Any individual 
who wanted internet in his or her home was required to accept installation of the TV 
signal and vice versa. The internet and broadcasting services provided by the STC 
were therefore tied because they were included in the agreement with anyone 
purchasing a TV or internet modem. In the same vein, although Virgin Mobile KSA has 
been awarded a license to operate as a Mobile Virtual Network Operator, the 
company’s services are tied to the STC’s network. Hence, Virgin Mobile KSA’s 
offerings or products may only be received on frequencies on which the STC’s network 
operates. 
4.3.2.2 EXPLOITATIVE ABUSE 
The second category of abuse is exploitative abuse which is where the dominant firm 
intentionally abuses its dominance by charging excessive prices and applies other 
conditions that are unfair to competitors and consumers.438 The exploitative categories 
include price discrimination and excessive pricing. 
4.3.2.2.1 Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination is a method for abusing a dominant position. It involves the 
treatment of customers in a unique way without a cost-based or legally adequate 
reason from a competition law perspective.439 Price discrimination can be experienced 
when a firm is charging a different price for a particular product or charging the same 
amount for a variety of products. Such tactics are expressly prohibited by Article 3(7) 
of the Telecommunications Act which provides that the objective of the law is ‘to 
ensure principles of equality and non-discrimination.’ Also, Article 6(1)(f) of the 
Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law enacted by the CCP (currently, the 
GAC) via Resolution No. 13/2006 of 16 December 2006440 provides that ‘Any entity of 
a dominant position in the market is prohibited from exploiting such a position to 
violate, limit or prevent competition, including discriminating among clients in similar 
contracts with respect to “commodity” prices, service charges or terms of sale and 
purchase thereof.’441 
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The GAC is empowered by Article 2 of the Rules Governing Exceptions and 
Exemptions to apply the rule of reasons approach to the various forms of prohibitions 
included in the illustrative list. This approach enables the regulator or adjudicator to 
assess the pro-competitive features of a restrictive agreement or practice against the 
anticompetitive effects of the agreement or practice and determine whether the 
agreement or practice should be prohibited.442 Where the agreement or practice 
substantially lessens competition and results in the discrimination against certain 
customers without any cost-based or legally adequate reason, the GAC is empowered 
to prohibit the agreement or practice. This implies that the GAC is very important in 
the development of competition law in the KSA. Nonetheless, in the absence of 
comprehensive guidelines, it is uncertain whether the GAC may prohibit a practice or 
agreement that substantially lessens competition but confers substantial benefits to 
low income consumers. This is in line with the principles of Sharia, as well as the 
consumer welfare approach443 in competition law. 
An example of price discrimination in the Saudi telecommunications sector is the 
STC’s treatment of cable pricing in the regions it served. The STC had laid an internet 
cable all the way from the KSA through the sea to Sudan. Then the company charged 
higher prices in Sudan compared to the KSA for internet provision.444 
4.4.3.2.2.2 Pricing 
In addition to refraining from charging discriminatory prices, a dominant firm should 
not charge an unnecessarily high price for its items. This is also reflected in Article 
3(1) of the Telecommunications Act which provides that services are to be provided at 
‘affordable prices’. As a rule, the ceiling for inordinate valuation has been set as 
moderately high and it is common that the costs utilized for establishing an appropriate 
value are included in the price. However, where a firm imposes an excessive price on 
its product or service, it bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of that 
particular product or service. Direction inordinate assessing is regularly identified with 
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high passage boundaries or hindrances to expansion since it is typically impractical 
for undertakings to keep up a preposterously high price level generally.445 
4.4.3.3   OTHER TYPES OF ABUSE 
Despite attempts to curb abusive tactics by dominant firms, the Saudi Arabian 
telecommunications sector has experienced competition abuse in recent years. 
Hence, a fine of SAR 10 million was imposed on the STC for abusing its dominant 
position, namely, for monopolizing some of the services it provided to its customers. 
The company is believed to have refused to activate a number of portability services, 
to have withheld various services to its client, and lastly, to have blocked international 
calls in violation of Article 3 of the Telecommunications Act, among other provisions. 
The court concluded that the company’s act of blocking customers from switching to 
a competitor’s phone service was an abuse of its dominant position.446 Remarking on 
the punishment, the then acting executive director of the GAC, Mohammed Abdullah 
Al-Qassem, told CNBC Arabiya that under the new anti-monopoly rules violators could 
be fined as much as 10 percent of their turnover. 
This is just one example of how a dominant firm has abused its dominant position in 
the Saudi telecommunications sector. Unfortunately, examples of anti-competitive 
conduct abound within the Kingdom’s telecommunications industry. Other examples 
of these common tactics will be discussed in turn in the following subsections. 
4.3.3.1   RESTRICTING THE ENTRY OF OTHER FIRMS 
The telecommunications industry in the country prior to the introduction of the 
Competition Law was the subject of monopoly abuse whereby the government itself, 
as the owner of the dominant telecommunications company, set very high standards 
in the market, thus restricting the entry of other firms that produced similar products. 
This was reflected in the limited number of licenses that were issued to competing 
service providers.  
As shown in Chapter Three, the STC was the dominating telecommunications 
company in the KSA and was responsible for providing all public telecommunications 
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services in the country. It provided fixed, mobile and data telecommunication 
services.447 According to the competition laws of numerous OECD states, the situation 
in the KSA was tantamount to the exploitation of market power by a single company 
or adoption of improper means to attain and retain power.448 This is because the STC 
in the KSA, which was a state-owned company, dominated the telecommunications 
industry by fixing markets and influencing prices making it difficult for other investors 
to penetrate the market. The actions that the government took with regard to the STC’s 
competitors therefore helped the company maintain its dominant position. The 
government also set the prices that the STC could charge consumers, making it 
difficult, if not impossible, for other firms to compete. 
4.3.3.2   ILLEGAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Before the introduction of the Competition Law in 2004, the dominant firms in the 
telecommunications sector of the KSA, particularly the STC, were involved in an 
extensive abuse of their dominant positions. For example, as shown in Chapter Three, 
the STC was involved in anti-competitive practices, such as price fixing, market 
partitioning and client discrimination, that hindered the entry of new entrants into the 
market or forced competitors out of the market. Also, the STC has been involved in a 
number of cases in which the company made secret and informal agreements with its 
fellow competitors such as Mobily in order to set or stabilize the prices of their services 
such as the price of telephone calls at certain levels. This is particularly illegal as it 
often results in an undue advantage to dominant companies at the expense of 
consumers and competitors. In one case, the court upheld a fine imposed on the STC 
for intentionally blocking international calls and refusing to activate a number portability 
service and other monopolizing practices.449 The STC was subject to a fine of SAR 10 
million for violating the competition provisions governing the telecommunications 
sector. The STC appealed against this judgment, but the decision was upheld by the 
Court of Appeal. 
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4.4.3.3.3   MARKET SHARING 
Market partitioning is an anti-competitive practice that usually involves a company 
colluding with its competitors in order to divide the market into their respective 
zones.450 For example, the STC has regularly been involved in various forms of market 
partitioning in an attempt to disadvantage some of its competitors and gain market 
advantage. With regard to client discrimination, the STC has in the past discriminated 
against the clients of its competitors by refusing to provide access to services. For 
example, in the case of Competition Council v STC,451 the latter was charged with 
refusing to activate the number portability service for individuals using the services of 
its competitors. Vogel points out that refusal to provide essential facilities was the norm 
in the KSA’s telecommunications sector prior to the introduction of the Competition 
Law in 2004.452 This practice often puts competitors of the dominant players in a 
position of weakness. For example, when the STC refused to activate number 
portability service for individuals, many of the customers were not able to migrate to 
the competitor networks. This resulted in a competitive disadvantage to some of the 
company’s market rivals. This explains why in case of recurrence of the same offence 
the fine imposed was multiplied which meant that the company was required to pay 
SAR 10 million. This is consistent with the KSA’s Telecommunications Act which 
stipulates such penalties for such offences.453 
4.3.3.4    PREDATORY PRICING 
Predatory pricing was another standard policy used by the STC prior to the 
establishment of the Competition Law in the KSA. The STC would use the prices they 
charged for their services to influence the market rates, such as by significantly 
lowering their prices below the market prices in an attempt to drive their competitors 
out of the market.454 At other times, the STC would significantly increase its prices as 
the only company offering a service because there were no laws to prevent them from 
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exploiting consumers in this fashion. Before the enactment of the Telecommunications 
Act, the Saudi Arabian government had not developed relevant laws to regulate pricing 
in the telecommunications sector that could monitor standard costs to provide 
evidence of any anticompetitive pricing or reactive pricing being charged by the STC 
or other dominant firms. 
4.3.3.5 CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION 
In the KSA, the STC used resources and cross-subsidization to maintain the status 
quo by discouraging competition in the market. In this way, the dominant firm used the 
majority of its vast revenues to fend off competition. Dominance was based on the 
price of the service or product it sold to consumers that was un-conducive for 
newcomers. Additionally, cross-subsidization impaired competitors and dissuaded 
newcomers from getting into the business for fear of making losses.455 Most foreign 
companies’ penetration into the market was fraught with problems. This was attributed 
to the absence of proper regulatory mechanisms and competition laws governing the 
telecommunications sector in the KSA. In managing this offence, the CITC imposed a 
daily fine of not less than SAR 1,000 and not more than SAR 10,000 until the violation 
was removed.456 
4.3.3.6 LIMITED CONSUMER OPTIONS 
The issue of limited consumer options is also very common among 
telecommunications companies. Where a particular product was on sale but the 
customer did not otherwise want to buy the product from that particular provider, the 
customer may have had no other option but to buy the product due to the limited 
options available in the market. This form of anti-competitive practice was regularly 
adopted by the STC within the telecommunications sector. As a result, foreign 
companies always felt unwelcome and were wary of attempting to compete, thus 
allowing the STC to remain in a dominant position in the industry.457 
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4.3.3.7 PRICING TACTICS 
To increase their dominance, most of the telecommunications companies like the STC 
and Mobily have used excessive pricing. They have done so by pricing above the level 
of their competition.458 As a result, the competitor always pulled off leaving the market. 
The STC was able to manipulate the country’s pricing rates due to the fact that it was 
the sole operator in the market. When this occurred, the aggrieved competitor sought 
assistance from the Board of Grievances and the Competition Council, and the latter 
sometimes punished the dominant company that abused its position in the market by 
controlling the market price, such as the STC.459 As shown in Chapter Two, in the 
KSA, the STC has held a dominant position in the country’s fixed broadband internet 
market since its penetration of the sector in 2001 when it launched DSL services. Ten 
years later, the STC remained far ahead of any substantial competitor in terms of 
market share.460 
4.3.3.8 BRAND POSITIONING 
As mentioned above, the Telecommunications Act provides that fixing prices of 
products in order for a company to make more profit is strictly prohibited. However, 
the STC still fixed the prices of its products and, because there were few rival 
companies in the KSA, people had no other option but to buy products from the STC. 
In this regard, the company used its dominant position to the direct detriment of its 
customers. Before the introduction of the Competition Law, the STC enjoyed 
monopolistic freedom and often manipulated the price structures of its products. 
Moreover, innovative technologies assisted the company to offer communication and 
internet services more efficiently, which ensured that it could meet the modern needs 
of consumers. This enhanced its brand image and helped it to maintain its dominant 
position in the telecommunications sector.461 
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4.4  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LACK OF A 
COMPETITION LAW IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR 
As noted above, the introduction of the Telecommunications Act did little to curb the 
anti-competitive behaviours of firms and operators in the telecommunications sector 
despite containing explicit provisions addressing competition. Further, without a 
general competition law, there was no other way outside of the general Sharia 
framework to challenge these practices. In order to sanction such behaviour, a 
comprehensive competition law would be necessary. 
However, the effects of unchecked anti-competitive behaviour extend far beyond 
regulatory formalities. Developing countries, particularly those with weak and small 
markets, are particularly susceptible to the negative economic effects of 
monopolization and the abuse of dominant power in comparison to the market sectors 
of highly-developed countries.462 The KSA may be described as a developing country 
given that its economy is still growing and finding its footing.463 It continues to see 
various sectors rise to prominence, particularly with an increased focus on FDI, as is 
the case with the telecommunications sector.464 However, a major challenge for this 
sector has been the monopoly exerted by the state-owned firm, the STC, which has 
both directly and indirectly affected attempts to establish private companies within it. 
The obstacles to further private investment and development of the sector have 
inflicted harm on the Kingdom’s economy and has notably hampered its 
telecommunications market and development.465 The particular negative effects of this 
anti-competitive environment within the sector will be discussed in the next 
subsections. 
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4.4.1 RESTRICTION OF FOREIGN COMPETITION AND HINDERED 
INVESTMENTS 
The abuse of power by dominant telecommunications firms in the KSA has hindered 
investment. Any economy without investment in various sectors is a doomed 
economy. The abuse of power has blocked potential investors from venturing into the 
market, thus discouraging foreign investors who were willing to invest in them. For 
example, in 2003, VSAT wanted to operate on its own since a foreign investor was 
willing to invest in the venture. However, the investors later became reluctant to invest 
after realizing that VSAT was not operating on its own but jointly.466 This problem has 
contributed to low growth in industrialization in the KSA, including for 
telecommunications companies. 
Abuse of power also affects customers negatively. The dominant player may decide 
to hike prices, especially after a predatory episode. The KSA is a developing country, 
implying that when the prices for goods and services are manipulated, most of its 
citizens are not able to afford them.467 This means that the distribution of goods within 
the economy is reduced, which has an impact on the economy. Abuse of power has 
restricted the free market in the KSA. Free market rustics such as competition and 
prices are set by the dominating firm. For example, when the STC dominated the 
market, many competitors were left out and the communication charges did not reflect 
the nature of the economy but rather were influenced by the STC.468 
4.4.2 SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH 
There has been an increase in total domestic telecommunications services revenue 
as operating companies that abused their dominant power increased the prices of their 
products and services, thereby increasing profit margins. The KSA’s 
telecommunications sector contributed approximately 2.6 per cent of the nation’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) owing to the abuse of dominant power by the operating 
companies. Besides, as shown in Chapter Three, there was strong growth in the 
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mobile subscriber base from 2004 when the telecommunications sector was 
liberalized. This made mobile services inexpensive in the KSA. 
The abuse of powers in the KSA’s economy led to a decline in economic growth since 
most operating companies involved in it were fined heavily. This lowered their profit 
margins and so decreased their financial performance.469 On the other hand, the 
government of the KSA obtained funds from the fines imposed on the companies 
abusing their dominant powers. As shown in Chapter 3, the inability to abuse 
dominant power also led to stiff competition in the domestic market and 
commoditization of the mobile voice market. This then encouraged 
telecommunications operators to decrease tariffs for standard and bundled services 
such as voice and data services. 
4.4.3 INNOVATION AND CREATION OF IDEAS 
While the exploitation of a dominant position has negative economic effects, the abuse 
of power also influences innovation and the creation of new ideas. Every successful 
economy depends on innovation and ideas creation. When attempts are made to force 
competitors out of a market, these companies often come up with new products and 
services, making the economy very active and introducing new available offerings. 
The abuse of power then has limited opportunities to affect these businesses as they 
venture into innovative areas. However, until these new areas are protected by law, 
the economy will continue to depend on the already existing offerings of the dominant 
firms.60 
4.4.4 CORRUPTION 
Corruption in the Saudi context is associated with a patronage system, the use of 
middlemen (wasta), passive bribery (baksheeh) and nepotism, which collectively have 
a negative effect on GDP growth.470 It has been argued that an analysis of monetary 
data is positively interrelated with resource accumulation and production growth.471 
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Thus, given that the issue of corruption is deep-rooted in the Kingdom, there cannot 
be fair competition among different companies.472 Corruption in the country has a large 
degree of influence over government institutions. Thus, although the Civil Service Law 
and Combating Bribery Law criminalise corruption and abuse of functions, the laws 
are enforced selectively.473 Moreover, there is no law regulating conflicts of interest. 
This level of corruption came about in the telecommunications industry as a result of 
dominance and the abuse of power, which in turn promoted institutionalized bribery. 
Unfair market practices committed by the dominant players in the market like the STC 
meant that many foreign investors shied away from the KSA due to increased risk 
of losses. As a result of shying away, the economy of the country stagnated, and few 
jobs were created, leaving many youths unemployed.474 
In previous years, the large Saudi Telecom project was involved in a huge corruption 
deal between a government official and the STC. Johani, who was then 
Telecommunications Minister, abused his power by promoting corrupt deals. Based 
on a lawsuit filed in 1997, it was alleged that Lucent and his partners and agents paid 
Johani between USD $15 million and $21 million in order to secure the Saudi Telecom 
project.475 This indicated the issue of corruption was rampant, and it dissuaded many 
potential investors which led to economic stagnation. According to Alotaibi, the abuse 
of a company’s dominant power especially when it is utilized to reduce competition 
through excluding rivals necessitates the intervention of the competition authority.476  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established that although associating the telecommunications sector 
with the free market economy may be beneficial to Saudi society, government 
intervention is necessary. It has shown that there are a number of anti-competitive 
practices that the government sought to explicitly prohibit by including competition 
                                               
472 However, the analysis of the concept of ‘corruption’ is outside the scope of this study. It is only 
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473 Cowan (n 471) 58. 
474 See NA Kadash, ‘An Evaluation of Service Quality of Mobily and STC Telecommunication 
Companies in Saudi Arabia’ (2014) 4(1) British Journal of Economics, Management and Trade 1599, 
1600. 
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provisions within the Telecommunications Act. However, these anti-competitive 
practices continued unabated despite the enforcement of the statute together with the 
Sharia principles that prohibit the abuse of power in the market. 
It was shown that the legislator in the Kingdom has been unable to achieve a balance 
between promoting competition in a free market and regulating the behaviour of 
producers and distributors. Although the telecommunications industry is not a natural 
monopoly, it has been dominated by the STC, a state-owned company that has 
consistently adopted anti-competitive practices that underminine the free market ideal. 
This de facto monopoly has been counterproductive. It also justifies government 
intervention given that letting the free market work without any form of government 
supervision and control, would allows the STC to continue to adopt practices to restrict 
competition in the market. Notwithstanding, there is no guidance for the enforcers of 
Sharia and the competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act, as well as the 
business community on how the legislator articulates the regulatory approach to 
exclusionary and exploitative conduct in the Kingdom.  
It may be contended that the Kingdom has equally adopted the ‘effects-based 
approach’, whereby the concept of abuse is narrowed down to anti-competitive 
behaviour that harms consumers. This is a reasonable approach given that the 
concept of abuse is broad and the Telecommunications Act and Competition Law do 
not cover all categories of possible abuse.477  The effects-based approach has largely 
been used to prevent dominant companies, which are also state-owned, from 
restricting competition unduly to the detriment of consumers. Thus, in the KSA, the 
existence of a dominant position of a business is not in itself prohibited.  
However, there is no comprehensive guidance to the enforcers of the 
Telecommunications Act and Competition Law, as well as the business community on 
how the legislator articulates the regulatory approach to exclusionary and exploitative 
conduct under the competition regime. Also, it has been difficult for the government 
regulator to supervise, control and sanction the state-owned STC, has which 
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undermined efforts to promote effective competition in a free market. It follows that the 
new regulatory framework is necessary. The next chapter discusses the importance 
of this framework and shows how a new regime that complies with international 
standards has been established in this regard. 
In its current legislative state, the likelihood of dominant position abuse should be 
much lower now than it was prior to the enactment of the Competition Law. Under 
Sharia principles, every firm in any particular business should compete fairly with its 
competitors, and the Competition Law further embodies these principles. Stiff and fair 
competition in an economy are indicators of growth and competition remains an 
essential tool for all market players. However, despite these developments, issues 
related to abuse of dominance are still being reported. The following section examines 
in greater detail the development of the Competition Law within the KSA,69 with the 
aim of ultimately identifying where additional improvements can be made to further 





THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the development of the regulatory framework in the 
telecommunications sector of the KSA. This framework comprises the Competition 
Law, the related regulations and competition rules, the Telecommunications Act of 
2001 and the relevant principles of Sharia. This chapter focuses on the importance of 
the competition legislation in the framework. As noted in Chapter Three, the 
introduction of the Competition Law significantly impacted the Kingdom’s 
telecommunications market, particularly with regard to the abuse of power by the 
dominant players in the market, such as the STC. However, it is shown here that the 
Competition Law advances goals beyond the competitive process as understood by 
local undertakings. It is also shown that the Law is susceptible to a multitude of 
considerations that impact on the transparency and certainty of the process of 
implementation, and it is unclear what role the Law plays in the KSA’s competition 
policy given that it overlaps with Sharia and sector-specific legislation such as the 
Telecommunications Act. 
It is then argued that although there was no specific competition legislation, the Sharia, 
the Telecommunications Act and the competition policy of the GCC provided different 
levels of protection to investors and the public, especially consumers. Hence, what 
was needed was more clarity regarding the regulatory framework rather than a 
competition legislation.  
5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Although the focus of this chapter is the regulatory framework that comprises the 
Competition Law, the Telecommunications Act and relevant principles of Sharia, it is 
important to note that there are other statutes in the KSA which sought to eliminate or 
minimise anti-competitive behaviour. Article 5 of the Commercial Court Law of 1931, 
for example states that all commercial practices should be carried out honestly and in 
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good faith, and no activity should be such that the principles of honesty are breached 
the parties’ duty of good faith is contravened. Alotaibi argues that these provisions 
prevented behaviour that had a negative effect within the commercial and business 
sectors, such as fraud and unfair competition, and imprisonment was one of the 
recommended punishments.478 Other examples include the Law of Trademarks479 that 
was enacted to ensure that competitors could not use registered trademarks unfairly, 
that is without the permission of the rightful owners of the trademarks.480 Also, they 
could not use imitations of the registered trademarks on goods of the same class, and 
comparative advertising of goods or services of the same class was prohibited.481 As 
such, the laws governing patents and tradenames enable the government of the KSA 
to ensure that businesses are not harmed by competitors. Nonetheless, these laws 
are not sufficient to undergird an efficient regulatory framework in the 
telecommunications sector. 
One of the most important ways in which the KSA sought to regulate its 
telecommunications market and protect foreign competitors was by acceding to the 
WTO. 482  This is because the WTO guarantees, at least theoretically, a fair and 
equitable opportunity for access by undertakings of one Member State into the 
markets of all other Member States.483 The KSA began negotiating its membership in 
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July 1993,484 and between that date and 2005 it took part in various negotiations aimed 
at liberalising its trade regime and offering a transparent environment for foreign 
investment in accordance with the WTO rules. Given that competition is the logical 
consequence of the liberalisation of a trade regime,485 it was only natural that the 
regulations governing trade in the KSA were modified in regard to the commitments 
undertaken by the KSA. These commitments included, inter alia, allowing up to 
seventy per cent of foreign equity ownership in the telecommunications sector 
(including both basic and value-added services) within three years from accession, 
and the provision of public telecommunications services through a joint stock 
company. The next section demonstrates how accession to the WTO strengthened 
the KSA’s regulatory framework. 
5.2.1 THE JOURNEY TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
The WTO is an organisation that regulates or ought to regulate international trade.486 
It began in 2005 under the Marrakesh Agreement that was signed by 124 nations487 
and has since provided a framework for Member States to negotiate trade agreements 
and enforce the terms of the agreements.488  In order to enhance trade in goods, 
services and intellectual property across the globe, it prohibits discrimination between 
trading partners except where the prohibiting state seeks to protect the environment 
or has justifiable national security concerns.489 The fact that it allows tariffs and other 
forms of protection in certain limited circumstances implies that it is not entirely a free 
                                               
Globalisation and Harmonisation of Environmental Laws’ (1995) 20 North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Company Regulation 205, 207-208. 
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Convention and Members of the World Trade Organization’ (2018) < 
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trade organisation.490 Thus, the WTO understands that the competition laws of 
Member States may be susceptible to a multitude of considerations491 that may in turn 
impact on the transparency and certainty of these laws. Nonetheless, since 2005, the 
influence of the WTO has been such that it is referenced in nearly all preferential trade 
agreements or parts of the WTO agreement are simply copied verbatim in trade 
agreements.492 Thus, it complements international trade agreements and has 
substantially increased trade for the states with institutional standing.493  
These must be the reasons that attracted the KSA to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) (and subsequently, the WTO). Through the Council of Ministers’ 
Decision No 18154 of 29 April 1993, the government of the KSA applied for full 
accession to GATT by noting that it had been an observer for many years and had 
examined and applied GATT rules and principles.494 It also argued that the Saudi 
economy was among the most open in the world, with no quantitative restrictions and 
very low custom duties.495 It was particularly pleased with the GATT’s success in 
liberalising and strengthening the multilateral trading system and believed that the 
KSA could contribute towards achieving this objective. Thus, it believed that the KSA’s 
accession would benefit both the KSA and its existing and potential trading partners. 
The GATT Council took note of the statement made by the government of the KSA 
and established a working party that was tasked with examining the KSA’s application 
under Article XXXIII of the GATT.496 
The KSA submitted a memorandum on its foreign trade regime to the GATT Working 
Party in 1993. When the WTO replaced the GATT in 1995, the WTO General Council 
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decided that the WTO Accession Working Party would continue the process began by 
the GATT working party and the KSA would have an observer status in the WTO 
General Council. Hence, in 1995, the KSA applied to accede to the WTO under Article 
XII of the Marrakech Agreement. In 1996, the KSA submitted another memorandum 
on its foreign trade regime that emphasised that the government of the KSA had 
demonstrated its preference for a free market economy in light of the Islamic values 
that it sought to preserve, and it strongly supported the participation of the private 
sector in the development process.497 
The Working Party invited Member States to submit questions concerning the KSA’s 
foreign trade regime. With regard to the telecommunications sector, some of the 
pertinent questions included whether there was a body responsible for regulating the 
sector, whether market entry was licensed, whether foreign undertakings were 
permitted to supply enhanced telecommunications services, whether the services 
could be supplied through the cross-border mode of supply, and whether there were 
any restrictions on foreign investment in the supply of enhanced services in the 
KSA.498 
The government of the KSA noted in response that the Ministry of Post, Telephone 
and Telegraph was the main regulatory body of the telecommunications sector and it 
was also responsible for issuing licenses to operators and service providers.499 The 
government also noted that foreign entities were permitted to supply enhanced 
services including database retrieval, electronic mail, fax and telex messaging, voice 
mail, file transfer, online information and conferencing.500 However, the government 
stated that all users were required to use the public telecommunications network and 
they had to be authorised by the relevant agency.501 The government then noted that 
foreign investment in the supply of enhanced services was governed by the same 
regulations that applied to foreign investment in general. It pointed out that the KSA 
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had been a participating member of the International Telecommunications Union and 
the Consultative Committee for International Telephones and Telegraphy and had 
therefore adopted best international standards in order to ensure interoperability and 
non-discrimination. It also noted that the government had no plans to privatise basic 
telecommunications services.502 
After a drawn out process of ten years, the WTO General Council issued a Protocol in 
November 2005 which noted that, following the report of the Working Party, the KSA 
could accede to the WTO.503 Attached to the report of the Working Party were 
schedules of specific commitments made by the KSA in regard to goods and 
services.504 Regarding the commitments to services, the schedule provided that 
foreign service suppliers had to obtain the approval of the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority (SAGIA) before establishing a commercial presence in the KSA 
in accordance with Foreign Investment Law of 2000 and Article 5(3) of the Regulation 
of the Foreign Investment Law.505 Regarding the telecommunications sector, the 
commitments taken by the KSA were based on the Basic Telecom Service 
Commitments (S/GBT/W/2/Rev 1) and the Market Access Limitations on Spectrum 
Availability (S/GBT/W/3). They provided that the KSA undertook to authorise cross-
border supply, subject to a commercial agreement between the foreign undertaking 
and an entity licensed or authorised by the CITC. The KSA also undertook to permit 
foreign equity of an undertaking to go from forty-nine per cent upon accession to 
seventy per cent after three years.506 This includes undertakings providing basic as 
well as enhanced telecommunications services. 
As such, accession to the WTO helped to ensure that the KSA effectively liberalised 
markets and removed protectionist barriers to trade. One of the conditions set by the 
WTO, as pointed out by Ramady, was the phasing in of telecommunications 
agreements to open up and allow competition in the telecommunications services 
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market and provide antitrust protection and consumer protection in accordance with 
the policies of the WTO.507 Despite some concerns about the compatibility of the WTO 
policies and the principles of Sharia,508 the Saudi government initially argued that most 
Islamic principles seek to prevent anti-competitive practices and, since Islamic law 
was the main law of the Kingdom, there was hardly any need for the specific 
promulgation of a competition law that complied with the WTO policies.509 However, 
the WTO set the enactment of competition law in the Kingdom as one of the conditions 
for it to join the WTO510 because there was no legislation to that effect and neither was 
there a public awareness of the prohibition against anti-competitive behaviour, both of 
which were much needed to enhance legal certainty.  
As such, between the KSA’s application in 1995 and its accession to the WTO in 2005, 
there were substantial changes to its legal landscape that involved the enactment of 
ninety-four basic laws, regulations and decrees; 314 rounds of bilateral market access 
negotiations, the responses to 3,400 questions on its trade regime; and thirty-eight 
bilateral agreements with influential countries, including the US.511 It may therefore be 
argued that competition law in the KSA was tilted in favour of the wider WTO agenda, 
which was understood by Saudi officials to imply a suitable means of attracting foreign 
investment.512 Hence, the Competition Law that was enacted in 2004 simply 
represented the measure put in place in the KSA to provide anti-trust protections to 
foreign investors as recommended by the WTO. In this light, the Competition Law 
advances goals beyond the competitive process as understood by local businesses. 
The next subsection examines the laws that regulated anti-competitive conduct and 
maintained market competition prior to the Competition Law and the KSA’s accession 
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to the WTO. The objective is to determine whether the KSA already had an effective 
regulatory framework and what made it effective. 
5.2.2 PRE-ACCESSION REGULATION IN THE KSA 
Prior to its accession to the WTO, there was no specific competition legislation. 
However, there were laws and policies providing different levels of protection to the 
public, especially consumers. Some of these protections were also available for 
international businesses seeking to invest in the Kingdom as shown below. As such, 
it is argued here that the widespread criticisms directed at the KSA513 failed to take 
these protections into account. 
5.2.2.1 THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL UNIFIED POLICY 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was created based on the EU model, with the 
aim of bringing together the Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the KSA and 
the UAE.514 In 2001, an agreement was signed between these states so as to establish 
a customs union and harmonise economic, financial and monetary policies and to 
provide a wider integration of the policies within the region.515 Since the aim of the 
GCC was to formulate policies for harmonisation and cooperation, it was also 
imperative to implement anti-competitive policies so as to ensure that trade 
liberalisation was promoted, and market operators were protected outside of their 
national boundaries.516 Thus, it was contended that the enforcement of pro-
competitive laws in a common regional market would enhance cooperation between 
the signatory countries.517 
In this light, the GCC countries worked towards easing licensing restrictions for 
domestic and international firms, making sure that competition was promoted widely 
so as to increase the efficiency of the providers and the harmonisation of regulatory 
practices, as well as reduce or eliminate restrictions on the movement of foreign 
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A report by the World Bank clearly highlighted the need for strong competition 
legislation and effective regulations before the liberalisation of the market and 
economies could be achieved in the region.519 This report also appreciated that the 
creation of regulations relating to competition and their implementation takes time.520 
Further, it noted that continued public ownership in some service sectors represented 
a hurdle for increased trade potential within the GCC where the concept of privatisation 
had always been looked upon with suspicion. Thus, in the UAE, rather than opening 
the telecommunications market to big foreign operators to curb the thirty-year 
monopoly of the Emirates Telecommunication Corporation, the government instead 
decided to establish the Emirates Company for Integrated Telecommunication.521 
However, by 1997, the GCC had sufficiently liberalised and reformed its financial 
sectors.522 Also, measures were taken to reduce government participation, enhance 
the supervisory framework and open up the markets to foreign competition by ensuring 
that transparent rules governed the entry and exit of undertakings.523 As such, the 
GCC provided some important protections to foreign undertakings seeking to invest in 
the KSA. 
Notwithstanding, as far as competition law was concerned, there was no clear 
guidance within the GCC policies or documents and neither was there a need 
expressed by any Member State of the GCC to enact regional laws to regulate anti-
competitive practices. Dabbah noted that without any commitment to the 
implementation of a competition legislation and appropriate policies, it was hard to 
predict if any competition regime would emerge within the GCC despite the fact that 
the model of the GCC was inspired by the EU model.524  EU competition law largely 
derives from Articles 101 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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Union (TFEU) and some relevant secondary525 and primary legislation.526 These 
instruments regulate anti-competitive conduct and maintain competition within the EU 
single market.527 
Although the policies of the GCC are not as advanced as those of the EU, in December 
2002 a commercial and economics law policy was agreed between the Members 
which stipulated a unified commercial policy for the GCC countries. This set the 
foundation of the economic relations between the Members and the outside world with 
the focus on the promotion of the GCC Member States’ economies and the 
strengthening of competitiveness.528 
Another objective of this policy was the promotion of the existing markets. The aims 
included the promotion of competitiveness of exports and national products in the 
markets and the adoption of a policy on a domestic front which would unify the 
commercial and economic laws and facilitate the flow of citizens, goods, services and 
transportation. The policy highlighted the need to regulate anti-competitive behaviour 
athough the term ‘anti-competition’ was not mentioned.529  
Furthermore, the GCC sought to act as a single bloc for the outside world.530 It 
intended to form a single market for the facilitation of goods, services and workers, 
very similar to the model of the TFEU. Similarly, the policy also sought to ensure that 
efforts were made to encourage the national products in the GCC Member States and 
to protect them collectively in the markets.531 A unified law was important because it 
protected national industry in the GCC states and prevented unfair competition.  
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What is important to note here is that the GCC policy strengthened the private sector, 
which involved opening the sector to foreign undertakings. Nonetheless, there was 
more concern about ‘injurious practices in international trade that cause or threaten 
material injury to an established GCC industry or retard the establishment of such an 
industry’.532 This concern was more about aggressive international competition that 
involved practices such as dumping, unjustifiable increases in imports and 
subsidies.533 Foreign competition that did not cause material injury to an established 
GCC industry was therefore welcome and protected. In the absence of specific 
competition legislation in a GCC country, foreign investors were therefore protected 
under the unified commercial policy. This was a better reflection of the competitive 
process as understood by local undertakings. However, it must be noted that the 
implementation of the policy was not very effective given that there were still serious 
questions about the extent to which the competition laws of GCC countries had been 
harmonised.534 
5.2.2.2  THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT  
Prior to the enactment of the Competition Law, competition was maintained in the 
telecommunications sector through the implementation of the Telecommunications 
Act of 2001. With the advancement of innovative technologies, telecommunications 
networks expanded, including a wide range of services which satisfied the needs and 
requirements of customers within the global domain. At the same time, this called for 
the need to regulate them through appropriate legislation, hence the reason for the 
Telecommunications Act. It entered into force in 2002 and provides the foundation for 
the framework of regulation by the CITC. 
The Telecommunications Act sought to ensure that the provision of advanced 
communications services was sufficient and affordable. Thus, the legislation 
compelled participants in the telecommunications industry to adopt and implement 
                                               
532 See Article 1 of the GCC Common Law 
533 See Habib Kazzi, ‘GCC States and Trade Remedies: Between Benefits and Challenges’ (2014) 1(2) 
European Law and Politics Journal 10, 14-16. 
534 See Raza Rizvi and Adil Hammad, ‘Competition Law in the Middle East – A Perspective from Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – Analysis of the Introduction and Reform of Competition Laws in 
Various Jurisdictions Across the Gulf Cooperation Council’ (Simmons & Simmons, 29 October 2013) 
<http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/antitrust-and-merger-control/29-competition-law-in-the-middle-
east> accessed 10 October 2017. 
 
142 
modern best practices. As discussed in Chapter Three, this involved ensuring that 
there was no monopoly and the prices charged for services were competitive.535 
Further to the Telecommunications Act’s bylaws, the CITC was authorised to regulate 
the telecommunications sector. The Act also sought to promote and encourage fair 
competition in all fields of telecommunications and ensure that everything was done 
with the utmost clarity and transparency by following the procedures to guarantee 
equality and non-discrimination.536 
Additionally, it was necessary to provide for the creation of an effective climate within 
the telecommunications industry for the purpose of encouraging fair competition that 
the Telecommunications Act aimed to achieve. There was also a need for service 
providers to look at the efficient use of all available frequencies and provide for 
telecommunications technologies transfer where the need arose in practice.537 
The Act emphasised the importance of equality in the market and the protection of the 
public interest along with that of individual users and those investing in the industry. 
That is why it may be said that the Telecommunications Act laid the foundations for 
what would later on be enacted as the Competition Law.538 Rizvi and Hammad 
contend that these statutes were necessary to alleviate the uncertainties faced by 
businesses as to the regulations with which they must abide and the potential 
enforcement penalties.539 Thus, the Telecommunications Act was also influenced by 
the KSA’s bid to accede to the WTO. It follows that the competition analysis conducted 
by the legislator was mainly economic in nature. 
In the lead up  to the enactment of the Telecommunications Act, the government 
decided to privatise 20 state-owned companies including the market leader, the 
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STC. A number of shares were open to ownership within the telecommunications 
industry. The key reasons for this restructuring of the telecommunications sector were 
the growing and high demand (by potential foreign investors and the WTO), the need 
for liberalisation, efficiency, productivity and the promotion of fair competition and a 
reduction in the monopoly of the government-owned STC. The privatisation was done 
through the sectorial legislation under the supervision of the CITC.540 With this in mind, 
the CITC Ordinance issued by the Saudi Arabian government specified its tasks and 
responsibilities which were geared towards the further development of the 
telecommunications industry. This would not only catered to the domestic companies 
but also opened the doors to international companies to enter the Kingdom, as they 
knew that there existed regulation to protect them against anti-competitive conduct.541 
Comprising more than 26 million inhabitants, the Kingdom has emerged as a 
prominent telecommunications market with significant potential for investors in this 
area.542 New players have entered the market to achieve a higher degree of 
penetration regarding the provision of internet and data services to local people.543 
Since the Kingdom adopted a more liberal approach and new licenses have been 
granted for the establishment of fixed line and wireless telecommunications services, 
competition has increased and has continued to grow with the enactment of the 
Competition Law and accession to the WTO.544 
5.2.3  THE NEED FOR A COMPETITION LAW IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Despite the protections provided by Sharia, the GCC policy and the 
Telecommunications Act, there was still no specific statute regulating anti-competitive 
behaviour in the KSA. It is uncertain whether one was needed. However, as noted 
above, the WTO required more clarity. Perceiving the potential for foreign investment, 
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the government slashed the minimum capital requirements or regulatory capital to 
attract small foreign firms and also ensure that there was always sufficient capital to 
buffer financial institutions against losses. This was done through the Foreign Capital 
Investment Regulations of 2000.545 Also, the start-up procedures for all businesses 
were simplified, which made it considerably easier for the investor companies to enter 
into Saudi markets.546  
However, for the market to thrive, consumers should be able to benefit from the price 
competition between stakeholders, greater product development and better quality of 
service between competitors.547 To this end, the law regulating anti-competitive 
practices should extend to agreements or practices which have the potential to 
undermine or destroy competition which may then affect the consumer adversely. 
Also, as noted above, KSA ownership of businesses was required, which constituted 
a disincentive to foreign investors because they were compelled to find a suitable 
Saudi partner before investing in the Kingdom. This continued in the 
telecommunications industry even after the KSA’s accession to the WTO given that 
the KSA committed to allowing up to seventy per cent of foreign equity, requiring local 
ownership of at least thirty per cent. Nonetheless, SAGIA announced in 2015 that non-
KSA nationals would be permitted to hold 100 per cent ownership. The Council of 
Ministers has since ratified the decision made by SAGIA. However, the 
telecommunications sector still does not have the desired autonomy as it must have 
100 per cent local employees and by the end of 2017 a foreign telecommunications 
retail company was yet to be granted a license for 100 per cent ownership.548 
Despite the above, the Competition Law has given a strong impetus to the increase in 
competition in the telecommunications sector has been the Competition Law of 2004. 
This statute seeks to prohibit barriers to trade with a view to making sure that the 
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goods and services are available at affordable prices within a designated market 
without any restrictions. Research has shown that the enforcement of pro-competitive 
rules does not only serves the objectives of fairness and efficiency but also induces 
foreign direct investment and increases consumer surplus and welfare.549 Hence, 
competition law ensures that the elimination or reduction of barriers to trade by the 
government is not undermined or negated by the anti-competitive conduct of local 
firms which may abuse their market power. Kennedy therefore noted that ‘by exploiting 
the law of comparative advantage, liberal trade policies permit the unrestricted cross-
border flow of the best goods and services at the lowest prices, thereby increasing 
[welfare]’.550 A law regulating competition is therefore likely to improve the working 
conditions and relationships between businesses and their consumers,551 which is the 
main reason why there was a great need for a specific competition statute in the 
Kingdom, especially in the telecommunications sector. Nonetheless, it is debatable 
whether the GCC policy, Telecommunications Act and the Sharia (if properly 
implemented) were not sufficient to improve the working conditions and relationships 
between businesses and their consumers. 
Saleem observes that the last two decades have seen a number of developing and 
transitional economies that have either enacted competition legislation or have been 
a signatory to one of the global organisations seeking to enforce anti-competitive 
measures and in principle agreeing to ensure that there are fewer barriers to trade.552 
The rapid growth of competition law has been the result of the liberalisation of 
developing economies together with individual country commitments to the 
agreements with these global organisations such as the WTO, as well as the need to 
protect the rights of businesses and consumers.553 
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Similarly, the KSA’s Competition Law seeks to achieve the above goals. The KSA’s 
telecommunications industry is considered one of the leading service sectors in the 
country and one that has gained great prominence over the past few years as shown 
in Chapters Three and Four. Based on the high spending capacity of the people of 
the KSA, the use of telecommunications services and devices has evolved, allowing 
the sector to attract many consumers and global technological undertakings. The latter 
have invested in the telecommunications infrastructure of the country, although there 
has been a growing call for legislation to combat specific anti-competitive practices by 
those within the market. 
With the promulgation of the Royal Decree No M/25 dated 22 June 2004, the 
Competition Law was approved and brought into force with the main aim of regulating 
competition within the Kingdom. This applies to all firms including partnerships and 
companies conducting business in the KSA. It also includes non-Saudi entities which 
can be classified as firms. However, the Competition Law does not apply to 
government agencies and fully state-owned enterprises.554 The Competition Law 
specifically aims to protect and promote fair competition and anti-monopolistic 
practices so as to ensure that the balance in the market and the improvement of the 
competitive environment in all economic activities (conducted by private undertakings) 
are promoted and achieved. The intention is to confer benefits on the consumers 
through lower prices of products, thriving competition and excellent quality of products 
and services. At the same time, it also seeks to increase the efficiency, productivity 
and competitiveness of the economy, although its scope is limited to private 
undertakings. 
Alotaibi  argues that the effectiveness of competition law depends on the imposition of 
penalties which are harsh and can act as a deterrent.555 This motivates potential  
businesses that wish to violate the competition law to refrain from doing so and 
represents a system of checks and balances in the furtherance of the objectives of the 
statute.556 However, whether this argument applies to sectors dominated by state-
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owned enterprises that are beyond the reach of the regulator. The Competition Law of 
the KSA was largely modelled on the EU competition regime, although there are some 
differences between the scope and application within the two jurisdictions mainly due 
to the fact that the Competition Law in the KSA does not apply to state-owned 
enterprises.557 Given the influence of the WTO and the objective of the government of 
the KSA to attract foreign investment, it may be argued that the Competition Law is 
largely driven by the competition process as understood by foreign investors. 
The Competition Law requires the CITC to oversee the foreign investment, review 
competition policies and ensure that the law is correctly implemented. This requires 
the approval of any proposed businesses which may be in a dominant position in the 
market. This law applies to all businesses operating in the Kingdom, which assures 
foreign investors that no dominant (private) firm in the KSA would abuse its position. 
In terms of dominant position, the Law requires a business not to be in a position to 
influence the prevailing prices within the market which may be a potential danger for 
good competition within the market. Therefore, a business influencing the price is 
required to seek approval from the CITC at least sixty days prior to effecting such 
changes, failing which it will be liable for fines and other sanctions. 
Also, the Competition Law has largely followed global competition law trends since it 
was brought into force to combat and prohibit price manipulation, including the 
practices of lowering prices and creating artificial shortages within the market to obtain 
a dominant position and eradicate competition. Similarly, it is also illegal to impose 
special conditions on the purchases of commodities and services which may have a 
negative impact on a business compared to others or puts them in an unequal position. 
Nonetheless, given that the Competition Law does not apply to undertakings fully-
owned by the state and  government agencies, it is uncertain whether it can be argued 
that the Law has had a major impact on the telecommunications market. This is 
because this market has been shaped and dominated by a company whose shares 
are owned by the state (seventy per cent) and by other state-owned undertakings 
                                               
557 See Sahin Ardiyok and Dilara Yesilyaprak, ‘Saudi Arabia: Spotlight on Saudi Arabia’s Competition 
Rules’ (Mondaq, 19 June 2015) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/406002/Trade+Regulation+Practices/Spotlight+On 
+Saudi+Arabias+Competition+Rules> accessed 10 October 2017. 
 
148 
(thirty per cent). 
5.3  THE COMPETITION LAW  
Having enacted a competition legislation, both to meet WTO requirements and 
complement the various sector-specific legislations in place to regulate market 
sectors, it is also important to determine whether the legislation can meet its objectives 
within the Saudi context.  
5.3.1  ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW 
The CITC was created as a regulatory body with the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act. With the passage of the Competition Law, a comparable 
body was needed to enforce the provisions of the Competition Law within the various 
economic sectors. The GAC, created under the Competition Law, has a wide range of 
powers, particularly over the regulation and control of entities. It is therefore in place 
to ensure that the Competition Law is adhered to. The GAC is independent and 
charged with supervising and implementing the Competition Law with the aim of 
specifically encouraging fair competition and ensuring that all monopolistic practices 
are kept out of the market. 
The GAC was created specifically pursuant to Article 8 of the Competition Law which 
provides for the number of members of the organ and their respective time periods. 
The mandate given to the GAC includes jurisdiction over the following tasks relating 
to the administration of fair competition: 
1. Approving the mergers and acquisitions which may also overlap, and which    
may result in a dominant position in the market; 
2. Administration of complaints and the review of the same and overseeing the 
action for violation of such complaints including the enquiry, evidence, 
investigation and prosecution of complaints based upon the merit of such 
complaints.558 
The goals of the GAC are stated in Article 9. It aims to achieve such things as the 
approval of mergers and acquisitions, including the joining of management of two 
entities into one which may put them in a position of dominance; collection of evidence 
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including complaints and practices; commencement of criminal cases against violators 
of the law; and making suggestions for any changes to the variables present within the 
market so as to keep abreast with developments and to ensure that adequate 
amendments are done to achieve the desired goals keeping in mind the economic 
changes and developments so as to also cater for the future. 
In light of the above powers, the GAC fined Riyadh Oxygen Plant in excess of SAR 
one million for price fixing in respect of the supply of medical gas. The GAC conducted 
an investigation following a complaint by the Ministry of Health and held that Riyadh 
Oxygen Plant had engaged in anti-competitive behaviour. The GAC’s decision was 
upheld by the Honourable Court of Appeal in the KSA.559  
The Preamble of the Competition Law states that based upon the economic policies 
in the Kingdom, to keep in line with economic achievements and developments and to 
enhance competition in business, the Competition Law was brought in force with the 
main aim of protecting and promoting competition and fighting monopolistic practices 
which have been affecting the legitimate competition within the Kingdom.560 The is 
reiterated in Article 1 of the Competition Law which succinctly states that: ‘This Law 
aims to protect and encourage fair competition and combat monopolistic practices that 
affect lawful competition.’  
This demonstrates the centrality of economic analysis in the Competition Law of the 
Kingdom.561 Thus, the effects of international pressure (WTO) and the domestic 
environment constitute an integral part of the KSA’s competition law, which as will be 
shown below shields arbitrary decision making by the GAC. Although the above 
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section (as well as Chapter Four) acknowledges the importance of competition law 
and an efficient regulatory framework,562 it is shown here that competition law is 
susceptible to a multitude of considerations which collectively undermine the 
transparency of the regulatory framework. These considerations may be described as 
‘external peripheral bypasses’ because they divert the subject matter away from 
competition analysis and also limit its scope.563 Thus, although the bypasses may 
enable the state to promote public interest or certain industrial policies, they undermine 
the transparency of the regulatory process. Emphasis is placed here on the fairness 
consideration and the difficulty of delineating the scope of the law due to the external 
peripheral bypasses confronted by the regulator in the KSA. 
5.3.1.1  THE FAIRNESS CONSIDERATION 
From a basic reading of the Preamble, it is clear that the government brought the 
Competition Law into force to restrict the monopolistic policies of organisations, 
including small-and-medium-sized enterprises, so as to ensure that economic 
development targets and goals are achieved and that the country develops in line with 
the other developed countries that have such a law. The text of the Preamble reflects 
the fact that the Kingdom wanted to initiate steps to keep in line with global 
developments. As noted above, one of the main reasons why foreign investors are 
attracted to economies is the existence of effective regulations and a good framework 
for an efficient competition law that ensures that a balance is achieved between the 
different factors present within the market. However, the broad aim of the Competition 
Law is the protection and encouragement of fair competition. The legislator believed 
that this could be achieved by prohibiting agreements between businesses whose 
object or effect is the restriction of the trade and commerce and the elimination of 
competition. Thus, the Competition Law prohibits any practices, agreements, and 
verbal or oral contracts between competing firms which result in the restriction, 
violation or for that matter the prevention of competition.  
It is uncertain why emphasis is placed on the concept of fairness. This is because 
fairness has a multifaceted nature. Despite the emphasis, the legislator is silent on the 
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role fairness considerations should play and it was difficult to find any study that 
examines the question in the KSA. However, Trebilcock and Ducci disentangle the 
concept of fairness in competition law in general by assessing distinct notions of 
fairness that are relevant to the market.564 They show that arguments in favour of and 
arguments dismissing any scope of fairness fail to clarify the type of fairness that 
should be relevant to any given market. In light of their analysis, it is argued here the 
types of fairness relevant to the Saudi context are what Trebilcock and Ducci called 
‘vertical fairness’ and ‘horizontal fairness’.565 This is because all laws in the KSA must 
comply with Sharia, and it has been noted that fairness is the most important rule 
under Sharia regarding business activities.566 Hence, fairness generally presupposes 
the fulfilment of the good faith obligation imposed by the Sharia. The vertical dimension 
of fairness relates to the concept of consumer welfare. Although it is not the 
predominant objective of the Competition Law,567 it is one of the objectives. Thus, the 
Saudi legislator had some distributional equity concerns for consumers. However, the 
standard actually adopted is a consumer welfare standard. In regard to the latter 
concept, Bork noted as follows: 
Consumer welfare is greatest when society’s economic resources are 
allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as 
technological constraints permit. Consumer welfare, in this sense, is 
merely another term for the wealth of nations. [Competition law] has 
a built-in preference for material prosperity, but it has nothing to say 
about the way prosperity is distributed or used.568 
This statement is reflective of the Competition Law in the KSA because the Law allows 
certain restrictive agreements or conduct insofar as they create efficiencies that are 
passed onto consumers in a fair manner. Also, the GAC is authorised not to apply the 
prohibitions contained in Article 4 of the Competition Law where the interests of 
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consumers are concerned. It suffices that the benefits realised to consumers outweigh 
the anti-competitive effect of the prohibited practice or agreement. This is equally the 
case in the EU regarding Article 101(3) of the TFEU, which as noted above, was 
influential on the formulation of competition policy in the KSA. These exceptions reflect 
a fairness concern for consumers even though the main objective of the Competition 
Law is to maintain competition in Saudi markets and attract foreign investment, which 
would grow the economy. Thus, the concern for consumers is only incidental to the 
desire to grow the wealth of the nation.  
However, unlike Trebilcock and Ducci,569 it is argued here that the vertical dimension 
of fairness is also relevant to competition law despite the adoption of the consumer 
welfare standard.570 Also, it is possible to recognise narrow dimensions of horizontal 
fairness in the Competition Law on both the demand side (different consumers ought 
to be treated fairly) and the supply side (undertakings should have equal access to the 
market). This explains why barriers to entry (such as predatory pricings, quota 
allocations and merger control) and exclusionary forms of conduct have been reduced 
or eliminated as shown in Chapter Four. 
As such, both vertical and horizontal fairness constitute the normative basis of the 
Competition Law in the KSA. In other words, there are normative reasons for 
considering notions of fairness regarding consumers, producers and society as a 
whole. The GAC is therefore required to consider the impact of the agreement or 
conduct on consumers, producers and society, in order to determine whether the 
conduct or agreement should be prohibited, regardless of whether the conduct or 
agreement complies with Article 4 of the Law. Given that it is uncertain what measure 
GAC uses to determine whether the benefits realised to consumers outweigh the anti-
competitive effect of the prohibited practice or agreement, it may be argued there is 
no difference between the requirement of the Competition Law and that of Sharia 
which emphasises good faith and fairness. This is further evidence that the 
Competition Law was enacted to assuage the fears of some (Western) influential 
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Member States of the WTO rather than address the competitive process in the KSA. 
A more reasonable approach would have been to clarify the principles of Sharia 
regarding issues of fairness and distributional justice.571 
5.3.1.2 DELINEATING THE SCOPE OF THE LAW 
The Competition Law applies to all firms operating within the Kingdom. Article 2 of the 
Law defines the term ‘firm’ as including factories, partnerships, companies and all 
similar undertakings which fall under the ambit of this law. Further, Article 2 defines 
the ‘market’ as including any place where current or prospective vendors meet.50 
According to  Article 4 of the Competition Law and Article 6 of the Competition Law 
Regulations, dominance may arise through sales of at least forty per cent of total sales 
within a continuous period of twelve months or where a company or group of 
companies is in a position to influence the prevailing price in the market. Hence, the 
undertaking must not be directly engaged in the Saudi market through the sales of 
goods or services. However, it is uncertain whether domination in terms of sales for a 
period of ten months would qualify as domination under the Law. There is no reason 
given why twelve months is used as the reference period.572 It is also problematic that 
the Law uses a seller specific test of domination without regard to the buyer’s 
perspective. There are instances where the consumers may benefit from lower prices 
set by the dominant firm. Hence, this test of abuse contradicts the consumer welfare 
standard  that the Law also adopts as shown above.  
It must also be noted that the existence of a dominant position is not prohibited by the 
Competition Law. The scope is limited to instances where the dominant position is 
abused. This may require evidence that the dominant undertaking has carried out an 
act of the kind described in Article 4 of the Law or Article 6 of the Regulations. 
However, the examples provided in these articles do not constitute an exhaustive list. 
Also, Article 2 gives the authority to the GAC to determine the percentage required to 
show the dominance of the market which could also include the availability of such a 
commodity within the market and any other criteria as determined by the GAC. For 
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example, it is up to the GAC to determine whether a merger or acquisition has resulted 
in the acquisition of a dominant position in the market. The GAC has therefore been 
tasked with determining any illegalities and preventing the imposition of any 
conditions, special or ordinary, on the purchase of goods or services which may also 
negatively impact other competitors in the market. The concept of abuse of dominance 
is not defined in the Competition Law so it may be useful to refer to the definition in 
Hoffman-La Roche v Commission, given the influence of EU law on the formulation of 
the competition policy in the KSA. It was defined as follows: 
An objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a 
market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in 
question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through 
recourse to methods different from those which condition normal 
competition in products or services on the basis of the transaction of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of 
the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of 
that competition.573 
Given that the concept ought to be objective, the reliance on the subjective 
assessment by the GAC raises questions about the fairness of the process seeing as 
the STC is still the dominant undertaking in the telecommunications sector. The fact 
that the chairperson of the GAC is a member of the government, the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, logically raises questions about the impartiality of the 
government in regulating undertakings in which the government owns shares.  
However, the Royal Decree No M/24 of 11 February 2014 amended the Competition 
Law (in particular, Article 15) in order to reinforce the GAC’s independent status and 
streamline the decision-making process. Also, by the end of 2015, the GAC had held 
forty-four ordinary meetings and rendered 178 decisions based on detailed memos,574 
and there is no evidence on record to show that it has not been impartial in dealing 
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with reports and complaints about undertakings in which the government has shares. 
Nonetheless, the Royal Decree No M/24 does not address the problems of 
transparency which are related to the reliance on the GAC’s subjective assessment of 
facts. The lack of clear guidance makes it difficult to delineate the scope of the Law. 
The next subsection demonstrates this problem with regard to what constitutes an 
anti-competitive agreement. 
5.3.1.3  ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS 
Article 4 of the Competition Law may be compared to Article 101 of the TFEU which 
prohibits agreement between undertakings and decisions by associations of 
undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, distortion or restriction 
of competition within the internal market.575 Article 4 covers any practice, agreements 
or contract that restricts commerce or distorts competition between firms. Article 4 
prohibits such practices and goes on to ban any such conduct which would control 
prices by increasing or decreasing them, restrict the freedom and flow of goods and 
deprive the market of certain commodities.  
From a basic reading, Article 4’s scope covers a bulk of anti-competitive practices. It 
is clear that Article 4 envisages all those practices which may be harmful to 
competition. However, the application of the provision is limited to restrictions based 
on a horizontal relationship, ie between competitor firms as opposed to EU law which 
also imposes restrictions on vertical relationships (between buyers and sellers of 
goods or services).576 Thus, the prohibitions under Article 4 relate to any agreements 
and contracts between competing or potentially competing companies which have as 
their aim to restrict, violate or prevent competition, with a particular focus on those 
which: 
1. Increase, decrease or fix prices, service charges or terms of sale and similar 
activities; 
2. Set limitations to the production of goods or such provision of services; 
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3. Attempt to divide markets based upon geographical territories together with 
the sale or purchase quantities, customers, or any other basis adversely 
affecting competition, and which could also adversely affect consumers; 
4. Discriminate within a group of similar clients and consumers by price, service 
provisions and the facilities afforded to such consumers; 
5. Take any steps and measures which may or can hinder the entry of another 
company into the market or trying to force it out of the market by monopolizing 
the products and services; 
6. Complicate bidding processes and tenders which would ensure that the 
competitors do not get a fair chance and as a result of which monopoly will be 
enhanced; and  
7. Set prices differently depending on where goods are sold and selling at less 
than cost so as to force competitors out of the market. 
Article 4 therefore covers the main kinds of practices, agreements and contracts 
between companies whose aim is to affect commercial activities in the market.577 
Thus, although Article 4 has different dimensions and components so as to cater to 
these anti-competitive practices, it  generally addresses three main types of action 
which are held to be prohibitive, including discriminations of price, agreements 
between two or more firms which may aim to violate the competition law, and any 
contracts between companies which may aim to violate the competition law.578   
Nonetheless, it is noted above that the list in Article 4 is not exhaustive and the GAC 
has extensive powers to determine whether any particular agreement or conduct is 
anti-competitive noted above, the scope and nature of the Competition Law is affected 
by wider policy attributes, including the encouragement of FDI through the Foreign 
Investment Law, and the application of the privatisation policy which has as main aim 
the enhancement of participation of the private sector in the domestic economy. As 
such, in assessing a complaint or report, the GAC takes note of the positive effect of 
the agreement or conduct of a foreign investor on employment and infrastructure in 
the KSA.579 GAC may also take note of the effect on the privatisation policy. However, 
the encouragement of foreign investment creates challenges for local companies 
attempting to obtain market access. Further, attempts at privatisation may also be 
problematic given that the government is a key stakeholder in the dominant companies 
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such as the STC, thereby creating irreconcilable conflicts of interest to the detriment 
of newly entering firms.580 Nonetheless, the fact that the Competition Law is 
susceptible to the international reality (especially that of the WTO) implies that it has 
been instrumentalised by the government to achieve objectives beyond the 
competitive process in the KSA. 
5.3.2  LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW 
Despite the broad scope of the Competition Law, it has certain crucial limitations that 
must be addressed to understand the relationship between the Law and the 
telecommunications sector. These limitations are discussed in this section.  
5.3.2.1  VERTICAL AGREEMENTS 
Ardiyok and Yuksel argue that particular consideration needs to be given to vertical 
agreements under the Competition Law in general.581 Hence, Article 4 is much 
narrower as it only prohibits agreements between actual and potential competitors. 
Although it covers these horizontal agreements between competitors, it fails to provide 
any provisions for the vertical agreements involving the range of buyers and sellers of 
goods and services at different levels of the chain. This is very clear from a recent 
ruling of the GAC which shows that the approach towards vertical restraints is not very 
wide so as to bring a lot of potentially illegal acts and agreements under its ambit. In 
Abdel Hadi Abdullah Al-Qahtani and Sons Beverage Industry Ltd, the Court imposed 
a fine on a Pepsi Cola bottler of roughly SAR 15 million for abusing its market position 
under Article 4.582 GAC had investigated the bottler and concluded that it had not 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct through the vertical agreements. However, the 
Court held that the bottler’s conduct and agreements amounted to price-fixing, abuse 
of dominance and the sharing of regional markets.  
Another example is the merger involving Al Azizia Panda United Giant Stores. Despite 
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the GAC’s study concluding that the merger would constitute more than 40 per cent of 
the Saudi market for commodity retail trade, the merger was determined to be in the 
best interests of consumers and allowed by the GAC.583  
The GAC is less likely to apply the same standards to a ‘horizontal’ cooperation that 
includes agreements and arrangements between different businesses who operate at 
the same level of the supply chain and so are the actual or potential competitors of 
each other, such as joint research and development projects between competing firms 
or sales and marketing joint ventures between two or more competing firms.584 In 
contrast, vertical arrangements are not treated the same way because they cover 
businesses which operate at different levels of the supply chain such as contracts 
between suppliers and manufacturers or distribution agreements between 
manufacturers and retailers. This raises the question of what approach to use when 
vertical arrangements are entered into between competitors and one manufacturer 
agrees to distribute on behalf of another. This could also be held to be a vertical 
agreement although, technically speaking, it is horizontal. However, the current 
approach, which is not unique to the KSA, is to be less formalistic and enforce rules in 
a purposive manner in light of the requirements of policy and economics.585 Thus, the 
GAC conducts an economic analysis to determine whether the relevant conduct or 
agreement is illegal.  
5.3.2.2  CONCERTED PRACTICES 
Compared to Article 4 of the Competition Law, Article 101 of the TFEU has a broader 
potential for arrangements between competitors to engage in vertical or horizontal 
agreements to be held as illegal. This may be attributed to the fact that there is limited 
information available on the actual scope of Article 4 and the Saudi regulator deals 
with more external peripheral bypasses than the EU regulator. The latter explains why 
the GAC has extensive powers and may decide to expand or limit the scope of the 
Competition Law by not applying the prohibitions contained in Article 4 of the Law to 
problematic practices and agreements that are deemed to improve efficiency and 
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realise benefits to consumers, and thus outweigh their anti-competitive effect.  
Similarly, it may be argued that Article 4 does not cover as much ground as Article 101 
TFEU given that Article 4 does not regulate concerted practices which may aim to 
determine the prices of products. In the CJEU case of ICI Ltd v Commission, it was 
held that concerted practices include coordination between companies and firms 
which have not yet achieved a contractual form but actually in practice substitute 
cooperation for the purposes of competition and may risk falling within anti-competitive 
practices.586 This is not covered by Article 4 as it only extends to agreements and 
contracts and any pre-contractual cooperation between the undertakings. However, it 
is noted above that the GAC is empowered to determine whether a particular conduct 
or agreement is anti-competitive. Given that it is allowed to use external peripheral 
bypasses, its assessment takes into account the interests of the public as well as the 
relevant industrial policies.  
5.3.2.3 ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
Article 5 of the Competition Law states that any undertaking which has a dominant 
position or enjoys the same is prohibited from selling goods and services below the 
market price with the object or effect of forcing competitors out of the market due to 
this cost reduction. It also prohibits putting any restrictions which hinder the supply of 
goods or services, creating artificial shortages so as to raise prices and in so doing 
puting another firm on a weak footing, and refusing to deal with another competing 
firm without justification 
It may be argued that unlike Article 4, there is a precise definition of dominance in 
Article 5, thereby restricting the GAC in determining whether an undertaking is 
dominating in the market. Thus, any entity with a market share which exceeds the forty 
per cent market threshold within a continuous period of twelve months or which is in 
a position to influence the price may be assumed to be in a dominant position if it 
cannot be challenged . However, what is important is whether the undertaking has 
abused its dominant position. It was shown above that the GAC does not rely solely 
on the market share or ability to influence the price in order to determine whether an 
undertaking has abused its dominating position. Hence, the measure provided by 
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Article 5 is not conclusive. 
5.3.2.4  MERGER CONTROL 
Article 6 deals with undertakings which are undergoing mergers in order to acquire 
assets or some other proprietary rights, which causes them to be in a dominant market 
position. These undertakings are required by Article 6 to inform the GAC at least sixty 
days before the completion of the merger or acquisition. 
Article 6 states that after notifying the GAC, the undertakings will be at the behest of 
the organ if the merger or acquisition is accepted or rejected. The GAC is then given 
the power to decide whether the coming together of two companies or partnerships 
results in them being in a dominant position, and whether the position has been 
abused. Generally, the new undertaking will be in a dominant position if its market 
share exceeds forty per cent after the merger or acquisition for a period of twelve 
months or it has been thrust into a position where it can influence the price in the 
market.587 However, the GAC is allowed to take into consideration the percentage of 
affected consumers and suppliers, the time period during which such practice has 
taken place, the volume of goods and services in question and the impact of the 
merger and acquisition on consumers. It follows that Article 6 also allows the GAC to 
use external peripheral bypasses. 
It is therefore clear from Articles 4 and 6 that the abuses of dominant positions are 
those acts as described within these articles and which, broadly speaking, target any 
practices which have as their aim or effect the restriction of competition between 
undertakings in the market based upon the broad areas of price control, restriction of 
free flow of goods and services, barriers to entering the market and barriers to leaving 
the market. This also includes attempting to force out the competitors, separation of 
markets, compelling a client to refrain from dealing with other similar companies and 
other acts of discrimination which fall within the scope of these articles. Nelson also 
argues that intellectual property rights, which are inherently monopolistic, have the 
potential to create a dominant position and competition laws have a legitimate 
objective to ensure that such rights are not abused588 Nonetheless, these are simply 
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guidelines since it is up to the GAC to determine whether in the circumstances a 
dominant position created by a merger or acquisition is acceptable under the 
Competition Law. 
5.4 REGULATING THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
MARKET 
The Competition Law was intended to be a turning point for curbing anti-competitive 
behaviour within the telecommunications sector. As discussed above, competition is 
fundamental for the growth of organisations as well as the professional development 
of individuals in the organisation. Competition enables individuals to bring their best to 
their roles in order to help organisations to reach their full potential and remain ahead 
of their competitors. If not properly managed, however, competition can be a major 
source of conflict. As individuals and organisations strive to emerge as the best in the 
course of competition, some may resort to unfair methods such as sabotaging the 
efforts of their competitors. This act of sabotage is closely linked to power struggles 
since the more one wins a competition, the more powerful one becomes over 
competitors.589 Competition can therefore be very unhealthy if it is not managed 
properly and can create many organisational conflicts. 
The KSA adopted the Competition Law in 2004 and it entered into force in January 
2005, with immediate applicability to the telecommunications sector, thus functioning 
as an overarching, gap-filling legislation that was required to work in coordination with 
the pre-existing Telecommunications Act. The Competition Law’s focus is similar to 
that of the Telecommunications Act, namely ensuring fair competition in the market, 
thus protecting consumers and emerging competitors who are discouraged by those 
with dominant power in the market. As noted above, this law prohibits three kinds of 
practices: anti-competitive agreements, which entail fixing of prices; abuse of a firm’s 
dominant position, which may include the imposition of unfavourable prices that hinder 
interested investors from venturing into the market; and finally, merger operations, 
which create dominant positions and so affect fair competition. These restrictions are 
applicable to all sectors of the Saudi economy, including the telecommunications 
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It is not difficult to see some of the immediate impacts of the Competition Law within 
the telecommunications sector. For example, the STC used to enjoy the benefits of 
monopoly prior to the adoption of the Competition Law.82 Its position was arguably 
contrary to Sharia but there was no codified law prohibiting it. The Competition Law 
has clarified the issue and also provided guidelines for fair competition in the 
telecommunications market. In this light, it must be noted that a dominant position in 
the KSA telecommunications industry is not: 
prohibited as long as the dominating firm is not abusing the power it 
poses. The intellectual property rights are inherently monopolistic, 
have the capability of providing job opportunities. The firm that 
dominates any particular market enjoys a large market that earns it a 
lot of profit and hence it should provide employment opportunities.590 
The regulator in the KSA is therefore required to conduct an economic analysis using 
what are described above as ‘external peripheral bypasses’ in order to ensure fair 
competition. However, it was shown above that they divert the subject matter away 
from competition analysis and unduly limit the scope of the Competition Law. This 
raises questions about the importance of the centrality of economics and whether fair 
competition can be achieved in the KSA. 
5.4.1 THE CENTRALITY OF ECONOMICS 
As noted above, economics is central to the analysis of the Competition Law. In 
Chapter Three, it was stated that the KSA’s ICT market accounts for more than 
seventy per cent of all ICT markets in the GCC. Capital value and volume spending 
have made the market the largest in the Middle East. Due to increased demand for 
smartphones and high-speed networks, there is a projection that growth in ICT 
spending will increase. such future development is supported by the legislature that 
sees the ICT industry improvement as a national need. It was also shown in Chapter 
Three that the mobile market, fixed line and the internet in the KSA have all been 
liberalised. In September 2014, Virgin Mobile Saudi Arabia started MVNO services. 
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The following December, Jawraa Lebara did the same. Since then, MVNO has 
become firmly established. By October 2015, Virgin Mobile Saudi Arabia hit its highest 
record of one million subscribers. Lebara KSA was not been left behind as in the same 
year it announced its partnership with Huawei to provide MVNO services to various 
telecommunications operators. 
The introduction of MVNO services and reduction in mobile termination rates has led 
to increased competition in the KSA mobile market. The telecommunications market 
of the KSA in the Middle East has therefore created fierce competition among various 
market players. Before the introduction of the Competition Law, the market was 
dominated by unfair practices among MVNO providers. Due to the dominance of 
the STC, the company manipulated market prices and even discouraged other firms 
such as VSAT from entering the market. In the end, VSAT was forced to enter into a 
collaboration with the STC. Before the Competition Law came into force, every firm 
wanted to win the large customer base of the Middle East and would often become 
involved in abuses of dominant power to gain a competitive advantage over 
competitors.591 At the time, the KSA market was largely unregulated and the main 
player in the industry was the STC, a state-owned undertaking that was in a position 
to manipulate market prices. 
In 1998, the STC was converted into a corporate entity. In 2000, plans were put in 
place to sell an equity stake of the STC to a foreign investor. However, this deal never 
materialized. In 2003, the company’s ownership was restructured through the selling 
of a thirty per cent stake to Saudi investors and state pension fund. This step as shown 
in Chapter Three constituted pseudo or partial privatisation and did not reduce the 
prospect of market dominance or influence of market prices by Etisalat and the STC. 
Companies that wanted to venture into the telecommunications sector such as VSAT 
service providers had to use the STC networks and thus did not work independently 
because the STC had a large customer base and venturing into the business was very 
expensive. Since the STC was owned by the state, it easily convinced the government 
to tighten rules governing entry into the telecommunications sector. 
As shown in Chapter Four, prior to the introduction of the Competition Law, the STC 
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had taken advantage of its market dominance to engage in unfair market practices. 
With its dominance, the company was able to increase the popularity of broadband, 
which drove fixed-line growth. The STC also enjoyed annual growth in excess of ten 
per cent. Also, it was able to control usage. The company’s ownership of more than 
80% of telecommunications gave it the ability to own shares in foreign countries and 
so control the communication platform of the KSA. 
The Competition Law was aimed at reducing the occurrence of anti-competitive 
practices in the telecommunications sector. It therefore provides the ground for 
appropriate regulation of competition as well as the imposition of penalties for any 
breach of the provisions of the law. Through its implementation, the entry of new 
players into the telecommunications industry was boosted. This also encouraged 
companies operating in the sector to ramp up scale and adopt new technologies. In 
fact, between 2008 and 2011, telecommunications operators invested SAR thirty-one 
billion, thus boosting efficiency in the communications sector.  
However, the STC has not been fined or sanctioned despite the fact that it was the 
dominant undertaking and abused its position on more than one occasion. This may 
be attributed to the economic importance of the STC. The regulatory framework also 
includes policies and legislative reforms by the SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency) that ensure a strong legal framework for financial services and has enabled 
free trade and open markets for new investors to invest in the sector. With its 
dominance, the STC has also been able to extend its market share in the KSA. 
However, rather than sanctions, the SAMA has constantly worked to provide the STC 
with tools and processes which has enabled it to take control of the international 
sharing platform and has accelerated creativity and development in the 
telecommunications sector.592 Thus, at each step of the way, the regulator has 
deemed it important to support rather than sanction the STC because of the 
undertaking’s importance to the telecommunications sector and the economy of the 
KSA. 
In light of the above, it is uncertain whether it may be said that the main goal of the 
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Competition Law is to promote and protect fair competition and fight unfair practices. 
As with the case of the STC, emphasis is placed on the effects of the practices rather 
than their unfairness regarding other competitors in the market. It must be noted that 
before the Telecommunications Act and the Competition Law, Sharia was already in 
force. Sharia restricts the ability of a company to obtain a dominant position in the 
market. Article 4 of the Competition Law reinforces this rule by stating that agreements 
and practices among the current communication firms, either written or verbal, with an 
aim of creating unl Telecommunications Act awful practices are prohibited. The GAC 
may take appropriate measures to prohibit dominant firms from further exploiting the 
market. However, this has not been done regarding the STC because of the centrality 
of economics in competition analysis.  
5.4.2  THE COMPETITION LAW ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT  
Concerns about anti-competitive practices and the need for a competition law are 
relatively new to the KSA, coming into play over the last few decades with the 
application to accede to the WTO. While these issues have long been addressed by 
the principles of Sharia, as the KSA sought to accede to the WTO and attract foreign 
investment and become a more respected player in the global market, its codified laws 
needed to reflect generally accepted competition principles. As such, the Competition 
Law that was enacted does not reflect the competitive process as understood by local 
undertakings. The fact that the Competition Law was enacted to assuage the fears of 
foreign investors explains why the role that statute plays in the KSA’s competition 
policy has been less clear than the Kingdom’s broad understanding of the need for its 
enactment.  
Thus, the existing Telecommunications Act, the Competition Law, and the Sharia 
principles upon which all Saudi laws are based find themselves within a muddled 
framework for the regulation of anti-competitive practices within the Kingdom’s 
telecommunications sector. A primary challenge with the dual governing legislations 
and Sharia is the issue of overlapping jurisdiction. 
5.4.2.1 THE PROBLEM OF OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION 
One of the difficulties with introducing formal, broad competition laws into an area that 
is already addressed by sector-specific regulation, as well as common law (in this 
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case, Sharia), is the overlap of jurisdiction between the competition authority and the 
sector’s regulatory authority. Indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to do away 
with the existing institutions and replace them with an ideally harmonised, singular 
entity.593 The following sections consider some of the issues the Kingdom has 
encountered as a result of having two pieces of legislation with jurisdiction over the 
same procedural and substantive issues within the telecommunications sector. 
5.4.2.2  RESOLVING JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS 
When one is faced with multiple pieces of legislation that have jurisdiction over the 
same matters, the adage ‘too many cooks in the kitchen’ becomes applicable. What 
becomes problematic is determining what the relationship between the two laws is, 
including the hierarchy of application, enforcement and authority. As Singh quips, 
trying to harmonise two pieces of competition legislation is like trying to determine who 
is the ‘chief chef’ in the competition regulation kitchen.594 What may have been simply 
overlooked by legislators when drafting a subsequent, broad competition law, poses 
problems for the day-to-day operations of competition regulators in the 
telecommunications industry who are actively trying to encourage a competitor 
environment. Thus, without some guidance as to how jurisdictional conflicts are to be 
resolved, regulators at both the broad economic level and the sector-specific level are 
faced with resolving what the legislatures failed to address. 
Singh suggests that there are essentially three options available for resolving 
jurisdictional conflicts.595 First, the sector-specific legislation and regulator must 
supersede the broad competition law and the competition authority. However, in 
practice in the KSA, the Telecommunications Act is insufficient on its own to regulate 
the sector, thus mandating the need for additional regulation. Second, the competition 
legislation and authority could replace the sector-specific legislation and regulator. Yet, 
this also does not appear to be ideal as it lacks provisions that address the nuances 
of the sector’s development. Finally, a third option would be to create a system in 
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which the broad competition law system and the sector-specific system can coexist. 
While this was not the explicit intention of the KSA in enacting the Telecommunications 
Act and the Competition Law, this is where it is left based on what has come to pass. 
Thus, the government must take the necessary steps to reconcile these systems so 
that they act in concert as opposed to providing two parallel systems for addressing 
the same concerns within the telecommunications sector. 
5.4.3  COMPETITION POLICY COHERENCE 
As mentioned above, there needs to be efforts to bring the two parallel sets of 
competition provisions that apply to the telecommunications sector into coordinated 
action. The failure to have a certain level of coherence often results in sporadic 
competition enforcement.596 Remedying these overlapping and unstable provisions 
means creating a certain level of coherence in the competition model from a legal 
context. There is no doubt that both a general competition authority and a sector- 
specific regulator each have unique characteristics and attributes that can contribute 
to the model’s success, but ultimately some reconciliation needs to happen to allow 
each of these entities to fulfil their purposes within the system. The problem here 
seems to be the fact that the government instrumentalised the Competition Law 
whereby its goals go beyond the competitive process as understood by local 
undertakings.  
It is therefore important to ensure that the enforcement of the Competition Law takes 
into account the goals of local participants in the telecommunications market. This 
would require ‘a fluent interplay between both agencies [in order to] properly take 
advantage of double control over the sector’.597 However, double control may lead to 
duplicative efforts rather than two agencies acting together in harmony to provide 
adequate regulation of a specific economic market sector. By creating competition 
policy coherence, the KSA can reduce duplicative efforts, increase efficiency, improve 
market stability and create consistent enforcement results to preserve the competition 
environment.99 
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5.4.3.1 STREAMLINED ENFORCEMENT 
There are numerous reasons why streamlined enforcement of competition issues is 
important. The first is so that the firms within the market are aware of which authority 
they are subject to and what measures of enforcement they are able to impose. 
Second, streamlining enforcement prevents the duplication of efforts by multiple 
regulatory entities within the Kingdom, creating operational efficiencies within the 
telecommunications sector. Further, as Singh notes, competition law is a specialized 
field and leaving the enforcement of competition matters to the specific competition 
authority can reduce transaction costs and enhance efficiency.598 Similarly, when it 
comes to matters of substantive enforcement, as opposed to competition enforcement, 
the sector-specific regulator’s expertise in the subject matter would position it more 
suitably to enforce any violations of the Telecommunications Act. However, the 
exclusion of the sector from the realm of competition law constitutes an external 
peripheral bypass which diverts the subject matter away from the competition analysis, 
making it more likely that undertakings in that sector would engage in anti-competitive 
practices. 
5.7 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The question then becomes – how can the issue of overlapping jurisdiction be 
addressed? It is apparent that some action needs to be taken to improve the overall 
effectiveness of competition regulation within the telecommunications sector, but it 
must be determined what that model looks like before the legislature can take effective 
action toward reconciling these pieces of legislation. In addressing the issues of 
overlapping jurisdiction, it is important to consider the various models used by 
countries to resolve the interplay between competition law and sector-specific 
regulation. The telecommunications sector may simply be excluded from the purview 
of the broad competition law, leaving regulation to the sector-specific legislation. 
Nonetheless, as noted above, this is likely to increase the incidence of anti-competitive 
practices in the sector. The telecommunications sector may also be specifically 
included within the scope of the competition law’s applicability. In this instance, the 
sector-specific regulation may take precedence over the competition legislation, and 
a policy document may be used to reconcile the applicability of the two laws. Finally, 
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a third approach involves developing the broad competition law and then promulgating 
sector-specific laws subject to the competition law’s applicability. This presents an 
option for a harmonised approach in the form of amending or replacing the 
Telecommunications Act in light of the nation’s development of its competition policy 
to create a harmonised framework. However, steps must be taken to ensure that the 
competition policy does not simply advance goals that are beyond the competitive 
process as understood by Saudi manufacturers and buyers. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The scope and nature of the Competition Law is affected by wide policy attributes, 
including the encouragement of FDI through the Foreign Investment Law, and the 
application of the privatisation policy which has as its main aim the enhancement of 
participation of the private sector in the domestic economy. Thus, in assessing a 
complaint or report, the GAC may take note of the positive effect of the anti-competitive 
agreement or conduct of a foreign investor on employment and infrastructure in the 
KSA. The GAC may also take note of the effect on the privatisation policy. However, 
the encouragement of foreign investment via such means creates challenges for local 
companies attempting to obtain market access. Also, from a legal perspective, it is 
objectionable that the GAC is required to prioritise economics in the competition 
analysis in such a subjective manner that makes it difficult to predict how the Law will 
be applied in any given circumstance. 
It may be contended that the Competition Law has much room for improvement and 
will develop with time as it is going through a teething phase at present.599 However, 
from the above analysis, it is uncertain what support this specific legislation actually 
provides to the regulatory framework in the telecommunications sector given that it 
largely overlaps with the Telecommunications Act and principles of Sharia.  
Nonetheless, research has shown that the enforcement of pro-competitive rules 
serves the objectives of fairness and efficiency and increases consumer surplus and 
welfare. Also, it ensures that the elimination or reduction of barriers to trade by the 
government is not undermined or negated by the anti-competitive conduct of local 
firms which may abuse their market power. The main problems with the Competition 
                                               
599 See Saleem (n 553) 290-291. 
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Law include the centrality of economic analysis which shields arbitrary decision 
making by the GAC, the fact that the Law is susceptible to a multitude of considerations 
which collectively undermine the transparency of the regulatory framework, and a poor 
delineation of the scope of the Law. Addressing the latter problem will help to solve 
that of overlapping jurisdiction and will also determine the suitable approach for 
developing a coherent competition policy in the telecommunications sector. The next 





UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE COMPETITION LAW AND THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As evidenced by the discussion in Chapter Five, competition law may promote 
consumer welfare on a large-scale or detrimentally harm that same welfare and inter-
societal relations if abused. Competition laws, while they go by different names,600 
embody the same underlying objectives in the countries in which they are enacted— 
to combat monopolistic practices and ensure fair competition in the market.601 The 
KSA is no different. As shown in Chapter Five, the purpose of the competition law 
regime in the KSA is to prevent a single entity from acquiring a dominant market 
position or from entering into arrangements with the intention of restricting competition. 
However, through a lack of coherence in the laws and their implementing regulations, 
the competition regime currently falls short of its intended goals. The current efforts 
within the KSA have been moving toward codification of substantive laws and 
procedural regulations.602 For these codification efforts to be successful and ensure 
clarity and legal certainty for market participants and consumers, the separate pieces 
of legislation must function in harmony to create a unified framework for addressing 
anti-competitive practices. 
                                               
600 Also referred to as antitrust or anti-monopoly laws. The genesis of the term ‘antitrust’ may be traced 
to the adoption of the Sherman Act of 1890 in the United States (US) that was primarily aimed at 
regulating the expansion of ‘trusts’ that business competitors used to coordinate their activities and 
run entire industries as monopolies. See Edward Biester, ‘Understanding Antitrust Laws, Competition, 
the Economy, and Their Impact on Our Everyday Lives’ (2011) 72(2) Social Education 68, 68. Diane 
Wood contended that the name ‘antitrust’ used in the US is ‘a quaint name, evocative of long-dead 
robber barons and swashbuckling Presidents. Other countries with more recently enacted laws give 
them the more straightforward label of "competition" laws-laws designed to protect competition and 
consumers.’ However, she noted that the competition laws in the US and Western Europe have 
common roots in the American experience of the first half of the twentieth century and the deeper 
common law traditions. See Diane P Wood, ‘The US Antitrust Laws in a Global Context’ (2004) 
Columbia Business Law Review 265, 265-266. 
601 See Nelson (131). 
602 Sebghatullah Qazi Zada and Mohd Ziaolhaq Qazi Zada, ‘Codification of Islamic Law in the Muslim 




This chapter attempts to formulate the suitable framework for encouraging competition 
in and regulation of, the telecommunications sector of the KSA. It conducts a 
comparative analysis of three jurisdictional models, namely the UAE, Qatar and the 
US. The goal of this analysis is to identify ways in which the Saudi legislative structure 
can be improved through a balance of the cultural considerations specific to the 
geographic region in which the KSA is situated while also learning from the experience 
of more sophisticated competition law systems that have withstood the challenges of 
time and technological advancements. It begins by discussing the criteria used to 
select the three jurisdictions. This is followed by an assessment of the models used in 
the countries and the suitability of the models to the KSA. 
The comparison achieves two objectives. First, it explores the relationship between 
competition law and sector-specific regulation. The jurisdictional models examined 
serve an instructive purpose by demonstrating ways in which the KSA can continue to 
advance its competition regime through legislative harmonisation. Second, it helps to 
understand where the current Saudi competition law regime (as applied in the 
telecommunications sector) is in relation to the global trends in competition culture. 
The analysis of the approaches of different jurisdictions helps to identify the similarities 
and differences between the given jurisdictions and the KSA and points to what can 
be avoided or achieved in the Kingdom through a competition policy. 
6.2 COMPARATIVE SELECTION CRITERIA 
At a global level, competition law has become a highly topical and debated issue 
because of the consensus on the fact that efficient competition is an important driver 
of productivity.603 When effectively managed, competition allows for the achievement 
of consumer and economic welfare on a large scale, but when left unchecked and 
when anti-competitive practices become prevalent, local welfare and relations 
between societies may be destroyed. 
                                               
603 See Jarig van Sinderen and Ron Kemp, ‘The Economic Effect of Competition Law Enforcement: The 
Case of the Netherlands’ (2008) 156(4) De Economist 365, 365-385; John S Metcalfe and Ronald 
Ramolgan, ‘Competition and the Regulation of Economic Development’ in Paul Cook, Raul Fabella and 
Cassey Lee (eds), Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries (Edward 
Elgar 2007) 21, 26; Yiuchiro Uchida and Paul Cook, ‘Domestic Competition and Technological and 
Trade Competitiveness’ in Paul Cook, Raul Fabella and Cassey Lee (eds), Competitive Advantage and 
Competition Policy in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar 2007) 311; William W Lewis, The Power of 
Productivity (University of Chicago Press 2004) 288. 
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In light of the importance of the competition regime in the KSA as shown in Chapters 
Four and Five, this chapter analyses the competition regime in three other jurisdictions 
and contextualizes the regime within the Sharia-based legal systems of two of the 
three jurisdictions, and specifically within their telecommunications sectors. It identifies 
the driving policy reasons necessitating competition statutes and attempts to 
determine whether the statutes are coherent and effective in their current iteration. 
The objective of the analyses is to make suggestions for enhancing the competition 
regime of the KSA. The two regimes within Sharia-based legal systems are two GCC 
nations, the UAE and Qatar. They are examined in order to demonstrate two different 
approaches to protecting competition in the telecommunications sectors of Muslim-
majority countries.604 The UAE has adopted an approach that expressly excludes 
telecommunications from the purview of competition law, leaving the regulation of anti-
competitive behaviours in the sector solely to the sector-specific regulatory authority. 
Qatar, for its part, demonstrates an attempt to harmonise sector-specific 
telecommunications regulations with the overarching competition law regime. Thus, 
the competition law applies coupled with a complementary set of sector-specific 
regulations. What makes the UAE and Qatar suitable comparable jurisdictions is that, 
similar to the KSA, they are both legal systems in which laws are required to comply 
with the principles of Sharia. As such, they provide two clear examples of attempts to 
develop a modern competition policy in a Sharia-based society. However, in both 
countries the development and implementation of the competition law systems are 
relatively new. Hence, they are not sufficiently developed because they are not based 
on rules or principles that were established and revisited in landmark decisions or 
longstanding customs of the communities.605 In view of this limitation, this chapter 
                                               
604 This dissertation takes a state-specific approach to addressing the different structures of competition 
law frameworks. This is in contrast to the supranational approach taken by the European Union to 
address competition law issues. See Katalin J Cseres, ‘Multijurisdictional Competition Law 
Enforcement: The Interface between European Competition Law and the Competition Laws of the New 
Member States’ (2007) 3(2) European Competition Journal 465, 465-502; Roger J Van Den Bergh and 
Peter D Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective 
(Intersentia 2001) 125-126. While it could be argued that the GCC is essentially an underdeveloped 
supranational entity that should follow in the steps of the European Union, such a transformation would 
need to be coordinated among all the member nations. Thus, at this point, it is purely theoretical. An 
exploration of a supranational GCC approach, while potentially viable as a distant, long-term solution, 
is therefore outside the scope of the current analysis. The goal of this chapter is to focus on positive 
changes that can be immediately adopted and implemented from comparable jurisdictions to assist the 
Saudi government in the effective regulation of competition in the Telecommunication. 
605 Abhimanyu Singh, ‘The Necessity for International Harmonization of Competition Law’ (24 
September 2015)<https://www.slideshare.net/abhimanyunusrl/the-necessity-for-international-
harmonization-of-competition-law- 53139851> accessed 15 May 2017. By the late 1970s, one in nine 
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examines a third model, that of the US. 
To help identify ways in which a harmonised structure can be implemented and 
improved, the well-established competition law regime of the US is considered. Unlike 
the UAE and Qatar, competition law in the US is based on well-defined judicial 
institutions, rules or principles established in landmark decisions and longstanding 
customs. It was described by Pierce as the oldest system of competition law.606 Its 
evaluation here is intended to provide a procedural model framework that can be 
adopted within the KSA, despite the use of legal precedent in the common law regime 
in the US, unlike the Sharia/civil law regime of the KSA. The goal of introducing the 
approach of an old and sophisticated regime is to determine whether an aspirational 
model may be designed based on notable and desirable features of the US approach. 
The choice of the US also stems from its harmonised approach that coordinates the 
application of the competition law framework with the sector-specific regulations of the 
telecommunications industry. In fact, the US competition law framework was the first 
to establish a broadly applicable competition law regime that applied to economic 
sectors.607 It created a system of antitrust enforcement that was initially untethered to 
any particular set of sector-specific regulations.608 However, over time, it became 
apparent that ex ante regulation was needed in addition to the ex post nature of 
competition law. Sector-specific regulations were therefore issued to work in harmony 
with the competition law provisions. Like the US in the past, GCC nations like the KSA 
and Qatar have found themselves with an unintended duality of legislation as a result 
of first creating sector-specific regulations. Thus, it is important to determine whether 
the system ought to be built on competition first, and then followed by tailored 
regulation.609 The US is an example of a system that was built to embody the 
                                               
jurisdictions had a competition law in place and of those nine, only six had a competition authority. By 
1990, twenty-three jurisdictions had a competition law and sixteen had a competition authority. 
However, it was between 1990 and 2013 that the global economy saw an increase of over 500 per cent 
in the development of jurisdictions with competition law regimes and competition authorities. By October 
2013, 127 jurisdictions had a competition law and 120 had a competition authority. Ibid. 
606 Richard J Pierce, ‘Comparing the Competition Law Regimes of the United States and India’ (2017) 
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2017-27 1, 1. < 
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2523&context=faculty_publications> 
accessed 10 October 2018. 
607 See Wood (n 601) 266. 
608 See Jonida Lamaj, ‘The Evolution of Antitrust Law in USA’ (2017) 13(4) European Scientific Journal 
154, 154-158. 
609 The Sherman Act 1890 began with a resolution introduced by congressman Henry Bacon in the first 
session of the fiftieth congress in 1888. The resolution directed the House Committee on manufactures 
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complementary nature of competition law and sector-specific regulation and may 
serve as a model on how to reconcile the two regimes in a unified policy.610 
As a preliminary note, it is also important to point out that the comparisons made by 
this chapter focus on procedural rather than substantive harmonisation. This focus on 
procedural harmonisation stems from the unique purposes that the two pieces of 
legislation (competition and sector-specific) serve. As will be further detailed in this 
chapter, competition laws regulate anti-competitive behaviours at a broad or general 
level, whereas sector-specific regulations deal with the specific aspects of the market 
sector, such as the telecommunications industry. As a function of their purposes, there 
is inherently some overlap between the jurisdictions of the two that must be resolved. 
However, this is not a conflict of substantive provisions. Rather, this is a situation 
necessitating a hierarchy of enforcement mechanisms from a procedural level, such 
that it becomes clear which competition authority has effective jurisdiction over which 
matters, or whether one may be excluded. Nonetheless, it was shown in Chapter Five 
that each of the relevant legislations serves a specific substantive function within the 
telecommunications competition policy and, for the most part, their substantive 
provisions do not need to be reconciled. 
6.2.1 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN COMPETITION LAWS AND THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS IN SELECTED 
JURISDICTIONS 
This comparative analysis highlights the competition law systems of three nations that 
have been chosen as instructive models with which to compare the Saudi approach. 
As noted above, the first two, the UAE and Qatar, were chosen for their role as Sharia 
-based members of the GCC. While having similar legal systems, the UAE and Qatar 
take different approaches to the implementation of competition regimes with regard to 
the telecommunications sector. The UAE specifically excludes telecommunications 
from the scope of its competition legislation, whereas Qatar employs both a 
competition law and sector-specific regulations. The US is then used as a third 
template, representing the longest-standing competition law regime in one of the 
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world’s most developed nations. It reflects an established harmonised approach that 
mirrors the Qatari and Saudi approaches. For each of these countries, a brief history 
of their competition law as well as its relationship with the telecommunications sector 
is provided. Each system will then be compared with the existing regime in the KSA to 
identify similarities, differences and opportunities for improvement. 
For competitive markets to be efficient, there must be some sort of governance in 
place that prevents the self-destruction of the sector.611 As pressures increase for the 
participating actors, competing with natural domestic monopolies and in the realm of 
international business activities, there must be a way to support these actors, preserve 
the efficiency of the market and protect the general welfare. While each country’s 
competition law regime will be unique depending on its existing legal framework and 
objectives, there are certain common characteristics that come up in nearly every 
regime. The most common characteristic is the prohibition of certain types of 
behaviour, conduct and transactions.612 Specifically, most competition laws prohibit 
collusion, price-fixing cartels or related schemes and the limiting of production by 
abusing a dominant position.613 In addition to being similar in substance, many 
regimes have also come to analyse competition issues in the same way. These 
similarities in approaches are particularly useful as the number of cross-border 
transactions increase and the need for bilateral cooperation becomes more prominent. 
However, just as these regimes have similarities that unite them, they also have many 
differences that distinguish them. Often these differences are shaped by a nation’s 
supplementary objectives. Dabbah614 highlights four primary ways that competition 
laws differ that will be helpful in this analysis of competing jurisdictional systems. First, 
nations differ in how they define competition and understand what type of activity the 
competition law is intended to prevent. Second, the naming conventions applied to the 
law and how the law fits within the nation’s existing regulatory framework differ 
depending on the jurisdiction. Third, and arguably most important, is how different 
                                               
611 Oliver Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition – Competence Allocation in International 
Competition Policy (Edward Elgar 2008) 1. 
612 Maher M Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 
2012) 13. 
613 Louis Kaplow and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust’ (2007) Harvard Law School Discussion Paper No. 575. < 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w12867> accessed 10 October 2018. 
614 Dabah (n 613) 13. 
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jurisdictions handle enforcement of the competition law. Finally, when assessing the 
methods and procedures, it is important to consider the meta-institutional approach 
that is used to achieve the objectives of competition law. 
It must be noted that there is no single formula for effectiveness with regard to 
competition regimes given that each regime has unique features based upon its 
objectives.615 Instead of being evaluated on the basis of the regime’s adherence to a 
prescribed model, the effectiveness of the regime may be evaluated with regard to a 
set of established criteria. As such, the author has established the following criteria for 
determining a competition regime’s effectiveness: ease of implementation; 
governance and interpretation; and an understanding of society and respect for its 
culture.616 
With regard to the first criterion, the ease of implementation, it is important to consider 
the history, politics and economics of the particular country.617 Competition law is 
designed to protect businesses and consumers from anti-competitive behaviour. The 
purpose of the law is to safeguard effective competition in order to deliver open, 
dynamic markets along with enhanced productivity, innovation and value for 
consumers.618 To achieve these goals, it is imperative that the law is structured in such 
a way that it fits within the societal landscape of the nation and that businesses 
operating within the market are able to comply. 
Furthermore, despite any differences in views or opinions, the introduction of a 
competition policy into the market of any country requires the support of enforcement 
and regulatory bodies as well as the judiciary. Through such enforcement activities, 
                                               
615 See Frederic Jenny, ‘The Globalization of Competition Law and Policy’ (11 July 2016) 
<http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/11.50-frederic-Competiton-law-An-internzational- 
perpsective-Lodnon-March-2013.pdf> accessed 12 May 2017. 
616 These are some of the criteria used by previous researchers to compare competition law regimes. 
See Richard Pierce (n 604); Andreas Polk and Andreja Primec, ‘Slovenian and German Competition 
Policy Regimes: A Comparative Analysis’ (2017) 63(2) Our Economy 3, 3-13; Jacqueline Bos, ‘Antitrust 
Treatment of Cartels: A Comparative Survey of Competition Law Exemptions in the United States, the 
European Union, Australia and Japan’ (2002) 1 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 415, 
429-439; Eleanor M Fox, ‘US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison’ in Edward M Graham and J 
David Richardson (eds), Global Competition Policy (Columbia University Press 1997) 339, 340-344. 
617 Jacqueline Bos, ibid, 448. See also, Phillip E Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application (Wolters Kluwer 1986) 637-642. 
618 Maurice E Stucke, ‘Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century’ (2007) 38(3) 
Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 513, 542; Eleanor M Fox, ‘The Battle for the Soul of Antitrusts’ 
(1987) 75 California Law Review 917, 919. 
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procedural, economic and legal rules are developed.619 In evaluating governance and 
interpretation, one must consider the applicability to public versus private entities, due 
process in enforcement, the overall enforcement priorities, and the general political 
and legal climates informing legislative interpretation. 
Finally, in discerning the understanding of society and respect for its culture, one must 
consider the country’s particular characteristics, including underlying societal 
principles, the level of poverty and potential for abuse, and the ease with which such 
structures can be integrated into the national economy while minimising the effects on 
citizens’ daily lives.620 Of particular importance for any competition regime being 
developed within the KSA is the central role that Sharia principles play in the daily lives 
of its citizens. It is important that competition regulators understand the extent to which 
such legislative policies are intrinsically tied to the societal culture. 
6.3 LESSONS FROM THE GULF COOPERATION 
COUNCIL 
The GCC comprises six nations—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the UAE.621 Together, these nations form a regional political and economic alliance. 
However, despite their commonalities and aligned interests, each has their own 
independent system of governance that differs in its approaches to the implementation 
of competition law.622 
One of the primary factors for the implementation of a regulatory competition 
framework in the GCC member countries is that it conforms to the requirements of the 
WTO.623 Despite some important progress, the GCC still has a number of challenges 
to face to promote an effective competition culture throughout the region. The GCC 
members recognise that competition in the telecommunications industry presents an 
                                               
619  Bos (n 618) 418, 450. 
620 Stucke (n 619) 515. 
621 Simona Sikimic, ‘Profile: What is the GCC?’ (Middle East Eye, 8 April 2014) 
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/profile-what-gcc-18030284> accessed 7 April 2017. 
622 For the dynamics of relations and approaches in the GCC, see M Eyren Tok, Jason J McSparren 
and Michael Olender, ‘The Perpetuation of Regime Security in Gulf Cooperation Council Sites: A Multi-
Lens Approach’ (2017) 26(1) Digest of Middle East Studies 150, 150-153. 
623 The importance of the WTO is discussed in Chapter Five. See also, Habib Kazzi, ‘GCC States and 




attractive opportunity and this has been one of the motivating factors behind WTO 
compliance. 
Regardless of the issues with existing systems, or in some countries the lack of 
implementation, there is widespread agreement among the members on the need for 
some form of regulation that involves a unified trade system, consumer protection laws 
and an effective competition system.624 It remains possible that supranational 
legislation could be enacted within the GCC to serve as a unified competition code 
applicable to all members.625 However, until such legislation is enacted, the members 
must regulate competition within their domestic legal systems. 
Of the six GCC countries, this section will review the competition law regimes and their 
applicability to the telecommunications sector of the UAE and Qatar. The UAE is an 
example of a system that specifically excludes the telecommunications sector from the 
scope of competition law, whereas Qatar is an example of a system that explicitly 
includes the telecommunications sector within the purview of competition law. The 
systems of both of these countries are heavily influenced by Sharia, likewise the KSA. 
6.3.1 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: EXCLUSION OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
The UAE is a rapidly growing country that has become an attractive investment haven. 
It is governed primarily by Sharia and a federal civil justice system, which includes the 
use of commercial codes.626 The Competition Law627 took effect on 23 February 2013, 
with the goal of regulating market behaviour and preventing market dominance and 
restrictive agreements. Prior to the enactment of this statute, the regulation of 
competition within the UAE was weak at best.628 Concerns were expressed by 
                                               
624 See Abdulrahman A Alajaji, An Evaluation of E-Commerce Legislation in GCC States: Lessons and 
Principles from the International Best Practices (Unpublished Dissertation, Lancaster University 2016) 
26-56. No progress has been made regarding enacting a supranational legislation on competition in the 
GCC.  
625 See The World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Region, ‘Economic Integration in the GCC’ (The 
World Bank, 2010) <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/GCCStudyweb.pdf> 
accessed 16 April 2017; Arab News, ‘GCC States to Unify 6 Commercial Laws’ (Arab News, 25 May 
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626 Alisha Ansari, What is the Scope of Competition Law in the UAE? – A Comparative Study with 
Developed and Developing Nations (Unpublished Dissertation, Western University, 2013) 101. 
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businesses about the inconsistencies between the treatment of undertakings owned 
by the state and private businesses, and the domestic encumbrances that were in 
place within the UAE as a result of the lack of a consolidated competition law.629 
Ultimately, these concerns along with the policies of the GCC and WTO led to the 
promulgation of UAE Federal Law No 4 of 2012 that regulates competition. 
When this law went into effect in early 2013, businesses were given a transitional 
period of six months to bring their agreements and operations into compliance with its 
provisions.630 During this six-month period, additional implementing measures were 
adopted to provide further guidance on the implications of the new Competition Law 
in practice.631 Although there had been anti-competitive provisions in previous 
legislations, the enactment of the Competition Law coupled with the creation of 
implementing regulations represented the first comprehensive competition regime 
within the UAE. 
6.3.1.1 SCOPE OF THE UAE COMPETITION LAW 
In line with the foundational objectives of nearly all competition regimes, the UAE’s 
Competition Law primarily concerns itself with limiting abuses of power within the 
market to protect consumers. Among its provisions are prohibitions on restrictive 
agreements,632 abuse of dominant positions within the market,633 and mergers that 
would threaten the market. The Competition Law was enacted with broad applicability, 
governing both domestic businesses and foreign businesses operating within the UAE. 
It is enforced by the Ministry of the Economy in conjunction with a special Competition 
Committee that acts as advisor to the Minister.634 
However, the Competition Law’s scope of application was narrowed by a list of 
                                               
uae.html> accessed 16 April 2017. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Zubair Mir et al, ‘The New UAE Federal Competition Law Federal Law No 4 of 2012 Concerning 
Regulating Competition’ (Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, 12 February 2013) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=de938446-ade9-4266-af28-a90bb5b37bbf> accessed 
16 April 2017. 
631 See also, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers No 37 of 2014. 
632 See Article 5 of the UAE Federal Law No 4 of 2012. 
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634 Maria Casoria, ‘Competition Law in the GCC Countries: The Tale of a Blurry Enforcement’ (2017) 
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exclusions including state-owned entities and undertakings operating in some sectors 
including oil and gas, financial services, pharmaceutical products, cultural activities, 
postal services, water and electricity, transportation, and the telecommunications 
sector.635 The rationale for the exclusion of the telecommunications sector is that it 
was already regulated by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.636 What 
remains unclear is what role the Competition Law then plays where sector-specific 
regulations are in force. 
6.3.1.2   UAE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS 
Having defined the scope of the Competition Law and its exclusion of the 
telecommunications sector, the next step is to look at the applicable regulations in 
place that govern this sector. The UAE Telecommunications Law637 was enacted in 
2003, nearly a decade before the Competition Law came into effect. The 
Telecommunications Law created the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority and 
requires all businesses dealing within the telecommunications sector to hold a license 
permitting them to provide these services to the public. Any business that fails to obtain 
a license could be subject to fines, suspension or closure. The goals that the regulatory 
authority seeks to achieve are similar to the foundational objectives of the Competition 
Law—to guarantee competitiveness, transparency and sustainability within the 
market.638 This may explain why the telecommunications sector was excluded from 
the Competition Law. 
6.3.1.3  INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COMPETITION LAW AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS 
As the UAE Competition Law specifically excludes telecommunications from the 
purview of its authority, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority continues to 
maintain exclusive regulatory and enforcement powers—powers that it had been 
exercising for almost a decade prior to the enactment of the Competition Law. 
However, as the industry continues to expand and evolve, it is important to examine 
                                               
635 Appendix to Article 4 of the Federal Competition Law of UAE 2012 
<http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws/federal_law_4_2012_en.pdf> accessed 16 April 2017. 
636 Mir et al (n 631). 
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the relationship between the Telecommunications Law and the Competition Law. 
First, it must be noted that the telecommunications sector within the UAE is a well-
developed and largely successful industry within the GCC and the Middle East. There 
are two primary integrated telecommunications operators within the region—Emirates 
Telecommunication Corporation (Etisalat) and Emirates Integrated 
Telecommunication Company (EITC), which implies that important markets in the 
telecommunications sector are vertical markets. For example, the vertical-specific 
products and services of Etisalat and EITC are promoted only within the industry (they 
provide connectivity to other telecommunications operators), although they also 
engage in horizontal marketing with the delivery of wireless services to end users 
across various industries. Also, underscoring the importance of this sector within the 
UAE economy, a report by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority stated that 
in 2010 this sector generated AED 3.2 billion in fixed telephony service, AED 18.4 
billion in mobile services and AED 2.7 billion in internet services.639 In terms of the 
scope of this industry, in 2010 it comprised 5.3 per cent of the UAE’s total GDP.640  
Given the importance of the telecommunications sector to the UAE economy, it is 
uncertain whether it is justified to specifically exclude the sector from the scope of the 
Competition Law on the grounds that the sector-specific regulator’s objectives are the 
same as those of the Competition Law. Certainly, the government does not believe 
that the sector should be unregulated but rather that the existing sector-specific 
regulator is, at least for the time being, sufficient to achieve the objectives of the 
competition policy.641 Thus, the Telecommunications Law provides that the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority’s powers are to be exercised without 
prejudice to any applicable laws or regulations. From a policy perspective, its 
regulatory actions should therefore be compatible with the requirements of the 
Competition Law. Nonetheless, when a sector is excluded from the scope of the 
competition legislation, the logical deduction is that the remedies provided by the 
competition legislation are inefficient as regards resolving the competition problems in 
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that sector. The remedies may also overlap with those already provided by the sector-
specific legislation such as price control, non-discrimination, transparency and 
compulsory access. Also, it may be deduced that there are no or low barriers to entry 
given that the sector-specific regulation is efficient, unless there is no policy objective 
to create a level playing field and support new entrants. 
Going back to the integration of Sharia principles into all laws in the nation, anti- 
monopolistic rules were already part of the provisions of the Telecommunications Law 
of 2003. To amend and harmonise this law with the Competition Law of 2012 would 
require rethinking the regulatory and enforcement framework for the 
telecommunications sector; although it would not require substantial amendments in 
order for both laws to be complementary (as will be seen in Qatar and the US). At the 
time of enacting the Competition Law, balancing the national economic objectives had 
priority. It was of primary importance to bring competition protections into otherwise 
unregulated sectors and exclude those with existing frameworks. Once the nation has 
fully embraced the principles of the modern competition policy, it may then revisit these 
previously excluded sectors to bring them in line with a more unified approach.642 This 
will be of particular importance in the telecommunications sector due to the existing 
duopoly in place: there are two dominant integrated telecommunications operators, 
Etisalat and EITC. The continuance of this two-company dominated system may hold 
the UAE back from developing this sector, causing significant losses in consumer 
welfare and act as a barrier to healthy competition practices. 
In addition to the influence of Sharia principles, the competition regime must also 
account for the civil law structure of the legal system. Unlike common law systems in 
which judicial interpretations create precedents that can explain the grey areas of the 
law and effectively use a form of judicial intervention to refine the legislation over time, 
the civil law system evaluates cases on an individual basis leading to uncertainty in 
the law’s application and enforcement. This civil law system combined with the need 
to uphold Sharia principles makes case management difficult and may discourage the 
effective enforcement of competition provisions within the laws. 
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6.3.1.4 EVALUATING THE MODEL 
Having laid out the legal framework of the competition policy for the 
telecommunications sector in the UAE, the framework can be evaluated using the 
criteria set out for this analysis above. First, in considering the ease of implementation, 
there is certainly a gap between the Competition Law and Telecommunications Law. 
Like the KSA, the UAE had an existing regime for managing competition within the 
telecommunications sector derived from the Telecommunication Law. However, unlike 
the KSA, when the UAE’s Competition Law went into effect, the telecommunications 
sector was explicitly excluded. So, from an implementation perspective, nothing new 
was introduced to the governance of this sector in the UAE by the Competition Law. It 
follows that unlike the KSA, the UAE is not required to establish a coherent system in 
order to achieve optimal coordination, whereby the laws and their implementing 
regulations are modified so as to create a complementary system. As shown in 
Chapter Five, this could be particularly burdensome and prevent the existence of a 
coherent competition policy for the telecommunications sector. Thus, competition 
authorities should not intervene in the telecommunications industry where the sector-
specific regulator is already tasked with maintaining market competition. 
Second, with regard to governance and interpretation, the dual civil law and Sharia 
approach, and the lack of any precedential authority, makes application, enforcement 
and refinement of the competition policy difficult. This is equally a problem in the KSA. 
Instead of allowing for the law to be developed and refined over time based on the 
issues presented within the sector, each case is considered anew and can lead to 
disparate results. It follows that there is no guarantee that almost two decades after its 
enactment the sector-specific regulation still meets all the relevant good governance 
principles, including in this case, legal certainty and transparency. Nonetheless, this 
is not a relational problem that can only be understood in terms of interactions between 
the application of Sharia and the use of sector-specific regulators. Nothing in Sharia 
prevents legislators and regulators from adopting relevant good governance principles 
and amending existing laws or regulations to enhance certainty and transparency. 
Finally, the Competition Law seems to exhibit a moderate alignment with the values 
of the UAE’s society and demonstrate the requisite respect for its culture. All laws 
within the system must comply with Sharia principles so integrating the values of the 
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society and then the civil system allows those laws and principles to be enforced. 
However, the effectiveness of the law comes into question when looking at the 
continued existence of the duopoly and the lack of competitors. Since the 
telecommunications sector continues to grow and expand, this reflects the needs of 
the people. Thus, part of the legislation’s goal should be to acknowledge those 
needs and ensure the general welfare by encouraging healthy competition in the 
marketplace. This is an exigency in both the UAE and the KSA. Nonetheless, the UAE 
model is appealing because the telecommunications sector is explicitly excluded from 
the scope of the Competition Law, thereby avoiding an overlap between the 
Competition Law and the sector-specific regulation. 
6.3.2 QATAR: INCLUSION OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR 
In contrast to the UAE, Qatar’s competition law regime encompasses the 
telecommunications sector. The legal system of Qatar is based primarily on Sharia 
and also on the civil law system since it achieved independence in 1971.643 The result 
is a dual legal system similar to that of the UAE. As a developing nation, Qatar 
embraced the idea of a free market economy and recognised the importance of 
competition. The Competition Law was enacted in 2006,644 reflecting the nation’s 
desire to protect economic competition and fight back against market interference. 
Article 7 of the Competition Law provided for the formation of the Competition 
Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee to oversee the implementation of the law in 
Qatar.645 The Committee’s purpose was to raise awareness about fair competition and 
its importance within the market, ensure fair pricing and prevent monopolistic practices 
that would negatively affect fair competition. 
6.3.2.1 SCOPE OF THE QATAR COMPETITION LAW 
The scope of the Competition Law is limited. It applies only to private sector 
businesses and their activities within Qatar and does not apply to entities controlled 
                                               
643 A Nizar Hamzeh, ‘Qatar: The Duality of the Legal Systelm’ (1994) 30(1) Middle Eastern Studies 79, 
79-80. 
644 Qatar Law No 19 of 2006. 
645 Ministry of Economy and Commerce, ‘Competition Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee’ 
(Ministry of Economy and Commerce, 2015) <http://www.mec.gov.qa/en/national- 
committees/Protect%20competition%20and%20prevent%20monopolistic%20practices'%20Committe
e> accessed 16 April 2017. 
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by the state.646 This is similar to the Competition Law of the KSA as shown in Chapters 
Four and Five. The Qatari law prohibits private businesses from engaging in collusion, 
malicious mergers or other abusive conduct that would create a dominant market 
position and pose a threat to the stability of domestic markets or healthy 
competition.647 However, the telecommunications sector is regulated by the Supreme 
Council of Information and Communication Technology that was established by 
decree in 2004.648 The same decree also established legislation governing the 
telecommunications industry within the nation. This legislation envisaged the licensing 
of telecommunications services, interconnection and access to telecommunication 
services and, above all, the prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour. Through its 
provisions, this law embodies the foundational objectives of competition policy by 
upholding the need for consumer protection and prohibiting abuse of dominant market 
positions.649 
In 2009, the telecommunications legislation was further refined through the issuance 
of executive bylaws.650 Among other things, the bylaws expanded consumer 
protections and prohibited service providers from making any false or misleading 
claims about the price, quality or availability of services in the telecommunications 
sector. 
6.3.1.3 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COMPETITION LAW AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS 
Similar to the legal system of the UAE, both the telecommunications and competition 
laws of Qatar contain provisions regarding the enforcement of competition policy. 
However, unlike the UAE, Qatar’s Competition Law encompasses the 
telecommunications sector as opposed to explicitly excluding it. In fact, the 2014 policy 
document established in accordance with Article 48 of the Telecommunications Law 
                                               
646 Carlo Procacci, ‘Competition Law in Qatar: A Closer Look’ (Al Tamimi & Co, September 2016) 
<http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-14/september-6/competition-law-in-qatar-a-
closer- look.html> accessed 16 April 2017. 
647 Ibid.  
648 Qatar Decree Law No 36 of 2004. 
649 See Article 43, ibid. 
650 They are discussed in detail in Anita Siassios, ‘Qatar Telecom Regulator Gets Tough, (Al Tamimi & 
Co, August/September 2011) 
<http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-7/august-september-1/qatar-telecoms-regulator-
gets- tough.html> accessed 16 April 2017. 
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specifically addresses the applicability of the Competition Law to the 
telecommunications sector.651 Part one of the policy document states that 
telecommunications policies should be read in conjunction with the established laws, 
which would include the Telecommunications Law and Competition Law.652 The policy 
document further provides for the review of the competition provision and practices 
within the telecommunications sector to bring both the Telecommunications Law and 
Competition Law into a common framework, thereby furthering consumer protection 
against anti-competitive behaviours. As such, the Qatari legislator has sought to align 
the regulation of the telecommunications industry with competition methodologies. 
However, it is uncertain whether the legislator took into account the nature of the 
markets in the telecommunications industry. It has been pointed out that competition 
rules are suited to stable and horizontal markets653 and require substantial 
modifications to deal with dynamic and vertical chains of production.654 Sector-specific 
regulation on the other hand is designed to deal with dynamic and vertical markets. 
As in the UAE, the telecommunications sector in Qatar is dominated by vertical 
markets because the manufacturers or sellers offer products or services that are 
specific to the industry or group of customers with specific communication or IT 
needs.655 Business customers for example require access to secure, reliable and high-
performance communication. As such, sector-specific regulation is appropriate in this 
context.  
Regulation is also required in such markets because the deregulated market is likely 
to fail even with the enforcement of strict competition laws.656 Due to technological 
change, telecommunications products and services are based on a complex network 
that produces products and services of varied quality, nature and delivery.657 Thus, 
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652 Ibid. 
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654 See Paul Richards, ‘The Limitations of Market-based Regulation of the Electronic Communications 
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detailed regulation is required to make effective use of the elements of market 
organisation. This is because the consequences of the rapid technological change 
include increased pressure for cost-based pricing of services and the possibility of 
competition in long-distance services.  
It is difficult to see how competitive outcomes (increased allocative or productive 
efficiency) may be achieved by market forces in the telecommunications industry 
without the intervention of a sector-specific regulator. Where for example the dominant 
supplier (with a large and high-value network) refuses to interconnect with new 
independent entrants (with a smaller and low-value network), businesses may be 
compelled to subscribe to separate telephone companies to reach different 
customers.658 Sector-specific regulation is required to compel interconnection; 
something which cannot be achieved through reliance on competition laws. Also, even 
where economic efficiency can be achieved through market forces, the deviation from 
the efficiency is socially desirable given that there are important social benefits such 
as low prices and better access by low-income consumers. The sector-specific 
regulator may not allow the prices of basic local services to rise above a reasonable 
level cost in order to ensure universal service. This is desirable in a developing country 
such as Qatar despite the fact that such an outcome is allocatively inefficient. Also, 
the enforcement of minimum safety standards in the industry increases social welfare 
and also ensures that consumers are not exposed to immoral content. 
It must be pointed out that not all commentators are convinced that harmony between 
telecommunications regulation and competition law should be recommended. For 
example, Gerardin and Luff argue that, at the international level, creating a coherent 
framework that integrates principles from both the telecommunications and 
competition laws is not possible.659 In practice, the laws can coexist. The Qatari 
government is continuing to introduce competition laws within the telecommunications 
sector and enforce competition policy and penalise anti-competitive practices in the 
                                               
658 This is what happened in the United States in the early 1980s with AT&T. See David Gabel and 
David F Weiman, ‘Historical Perspectives on Interconnection between Competing Local Operating 
Companies: The United States, 1894-1914’ in David Gabel and David F Weiman (eds), Opening 
Networks to Competition: The Regulation and Pricing of Access (Springer 1998) 75-106. On the 
incentives of firms of different sizes to interconnect, see Nicholas Economides, ‘The Economics of 
Networks’ (1996) 14(2) International Journal of Industrial Organization 675, 675-699. 
659 Damien Geradin & David Luff, The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunication and Audio 
Visual Services (Cambridge University Press 2004) 415. 
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sector. For example, in 2011, the telecommunications regulator issued notices of anti-
competitive conduct under the Telecommunications Law regarding the abuse of 
market power by Qtel.660 The company was engaged in activities that misled 
customers after it partnered with Virgin. During this time, Vodafone Qatar launched as 
a second licensed provider of telecommunications services and filed a formal 
complaint against Qtel over the Qtel Virgin service. Vodafone Qatar claimed that the 
introduction of Virgin was effectively a third provider within the nation and that Virgin 
had not obtained the appropriate licenses to operate.661 Ultimately, the 
telecommunications authority ruled against Qtel. The authority found that Qtel had 
breached the applicable laws through its partnership with Virgin and that the Qtel 
Virgin marketing strategies comprised misleading and deceptive practices and rose to 
the level of anti-competitive behaviour in breach of the Telecommunication Law and 
its bylaws.662 This illustrates the ex post features of the competition regime within 
Qatar. Although active in its enforcement of breaches of competition policies, the laws 
continue to develop and move more toward an ex ante approach that will function as 
a deterrent to such activity. 
6.3.1.4 EVALUATING THE MODEL 
Turning to the analysis criteria set out above, there are both positive and negative 
aspects to the competition regime of Qatar. With regard to the ease of implementation, 
the laws are enforced simultaneously through relevant regulations. There is little 
resistance to the concept of competition policy within the state at a theoretical level. 
Thus, it is believed that competitive outcomes may not be achieved through reliance 
on market forces and the Competition Law only. The intervention of the sector-specific 
regulator is also required. 
However, it must be noted that although regulators have taken effective steps to 
promote fair competition in the telecommunications sector, these steps only apply to 
private actors in the sector and not government entities. This becomes problematic as 
countries in the Middle East are prone to having their governments control major 
entities within economic sectors,—for instance, they are the primary 
                                               





telecommunications service providers. State organisations often do not improve 
because of the lack of effective market controls on these players. Furthermore, 
government entities are susceptible to the effects of political changes and, without 
market regulation, politics can then directly affect the provision of services to the 
public. Arguably, the only way to overcome this barrier is to subject all market players, 
both government and private, to the same competition policies. 
Additionally, there are enforcement concerns that need to be addressed regarding the 
disparate treatment of government versus private companies. There have been 
complaints that the Qatari courts rarely support claims made by private entities against 
the government or its contractors.663 Further, it has been noted that the process for 
bringing such complaints lacks transparency, creating the perception that political and 
judicial institutions are biased in favour of government entities as far as economic 
investment is concerned.664 
To combat these issues, Qatar has posited a national vision for 2030 to increase 
foreign investment within the economy.665 This includes offering additional perks to 
foreign companies to invest in Qatar and easing the applicable restrictions on foreign 
investors. For example, a previous restriction required a local entity to own fifty-one 
per cent of any venture with a foreign investor.666 Recently, Qatar has begun the 
process of achieving these goals by passing laws to simplify the procedures for foreign 
investors and improve market access in response to increased competition for 
investment throughout the entire GCC.667 
With regard to understanding the nation and respect for the culture, the competition 
regime is somewhat lacking. While the laws are based on Sharia principles, 
demonstrating the integration of the people’s beliefs into the legal structure, the 
exclusion of government entities in the enforcement of the Competition Law does little 
to protect the general welfare of the public. It was not possible to find evidence showing 
that on the one hand, these state-owned entities represent the best means of ensuring 
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the maximisation of the welfare of citizens and, on the other hand, the intervention of 
the government in the operation of private entities was necessary because market 
forces could not compel private entities to deliver this objective. 
Ultimately, the competition regime in Qatar is an example of the Telecommunication 
Law and Competition Law serving as complementary instruments. It must be noted 
that their objectives do not differ because this might create legal confusion and 
uncertainty. Their objectives are to maintain a competitive market structure within the 
Qatari economy and maximise consumer welfare—at least as far as the activities of 
private actors are concerned. This is a model that is most similar to that of the KSA 
and one that demonstrates that these laws can in fact coexist in a Sharia-based 
system. Nonetheless, it remains to be demonstrated whether competition rules are 
suited to the telecommunications sector which comprises vertical markets, where 
competition is not mainly on price. Also, if the deregulated telecommunications market 
is likely to fail even with the enforcement of strict competition laws, it serves little 
purpose enforcing the Competition Law in the telecommunications industry. The UAE 
approach of excluding the telecommunications industry from the scope of the 
Competition Law may then be more appropriate. Legislators from both the UAE and 
Qatar agree on the fact that sector-specific regulation is necessary in the 
telecommunications industry but they disagree on its optimal design. There are 
persuasive arguments for and against the exclusion of the industry from the scope of 
competition regulations. Nonetheless, there is no normative evidence that either 
approach may provide undertakings in the KSA with the right incentives to enter the 
telecommunications market, set prices at a reasonable level above cost, and invest in 
innovation at a level that is socially optimal. 
6.4 UNITED STATES: A MODEL FOR PROCEDURAL 
HARMONISATION? 
In contrast to the legal systems of the GCC nations, the US has a much older and 
more sophisticated competition regime that includes the regulation of the 
telecommunications sector.668 What is notable about the US regime is that there is no 
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single policy that governs competition. Rather, many competition policies have 
developed over nearly a century of legislation and judicial interpretation.669 
Additionally, there is no single agency or regulatory body that is responsible for 
overseeing competition policies. Instead, actors from various agencies and industries 
that span a wide range of state and federal positions must cooperate to ensure that 
competition policy as a whole is upheld.670 Hence, the US has a hybrid system that 
combines broad competition laws with sector-specific regulations.671 The broad laws 
represent the antitrust laws that were first put in place to prevent dominant positions 
leading to market power and abuse. These were followed by the creation of sector-
specific regulations with the goal of protecting the public interest.672 Further still, the 
competition policy extends beyond federal legislation to the state level, where the state 
governments have their own regulatory regimes to secure consumer protection. 
6.4.1 BACKGROUND 
To understand the present interplay of the laws and regulations that comprise the 
current competition policy in the US, it is important to first understand the history that 
led to their development. Unlike most countries, including the KSA, that nationalised 
their telecommunications industry through provision by a government agency or state-
owned undertaking, the US did not.673 In fact, the first commercial telephone service 
provided was the privately held American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), 
which held the patents on the telephone technology invented by Alexander Graham 
                                               
669 Federal Trade Commission, ‘Guide to Antitrust Laws’ (FTC, 2017) <https://www.ftc.gov/tips- 
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws> accessed 21 May 2017 (noting that the Antitrust 
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671 William Lehr and Thomas Kiessling, ‘Telecommunication Regulation in the United States and 
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1999) 
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672 For example, Federal Communications Commission Regulations, 47 USC § 151 et seq. 
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Bell. Ii was not until these patents expired in 1893 and competitors were able to adopt 
the technology and provide competing services that the regulation of the industry was 
deemed to be necessary.674 Up until this point, a natural monopoly had existed so 
regulators were not concerned with the preservation of competition in the 
marketplace, despite the existence of a monopolistic bottleneck.675 Thus, as 
competitors entered the market, the law continued to develop to meet the changing 
needs of the industry. 
The primary competition law that is still in force is the Sherman Antitrust Act.676 The 
Act was passed in 1890 to prohibit business practices that federal regulators deem to 
be anti-competitive.677 Although it was created in response to activities in the railroad 
industry, the law is not limited to any specific sector.678 Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
bans business arrangements that create a restraint on trade, and Section 2 prohibits 
intentional monopolies—as opposed to the natural monopoly first seen in the 
telecommunications sector. 
The Sherman Act was followed by the Clayton Antitrust Act, which was passed by 
Congress in 1914 to provide further clarification and substance to the Sherman Act.679 
The Clayton Act further strengthened the competition regime by addressing corporate 
price discrimination, exclusive deals and placing limits on anticompetitive mergers.680 
The goal of the Clayton Act was to promote free trade and prohibit business activities 
that would harm competition and consumers.681 
 
                                               
674 Ibid. 
675 This describes a situation where a natural monopoly is already operating at its full capacity and 
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6.4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Although competition was being addressed broadly at the federal level through the all-
encompassing Sherman Act, when it came to the telecommunications sector, the 
states regulated competition within their borders. This went on until Congress passed 
the Communications Act of 1934.682 This Act centralised the federal regulation of 
telephone, telegraph and radio communications.683 It was the most comprehensive 
piece of legislation in this area and its seven subchapters included regulations on 
every aspect of the communications and broadcasting industry, including 
competition.684 The Act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
as the designated body for regulation and oversight of the industry.685 The Act 
remained in place until it was largely amended and most of its sections were repealed 
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.686 
Despite the existence of federal regulations, there was still disparate treatment among 
states.687 While many were attempting to dismantle the legal and regulatory barriers 
to competition at the local service level, it became apparent that a state-by-state 
approach to ensuring competition at the local level would be inefficient and lead to 
vastly different environments from region to region.688 In response to industry 
demands, Congress adopted the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This Act created 
a national competition policy applicable at all levels of telephony. Also, it recognises 
the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry and the need for a centralised 
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regulatory authority to protect the public interest.689 
6.4.3 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS 
With the development of sector-specific regulations, the question then becomes 
whether the antitrust framework set out in the Sherman Act and Clayton Act informs 
the interpretation and application of the Telecommunications Act and, if so, to what 
extent. This is addressed by Section 601(b) of the Telecommunications Act which 
provides as follows: 
[N]othing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be 
construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of 
the antitrust laws. 
Thus, by the way the laws are construed, the antitrust laws embodied in the Sherman 
Act and the Clayton Act create the competition framework for economic sectors within 
the US. Their broad reach makes them applicable to all sectors unless otherwise 
excepted. Then, within that competition framework, sector-specific regulations are 
created that address the particular nuances of the specific industry and respond to 
evolving concerns. The power to enforce these regulations continues to be vested in 
the FCC, with the states also streamlining their regional laws to be aligned with those 
promulgated at the federal level.690 On the other hand, the Sherman Act, Federal 
Trade Commission Act and Clayton Act are enforced by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC)691 and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The FTC’s Bureau of 
Consumer Protection is tasked with protecting consumers against deceptive or unfair 
business practices, while its Bureau of Competition’s mission is to eliminate and 
prevent anti-competitive practices in commerce.692 The FTC shares jurisdiction over 
civil cases with the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. The latter may also file criminal cases 
against entities that wilfully violate competition laws. 
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Considering the criteria set out for the analysis of competition regimes in this chapter, 
the US approach stands out as a model for the harmony that can be created through 
a combination of general competition law and sector-specific regulations. With regard 
to the ease of implementation, the US has continuously worked towards a streamlined 
approach through the enactment of federal legislation. The federal system of the US 
allows for national laws to supersede those of the states, and states must bring their 
local laws into compliance. By working from the top down, the law is set up in such a 
way that important changes can be made centrally through regulations at the federal 
level and then the burden of ensuring regional compliance is distributed among the 
states. Additionally, by utilising a general competition law in conjunction with sector-
specific regulations, changes can be made to the regulations in accordance with 
industry developments without affecting the overarching competition framework.  
This is a similar approach to that adopted in Qatar whereby the telecommunications 
industry is regulated by the competition authorities as well as a sector-specific 
regulator. Thus, the US legislator also acknowledges the fact that competitive 
outcomes cannot be achieved by market forces in the telecommunications industry 
without the intervention of a sector-specific regulator. The advantages of the US 
system are that both state-owned and private undertakings must comply with the 
competition legislation and there is no single agency or regulatory body responsible 
for overseeing competition policies – whose jurisdiction may overlap with that of the 
sector-specific regulator, thereby creating confusion and uncertainty. Also, the 
competition policies are based on centuries of parliamentary debates and court 
deliberations on the efficiency of competition law. The monopolistic bottleneck created 
by AT&T and subsequent entry into the market by small competitors for example 
enabled the antitrust laws to be modified significantly with the development of a vertical 
market, as well as the increasingly complex network producing products and services 
of varied quality due to rapid technological change.693 
Turning to governance and enforcement, again centralisation plays a significant role 
with the creation and preservation of the FCC. The states support the FCC’s work at 
the local level but ultimately it is the leading regulatory body that issues guidance within 
the industry. Additionally, to the extent that there are gaps in the law, the US has a 
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common law system. Hence, when cases are heard, the resulting decisions create 
precedential authority that can be used subsequently to ensure that laws are being 
interpreted and enforced in the same manner. Although it is agreed that a monopoly 
established due to economies of scale or advanced technology does not violate the 
Sherman Act,694 competition law as a whole has been shaped by court decisions 
interpreting the Act in light of developments in the industry and with the objective of 
achieving optimal outcomes.  
In United States v Aluminium Company of America,695 for example, the Court of 
Appeals held that the Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa) had violated the 
Sherman Act by wilfully engaging in conduct to maintain a ninety per cent market share 
that indicated a monopoly. In United States v Paramount Pictures, Inc,696 the Supreme 
Court held that the collective ownership of distribution and exhibition facilities by many 
production studios that favoured large firms and excluded small firms was in violation 
of the Sherman Act, and one of the large firms, Paramount Pictures was also guilty of 
engaging in horizontal and vertical price-fixing as a result. Thus, Paramount Pictures 
was compelled to sell the theatres in which their films were shown and could not 
control the distribution and exhibition in order to open up the market to smaller firms. 
The landmark case was United States v AT&T,697 where the Department of Justice 
brought an action against the telephone service giant AT&T which was operating as a 
regulated monopoly providing phone service. The Court forced AT&T to split its 
research and development department from local branches that operated telephone 
lines. This ended the company’s monopoly and enabled competitors to enter the 
market. 
 
                                               
694 With regard to section 2 of the Sherman Act that criminalises monopolising or attempts to 
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Similarly, in United States v Microsoft Corp698 the government brought an action 
against Microsoft for restricting the market for competing web browsers unfairly. The 
company had bundled its personal computer operating system with Internet Explorer 
and sold the bundle to computer manufacturers. After a remand, the court approved a 
negotiated consent decree by which the company agreed to share programming 
interfaces with competitors. This enhanced competition in the personal computers and 
internet markets. 
Then, in Leegin Creative Leather Products v PSKS, Inc,699 the Supreme Court 
overruled its previous decisions by holding that vertical minimum price agreements did 
not violate the Sherman Act. 
The US’s enactment of a competition regime in the telecommunications sector and the 
development of the relevant rules by courts demonstrate an understanding of the 
market and respect for the local culture. Indeed, the legislation enacted were derived 
from the efforts of domestic parties seeking to c la r i f y  and enforce their rights. 
Additionally, the legal structure of the US allows for further amendments based on 
the desires of its citizens through the democratic process. 
6.4.4 SUITABILITY OF THE US MODEL TO THE KSA 
While competition laws have a functional economic purpose for the nations that 
implement them, they are far from an ideal, one-size-fits-all solution. In fact, the 
nuances of different industries and sectors within an economy necessitate the ability 
to tailor the laws and approach depending on the subject matter. This is why it is 
important for the framework to be supported by a reliable and sophisticated judicial 
system. Thus, as opposed to being a free-standing legislation, competition legislation 
can best be viewed as a framework within which the government can work. This 
framework sets out the foundational principles and general enforcement penalties, 
while the narrower, sector-specific regulations allow those principles to be upheld in 
practice. 
The benefits of competition within the market are many—lower costs and prices for 
goods and services; better quality; more choices and variety; more innovation; greater 
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efficiency and productivity; economic development and growth; and greater wealth 
equality.700 It is important to note that ‘the essential point is not whether there is more 
or less regulation, but what type of regulation is needed’.701 Answering this question 
requires having an understanding of the nation in question, its economy  and 
positioning for growth and expansion, and the needs and ideals of its people. 
Regulation needs to be a reflection of a coherent competition policy based in 
competition law and complementary, sector-specific regulations that work together to 
support the promotion of competition rather than its suppression. For this form of 
regulation to be effective, it cannot take the shape of fragmented and piecemeal acts 
of legislation that are superficial deterrents at best and do not carry with them the 
weight of enforcement. 
When dealing with the telecommunications sector, the regulations need to have a solid 
basis on the foundational objectives for competition policy that serve as a 
framework for all industries. As competition laws become more comprehensive within 
nations, as opposed to the existence of numerous frameworks that are created within 
each different sector of the economy, that framework needs to envisage an approach 
based on economic regulation. Specifically, such an approach recognises that 
‘intervention [in] the market is necessary and beneficial only when it offers the solution 
to certain sorts of market power, and in particular to market failure which derive from 
formerly monopolistic market structures’.702 
As sector-specific regulations are developed, they are influenced by the existence of 
the competition law framework. They are not inconsistent tools for regulating a market 
given that their objectives are often the same, viz, promoting fair trade and maximising 
the welfare of citizens. Thus, sector-specific regulation and competition legislation 
ought to be complementary means of dealing with common problems and achieving 
mutually desirable solutions, both at the macro and micro levels. Both regimes could 
therefore work towards preventing the abuse of market power and maximising the 
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public welfare by placing the end user at the centre of any economic activity. 
For such regulation to be effective in the telecommunications sector, the relevant legal 
approach cannot simply be grounded in administrative functions. The system must be 
viewed holistically, allowing for an underlying analysis to permeate the legal framework 
through the use of both competition and sector-specific regulations that account for 
the nuances of the industry. This will prevent two things: first, the centrality of 
economics in competition analysis and second, the adoption of a legalistic approach 
that fails to consider non-legal factors that affect competition in the market. When 
competition legislation and sector-specific regulations are implemented in this light, 
they become harmoniously functional and open the door to the development of self-
sustaining competitive market conditions. 
This is an approach that has been recognised by both Qatar and the US, and to a 
certain extent the UAE. However, the latter explicitly excludes telecommunications 
from the purview of its Competition Law and leaves regulation to sector-specific 
legislation and authorities, despite the fact that the sector-specific legislation is not 
sufficiently comprehensive to ensure fair competition and protect consumers. Qatar 
and the US on the other hand have embraced the need for a regime that includes the 
telecommunications sector in the scope of the competition legislation. The 
development of Saudi competition policy for the telecommunications industry most 
closely mirrors that of Qatar – beginning with a communications law that regulates 
competition within the sector, followed later by a broad competition law put in place as 
GCC nations attempt to align themselves to global legal trends. 
What can be learned from the Qatari and US approaches is that these laws must work 
together effectively to manage anti-competitive practices through both a deterrent ex 
ante basis and ex post regulatory enforcement. The Competition Law is essentially a 
sector-neutral statement of intolerable practices that pose a threat to the market and 
the general welfare. It is then the place of sector-specific regulation to identify the 
needs of the market and create the applicable provisions to achieve the industry’s 
goals. 
Qatar overcame the issue of prior enactment of the Communications Law by the 
issuance of a policy document that specifically outlined the ways the two laws would 
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work together. In the US, provisions in the Telecommunications Act make clear that it 
is to be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the competition policies 
enshrined in the Sherman Act. This is what the KSA is lacking. It needs to find a way 
to harmonise the statutes and clarify that they are meant to work together to achieve 
their shared principles and objectives. 
A coherent, broad framework and sector-specific approach is the best way to 
accomplish the protection of competition within the telecommunications sector to 
achieve the goals of this analysis. Among the options available, it would be the easiest 
to implement within the Kingdom. The Competition Law serves as a lens through which 
all other laws should be interpreted. It ensures that competition policy prevails within 
the Saudi market and the underlying Sharia principles are upheld. Further, as the 
markets continue to develop and change, these changes can be addressed through 
sector-specific regulations. This will allow the laws to be amended as needed without 
affecting the competition framework. 
Moreover, the regime would allow for sufficient governance and enforcement. The 
Competition Law provides for governance at the macro level, providing a basis for 
enforcing provisions that are contrary to its intent. This is then carried out at the sector-
specific micro level by a centralised regulatory authority. By streamlining regulation 
and enforcement, it would improve the likelihood that laws will be applied consistently 
and uniformly in each case. 
Finally, this system would reflect an understanding of the market and nation and a 
respect for the local culture. The principles underlying the competition regime are 
reflective of the Sharia principles that are intrinsic to the Kingdom’s people. By 
preventing these damaging practices, the laws would work together to promote the 
citizens’ general welfare and ensure that their interests were protected by a legal 
regime that could be adapted as the market continued to develop and change. 
 
6.5   SITUATING REFORM OF THE KSA LEGAL SYSTEM 
IN THE BROADER DEBATE 
The development of competition law is intrinsically linked to the trends of 
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globalisation.703 A central feature of this debate is how to employ competition policies 
to achieve economic welfare on a large scale without destroying local welfare and 
relations between societies.704 In many Middle Eastern countries, the 
telecommunications sector was historically dominated by state-owned entities, such 
as the STC in the KSA.705 This led to the creation of natural monopolies even in 
countries with market economies because the government provided these public 
services in the place of private entities.706 In other countries such as the US the sector 
was dominated by natural monopolies due to intellectual property rights and 
irreversible costs of entry. However, as the telecommunications sectors in these 
countries continued to grow and develop, this led to an increase in the number of 
available service providers and the reform of the relevant legislation. Beginning in 
developed countries, the telecommunications sector began to embrace liberalisation 
and deregulation. In developing countries, the industry change brought 
macroeconomic and infrastructural reforms, often implementing a competition regime 
for the first time. 
Looking specifically at the telecommunications sector of Middle Eastern countries, the 
government was typically both the service provider holding a natural monopoly in the 
industry as well as the sector’s regulator.707 However, in recent years, Middle Eastern 
countries have begun to follow the trends of developed nations, allowing for 
liberalisation and privatisation of the telecommunications sector. These changes 
recognise that supporting competitive activity in domestic economic markets helps 
nations compete on a global scale.708 
As with any reform based on changes to infrastructure, in this case the implementation 
of a competition law framework that can apply to the telecommunications sector, it is 
important to remember that such change takes time. It is an inherently iterative 
process that requires not only a foundational piece of legislation but also implementing 
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regulations that can be amended as needed in response to market needs. In creating 
these statutes, it is important to take into account the country’s main objectives in 
implementing a competition law regime and continuously evaluate the law’s 
effectiveness in meeting those objectives. 
As the world’s economy becomes more globalised in nature, it is important that nations 
create legal regimes that embrace this development and are welcoming to investment, 
both foreign and domestic, public and private.709 It is becoming increasingly essential 
that nations enact coherent and harmonised approaches to regulating competition, 
and many developed nations, in particular the US, have paved the way for this. The 
general objective of competition regimes is to ‘maintain and encourage the process of 
competition in order to promote efficient use of resources while protecting the freedom 
of economic action of various market participants’.710 Among other primary objectives 
are preventing the abuse of economic power, decentralising economic decision-
making, and achieving a certain degree of fairness and equity and other socio-political 
values.711 These latter objectives are referred to as supplementary objectives and vary 
by jurisdiction. One should note that the more objectives that are introduced into the 
equation, the more likely there is to be conflict and inconsistent application of the 
jurisdiction’s competition policy. While the majority of developed nations are moving 
away from these supplementary public interest objectives, they continue to be 
widespread in developing and transitioning countries.712  
Although there is arguably no such thing as ‘global competition law’, there are certain 
underlying foundational objectives that remain constant and desirable in all systems 
that enact competition laws—economic efficiency and the maximisation of consumer 
welfare.713 Over time, it has become apparent that in order to achieve such objectives, 
there must be competition in the market and the way to encourage and preserve such 
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competition is through the implementation of a legal framework.714 The increased use 
of competition law in recent years has been in direct response to the worldwide 
changes in economic behaviour and political thinking.715 One area where competition 
law is of particular importance is the telecommunications sector—a sector that was 
often regarded as a natural monopoly within many economies.716 
While the foundational objectives of competition law are fairly consistent from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the supplementary objectives are jurisdiction-dependent, 
particularly in developing countries.717 As a result, the enactment of competition laws 
and implementing regulations within a particular jurisdiction is largely influenced by the 
supplementary objectives.718 This leads to a dissonance in the implementation of 
competition regimes. Developing nations often look to the systems in place in 
developed nations as a basis on which they can model their system. However, the 
supplementary objectives of the jurisdiction require the regime to be altered to reflect 
the special characteristics of the jurisdiction.719 
6.6 BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW 
AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION IN KSA 
Traditionally-owned and operated by state-owned entities, the telecommunications 
sector in the KSA is undergoing a period of rapid transformation as shown in Chapter 
Three. Technology continues to advance, and players routinely enter and exit the 
market and merge or expand to accommodate the evolving landscape. Specifically, it 
has been noted that ‘the electronic communications industry is at the forefront of 
technological and social change, and the competitive conditions underpinning the 
market are critical to societal development’.720 The question then becomes: how and 
to what extent is this sector regulated to protect the players and their customers? What 
becomes apparent when attempting to answer this question is that the approach and 
appropriate level of regulation differs significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based 
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on the circumstances and institutions in place. 
Despite these differences, there are arguably certain goals that any competition 
regime should attempt to achieve within its regulation of the sector—these are the 
foundational objectives. First, to the extent that a competition law is in place, it should 
be applicable to the telecommunications sector and provide for effective incentives, 
sanctions and remedies to deter anti-competitive or monopolistic conduct.721 Second, 
there must be transparency with regard to the powers and duties of the competition 
authority and sector-specific regulator to minimize the potential for impropriety or 
abuse.722 Third, there must be coordination between the governing authorities to 
prevent conflicts due to overlapping jurisdiction; essentially, it must be clear who is 
responsible for ensuring that competition is substantially preserved.723 Finally, when a 
government acts as a player in the competitive market, the governing competition 
authority must be separate from the entity acting within the market to ensure that there 
is no impropriety or favourable treatment.724 The only way that these objectives can 
be achieved in practice is through the harmonisation of the general competition law 
framework and the sector-specific telecommunications regulations within a given 
country. 
6.6.1 THE IMPACT OF SHARIA ON COMPETITION LAW 
One of the primary factors to be considered when implementing legislation to protect 
competition is an evaluation of how this introduction of competition culture accords 
with the culture of the land and its people. It is imperative that societal culture be 
evaluated and understood so that it may be accounted for from a governance 
perspective. The protection of competition within a country is of no use if the regime 
goes against the society’s cultural principles and traditions and the people themselves 
are not receptive to the players entering the market. For a competition law regime to 
be successful, it must be structured in such a way that it respects those that it aims to 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, Saudi law is based on Islamic principles and the 
relationship between these principles and competition in the marketplace dates back 
to the beginnings of Islam.725 Islam is more than just a religion; it functions as a 
practical system of life and provides guidance on the different aspects of life in society, 
including the economy.726 The primary sources of Islamic law are the Quran and the 
Sunnah, which collectively make up what is also referred to as Sharia.727 Islamic law 
is typically divided into two categories: ‘Ibadat, which are obligations regarding 
worship, and Mu’amalat, which comprises civil and legal obligations.’728 The regulation 
of business operations and market competition fall into the latter category. Islamic 
principles emphasise the need for trade and business activities and provide for 
mechanisms of market intervention to prevent abuse by traders.729 
When looking at the role that Sharia principles play as the basis for competition policy 
and legislation, there are two primary aspects: the first is the prevention of monopolies, 
and the second is the prevention of damage or harm in the economic sector.730 
Although the Sharia guidance on monopolies was initially limited to food, the Islamic 
schools of thought and scholars have determined that its scope extends to any good 
or service supplied by a merchant who intends to dominate the market to the detriment 
of consumers.731 However, it must be noted that although such monopolistic practices 
are prohibited by Sharia, the Competition Law in the KSA does not prevent the 
existence of a legal monopoly in the market.732 Legal monopolies most commonly 
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occur when the government controls a given sector. A natural monopoly may also 
occur where a single producer is able to satisfy the entire demand at lowest cost.733 
However, it may also be argued that Sharia permits the existence of the legal 
monopoly but prohibits the dominant market player from abusing this position to the 
detriment of consumers, such as through reducing the quality of service or increasing 
prices.734 This raises the question of whether the Competition Law is not duplicative 
given that Sharia already prohibits monopolisation and gives adjudicators the requisite 
flexibility to determine when a monopoly is acceptable or not. Nonetheless, concerns 
about legal monopolies within the telecommunications sector are decreasing as the 
market becomes liberalised and allows for the increased competition of private 
entities. 
The second area of Sharia concern over competition policy relates to the prevention 
of damage. As a basic principle, the Prophet stated that: ‘You should neither harm 
yourself nor cause harm to others.’123 Such harm is not limited to physical harm but 
encompasses the idea of civil or economic harm.735 Thus, anti-competitive practices 
aimed at benefiting a few companies at the expense of consumer welfare are contrary 
to Sharia. This also raises the question of why a competition legislation is needed. 
Nonetheless, in Islamic nations, all laws enacted must comply with Sharia principles. 
Thus, any competition regime implemented in an Islamic nation must take into account 
the prohibition of monopolistic practices and the need to prevent harm. This extends 
to both the creation of broad competition laws and the development of sector-specific 
regulations. 
6.6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAUDI MODEL 
As mentioned above, the basic purpose of competition—preventing traders from 
abusing their position in the marketplace—is a longstanding principle of Islam. 
However, beyond these underlying traditions there are compelling political and 
economic reasons why this developing nation needed to continue its modernisation 
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efforts and align itself with the competition regimes of developed countries in the 
Western world. 
6.6.3  ASCERTAINING THE PURPOSE OF COMPETITION LAW  
As the markets in the KSA continue to grow in such a way that FDI becomes attractive, 
it is essential for there to be a legal infrastructure that will protect fair competition in 
the marketplace and combat monopolistic practices, both by state entities and private 
companies. The 2014 amendments to the Competition Law reaffirmed this approach 
in the foreword which states that the law ‘aims to protect and encourage fair 
competition and combat monopolistic practices that affect lawful competition’.736 The 
Implementing Regulations further elaborate the goal of the Competition Law in its 
Preamble, indicating that the purposes of the regime are to protect and promote fair 
competition, combat monopolistic practices, ensure the availability of high-quality 
goods and services at competitive prices, encourage innovation, and support the 
economic growth of society. These developments recognise the importance of the 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector through the privatisation process that 
began in 1998. It is this shift from a national-centric economy to that of a free market 
one that marks the point at which the KSA began to attract foreign investors from non-
Muslim countries. 
As noted in Chapters Four and Five, the competition legislation that the KSA has put 
in place prohibits anti-competitive agreements and the abuse of dominant market  
positions.737 In 2005, the CCP (currently, the GAC) was formed and in 2006 it issued 
the first Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law.738 The GAC amended 
articles of the Implementing Regulation in 2008 and adopted a number of governing 
rules.739 
Modelling its approach on the competition laws of established Western legal systems 
such as the US, the aims of the competition law are to create market efficiency and 
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protect consumer welfare by restricting anti-competitive behaviours, abuse of 
dominant market positions and mergers that would threaten free competition in the 
market. 
Shifting focus from the broad Competition Law to the telecommunications sector 
specifically, it is noted in Chapter Three that the Telecommunications Act was enacted 
in 2001 as an attempt to regulate the sector. Although enacted prior to the Competition 
Law, the Telecommunications Act addressed competition directly and aimed to 
promote fair competition in the telecommunications sector.740 To accomplish this, 
Article 24 explicitly prohibits practices that create dominant market positions, Article 
25 restricts mergers, and Article 26 prohibits companies from abusing dominant 
market positions. In reconciling these two pieces of legislation, what becomes 
problematic is that the Telecommunications Act was enacted prior to the Competition 
Law and thus makes no reference to it. For these laws to create a coherent competition 
regime for the telecommunications sector, the provisions contained in Articles 24 to 
26 of the Telecommunications Act must be reconciled with Articles 4 through 6 of the 
Competition Law, and efforts must be coordinated to effectively enforce these laws to 
prohibit anticompetitive activities. 
Based on the above analysis, there are other specific recommendations that can be 
made to strengthen the Saudi competition framework. Chapter Seven elaborates on 
these recommendations and explains how they can be integrated into the Saudi 
competition regime and put into practice. First, the Kingdom should make clear that all 
communications laws are subject to the principles embodied in the Competition Law. 
This approach has been taken by both the US in its provisions of its 
Telecommunications Act and by Qatar through the issuance of a policy document that 
reconciles the laws. Given the prior existence of the Telecommunications Act in the 
KSA, its approach would most likely mirror that of Qatar, else the Telecommunications 
Act may simply be amended. The Kingdom should issue a binding decree that states 
how these two laws are intended to work together and perform complementary 
functions. Alternatively, the Kingdom could amend the Telecommunications Act to 
expressly subject it to the Competition Law, similar to the approach employed in the 
                                               




Second, as the markets continue to become more liberalised and globalised, the 
Kingdom must embrace the process of deregulation and re-regulation.741 
Developments in the telecommunications industry and global legal trends, particularly 
those endorsed by the WTO, require a certain degree of flexibility within 
telecommunications regulations. There will naturally be some period of trial and error 
to find the most efficient approach to maximising the market, ensuring equality in the 
treatment of both service providers and users, and effectively regulating the industry 
on both ex ante and ex post bases.742 This will require the Kingdom to adopt an 
approach of phasing out regulations that no longer serve their purpose and replacing 
them with regulations that reflect the current state of the market.743 
Finally, the Kingdom will need to coordinate legislative and enforcement efforts among 
the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, the CITC and the 
Council of Ministers. While the CITC is an independent administrator for the 
Telecommunications Act, any licenses issued by it pursuant to the Act must be 
sanctioned by the Council of Ministers.744 Further, the Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology will oversee the planning and implementation of all of the 
government’s strategies and policies within the telecommunications sector.745 As 
government policy becomes a national priority for the Kingdom, coordination between 
these bodies is more important than ever. The Kingdom should make an effort to 
streamline communications, responsibilities and processes among these bodies and 
delineate the scope and authority of each. By clarifying their roles, this will lead to 
more efficient administration of competition policy within the Kingdom. 
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This chapter has conducted a comparative analysis of the competition and 
telecommunications regimes of three countries, namely the UAE, Qatar and the US. 
It has shown that competition law is essentially a sector-neutral statement of 
intolerable practices that pose a threat to the market as well as consumer welfare. 
However, sector-specific regulation is also important because it identifies and 
addresses the needs of the market and creates the applicable provisions to achieve 
the industry’s goals. Thus, where competition legislation and sector-specific 
regulations cannot be harmoniously functional, the sector should be excluded from the 
scope of the competition legislation if the sector-specific regulator is also tasked with 
maintaining market competition. However, where competition legislation and sector-
specific regulations can be harmoniously functional, they open the door to the 
development of self-sustaining competitive market conditions. This also helps to 
prevent two things: first, the centrality of economics in competition analysis and 
second, the adoption of a purely legalistic approach that fails to consider non-legal 
factors that affect competition in the market. 
It was shown that this is an approach that has been recognised by both Qatar and the 
US, and to a certain extent the UAE. Legislators from the three countries agree on the 
fact that sector-specific regulation is necessary in the telecommunications industry. 
Nonetheless, they disagree on its optimal design. It was argued that the UAE’s design 
is  not best suited to the KSA because it explicitly excludes telecommunications from 
the purview of its Competition Law and leaves regulation to sector-specific legislation 
only, despite the fact that the sector-specific legislation is not sufficiently 
comprehensive to ensure fair competition and protect consumers. Qatar and the US 
on the other hand have embraced the need for a regime that includes the 
telecommunications sector in the scope of the competition legislation. Hence, these 
laws work together effectively to manage anti-competitive practices through both a 
deterrent ex ante basis and ex post regulatory enforcement. 
It follows that when dealing with the telecommunications sector, the regulations need 
to have a solid basis on the foundational objectives for competition policy that 
serve as a framework for all industries. In the words of Monti, such an approach 
recognises that intervention in the market is necessary and beneficial because ‘it offers 
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the solution to certain sorts of market power, and in particular to market failure which 
derive from formerly monopolistic market structures’.746  
The Qatari and US legislators therefore acknowledge that competitive outcomes 
cannot be achieved by market forces in the telecommunications industry without the 
intervention of a sector-specific regulator, but the latter must act within the broader 
framework of competition policies. Nonetheless, it is argued that the US model is less 
suitable because in the US both state-owned and private undertakings must comply 
with the competition legislation, unlike in Qatar and the KSA where state-owned 
undertakings are excluded despite the fact that they are dominant in the industry.  
  
                                               




RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The telecommunications sector represents one of the many distinct markets that have 
witnessed growth and increased attention in the Middle East. However, it is also one 
that has been the subject of monopolistic practices and historically been marked by 
significant barriers to entry.747 Yet, over the last fifteen years the region has been 
undergoing a period of change since the introduction of reforms to legislation and 
competition policy. The KSA, which is often looked to as a standout leader among the 
GCC states,748 is currently best positioned to pave the way for a harmonised approach 
to telecommunications competition regulation in the MENA region.749 
What has become apparent in the analysis of the telecommunications sector is that it 
is not only a driver of economic growth in and of itself but also affects the efficiency 
and growth of a wide range of other industries.750 The quality and price of 
telecommunications services affect the capacity of all businesses within the nation to 
compete in both foreign and domestic markets, thus directly shaping overall economic 
performance.751 As this sector continues to grow within the KSA, it has become 
apparent that the existing monopolistic model no longer serves the needs of the 
market and consumers. Technological advancements have mandated that the sector 
shift away from its natural monopoly and that the barriers to entry be eliminated, 
allowing for additional private firms to enter the market. Ideally, as the market becomes 
more competitive, that competition in and of itself will perpetuate the free market 
environment of the telecommunications sector. However, the KSA has not achieved 
that state yet. Thus, the Kingdom still requires an effective competition policy. 
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The purpose of this study has been to discuss the different roles of competition policy 
enforcement and sector regulation, both within the KSA and comparatively in other 
GCC nations and the modernised US. The legislative competition framework in the 
KSA has taken on a dual nature, enforcing competition policy on the one hand and 
developing sector-specific regulation on the other. However, one can argue that this 
duality is in fact a strength of the system, and that is what this chapter aims to 
explore—how a harmonised hybrid approach between competition law and sector- 
specific regulation creates an ideal environment for effective competition in the Saudi 
telecommunications sector. 
The dualist approach set up by the current Saudi competition framework and the 
telecommunications sector has helped to ensure that competition policy objectives are 
being accounted for as telecommunications regulations continue to undergo legislative 
reform. Ultimately, the goal of competition policy and the competition provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act is to ensure that the telecommunications market works for 
the benefit of all participating firms and consumers. By having a complementary 
approach to competition policy for the telecommunications sector, the Competition 
Law has ensured that the market remains free and competitive and, where the market 
fails, sector-specific regulations intervene to restore the balance. 
Having explored the history and development of the Saudi telecommunications sector 
and the Competition Law of 2004, along with a comparative analysis of the prevailing 
approaches taken by other nations with competition models, this chapter focuses on 
identifying the goals of competition regulation in the Saudi telecommunications sector 
and the current challenges facing the existing legislative regime. This chapter then 
considers the lessons to be learned from the comparative models and specifically 
explores how a harmonized competition policy framework akin to those of Qatar and 
the US is most suitable for the KSA to achieve its stated objectives. This section breaks 
down the specific functions that the Competition Law and sector regulations serve and 
how these two pieces of legislation can serve complementary functions that create a 
stronger framework than either one would alone. The chapter then makes specific 
recommendations for how to improve the current regime and build upon the 
momentum of Saudi legislative reform initiated in the early 2000s. These 
recommendations aim to bring the KSA’s regulation of competition in the 
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telecommunications sector in line with the hybrid model employed by the US and 
Qatar. The proposed legislative amendments are intended to further the development 
of the Saudi competition law regime specifically within the telecommunications sector, 
taking into account dominant cultural factors. 
This chapter begins by showing how the research questions were answered. It then 
discusses in detail the lessons that can be extracted from the policy and procedural 
underpinnings of the comparative models outlined in the previous chapter, outlining 
how harmonisation of the Competition Law and the Telecommunications Act will 
create a complementary regime that will best achieve the KSA’s telecommunications 
goals. Finally, this chapter details specific recommendations on how the KSA can 
effectuate this harmonisation and further refine its telecommunications competition 
regime. 
7.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
7.2.1  PRINCIPLES OF THE SHARIA THAT GUIDE COMPETITION 
POLICY 
Although the applicability of Sharia is often intimidating to foreign investors and those 
unfamiliar with the Saudi Arabian legal system, competition policy is one area where 
Sharia principles align closely with the economic principles that are familiar in non-
Islamic legal systems. Notable Islamic principles that regulate the economic sector 
include a prohibition on the abuse of any rights; prevention of monopolies; and 
ensuring the freedom of the economic sector.752 
In Chapter Two, it was noted that the teachings of Islam regarding business practices 
are focused on providing equal opportunities to all businesses while establishing an 
environment that promotes businesses without affecting the rights of other individuals 
in society. Thus, many principles and rules have been formulated to promote fair and 
just competition in the market. They demonstrate that the Sharia prohibits anti-
competitive conduct by requiring businesses to do the following: prioritise the 
promotion of the interests of all constituencies (maslahah), refrain from inflicting harm 
on others (la dhararwa la dhirar), refrain from conducting interest-based transactions 
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(riba), refrain from hoarding or limiting output in order to artificially increase the price 
of products (ihtikar), refrain from using evasive legal devices (saddu zara’i), and refrain 
from misusing rights and privileges (assuf fi al-isti). 
The above principles generally seek to prohibit one entity from causing harm to 
another.753 Such harm is prohibited in all forms, including commercial and economic 
harm against other businesses and consumers. Anticompetitive telecommunication 
practices fall squarely within this realm of economic harm as they negatively affect all 
parties in the market. However, there must be some reasonable balance struck as to 
what constitutes ‘damaging’ practices in light of the Competition Law and 
Telecommunications Act. For example, actions taken to inflate prices or acquire 
dominant market share are surely intended to produce detrimental effects on other 
market players. Higher prices negatively affect consumers and market dominance 
inhibits the success of small market players. Yet, actions that are inherently 
competitive in nature, such as technological advancements that allow a firm to 
undercut the pricing of a competitor while having a detrimental effect on another would 
not be viewed as an unfair practice. In exploring the scope of prohibited actions 
in the competition realm in light of Sharia principles, additional prohibited actions 
include exclusiveness; collusion; price-fixing agreements; and dumping practices.754 
One notable area where the Competition Law differs from the provisions of Sharia law 
relates to the existence of legal monopolies. Under Sharia law, all monopolies are 
prohibited. However, under the Competition Law, legal monopolies by the government 
or wholly-owned state entities are exempted from the law’s purview and are implicitly 
permissible.755 While this has yet to become an issue within the telecommunications 
sector, it is nevertheless worth noting. To the extent any such monopoly was to occur, 
government control of the services would need to be justifiable on the grounds of social 
objectives. This is because, as shown in Chapter Two, Sharia is predicated on the 
benefits of the community and imposes a general duty to promote the welfare of all 
human beings. Hence Sharia continues to govern any monopoly by the state and such 
a position cannot be used to increase prices or reduce the quality of 
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telecommunications services given that these actions are detrimental to societal 
welfare. 
Ultimately, what one can take away from this discussion is that the principles of Sharia 
and those of general competition policy are well-aligned. The principles of Sharia that 
must be accounted for by all laws established within the KSA comprise comprehensive 
prohibitions of anticompetitive practices that are reflected in the establishment of the 
Saudi Competition Law and the competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act.  
7.22 HOW THE SAUDI COMPETITION REGIME ADDRESSES THE 
MONOPOLY SYSTEM 
It was shown in Chapter Three that although the telecommunications sector was the 
first to be privatised in the KSA with the objectives of increasing the efficiency of and 
ensuring fair competition among private undertakings in the industry, what actually 
happened was that the telecommunications activity was corporatized and kept wholly 
under full public ownership. Hence, it was pseudo-privatisation given that assets were 
de facto transferred to state-owned undertakings or quasi-state investors, thereby 
expanding state entrepreneurship. The state largely owns the three companies that 
dominate the market and therefore retains such control that makes possible the 
manipulation of prices to ensure that they are affordable to all customers. It also 
ensures that customers acquire their desired product or service in accordance with 
their quality expectations. This leaves room for complex problems such as conflicts of 
interest and regulatory capture. Thus, it is suggested that with the continuous 
expansion of the telecommunications market and the entry of companies with no ties 
to the state, the government should consider empowering private orderings to tackle 
market failure. It has been widely acknowledged that the developing 
telecommunications industry is a primary driver of social and technological change.756 
Further, competitive conditions underpinning the telecommunications sector have 
become critical to societal development.757 As such, a coherent approach to dealing 
with the problems arising from this sector is also essential. However, given the 
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conflicting sets of broad, proscriptive enforcement under the Competition Law and 
narrow, prescriptive regulation under the Telecommunications Act, it can be difficult to 
achieve market efficiency. One of the primary reasons for having an approach that 
harmonizes general competition law with sector-specific regulation is the need for a 
regulatory framework that can effectively account for both ex ante and ex post 
regulation within market activity.758 
As it currently stands, the competition regime in the KSA focuses on what a particular 
market player cannot do and provides little insight into proscribing what a player can 
permissibly do. This approach fails to effectively regulate the sector in a way that 
supports the introduction of competitive practices. In fact, this is not a problem isolated 
to the KSA. It has been pointed out that often regulation in the telecommunications 
sectors of various nations has instead become synonymous with fragmented and 
inconsequential norms that in practice inhibit rather than support competition.759 In 
resolving this issue, creating sector-specific regulatory frameworks grounded in the 
tenets of competition analysis creates the most hospitable environment for an 
economically self-sustaining industry. Such a regulatory system allows for the 
development of self-sustaining and perpetual market conditions grounded on the 
underpinnings of competition policies and principles.760 
Additionally, one of the economic goals of the Saudi telecommunications market is to 
attract foreign investment. The introduction of cross-border business activities brings 
with it a new dimension to the complexities of competition law enforcement, particularly 
where a telecommunications service provider spans multiple jurisdictions.761 The KSA 
has made clear that the provisions of the Telecommunications Act and Competition 
Law governing activities in the telecommunications sector are equally applicable to 
both foreign and domestic firms. However, this applicability has yet to be tested in 
practice and may create challenges for effective enforcement. 
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7.2.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF A SEPARATE COMPETITION 
LEGISLATION 
It was shown in Chapter Four that there are a number of anti-competitive practices 
that the government sought to explicitly prohibit by including competition provisions 
within the Telecommunications Act. However, these anti-competitive practices 
continued unabated despite the enforcement of the statute together with the Sharia 
principles that prohibit the abuse of power in the market. Also, there is no guidance for 
the enforcers of the Sharia law and the competition provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act, as well as the business community on how the legislator 
articulates the regulatory approach to exclusionary and exploitative conduct in the 
Kingdom. As such, it has been difficult for the government regulator to supervise, 
control and sanction the state-owned STC under the Telecommunications Act, which 
undermines efforts to promote effective competition in a free telecommunications 
market. Hence, a separate competition legislation was necessary. 
 Although the goals of the Saudi Competition Law are commendable, there are 
certainly some questions as to the effectiveness of the existing regime. This is not to 
say that progress has not been made but rather that telecommunications sector 
development has fallen short of its anticipated growth. 
The following will consider the limitations of the Competition Law for the 
telecommunications sector. First, the Competition Law’s scope is limited to private 
firms operating within the telecommunications sector. This means that government 
entities like public corporations and wholly-owned state entities are exempted from the 
Competition Law.762 While this does not currently present an issue within the 
telecommunications sector as the KSA has not ventured into state-owned 
telecommunications services, it is possible that this could create an issue with regard 
to the Competition Law’s effectiveness in the future. In the event that the KSA decides 
to transition telecommunications services from privately operated networks to public 
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utilities, there would be nothing in the current legislative framework to protect the 
market and prevent a state monopoly. 
Returning the focus back to the current private sector development, it is still too early 
to determine whether the competition regime is proving successful in the Saudi 
telecommunications sector. By default, there can be no competition when the market 
lacks multiple service providers or where there is no incumbent in the market. Even 
when such an incumbent exists, it is unlikely that effective competition can occur when 
the incumbent dominates the market. 
There is no question that the STC has long been the dominant market player in the 
Saudi telecommunications sector. It was primarily this monopoly that the sector reform 
intended to break up. In this regard, the Competition Law and the competition 
provisions of the Telecommunications Act have proven effective in dismantling this 
monopoly. As shown in Chapter Three, the STC first lost its monopoly over the 
provision of mobile phone services within the KSA when a second license to provide 
services was issued to Etihad Etisalat. Then, in April 2007, the STC lost its monopoly 
over fixed telephone services when a second license was issued to Bahraini Batelco 
to provide such services.  
Despite the end of the STC’s monopoly, the telecommunications sector has yet to see 
the growth anticipated by introducing competition into the market. However, it is too 
soon to determine whether this slow growth is attributable to the shortcomings of the 
competition policy or is the result of a market emerging from a decades-long 
monopoly, which is the more likely of the two. However, one should not mistake slow 
growth with a lack of progress altogether. For example, there are now two key players 
in the fixed broadband industry, STC and Go Telecom, and numerous mobile 
providers, including STC, Mobily, Zain Saudi Arabia, Virgin Mobile Saudi Arabia and 
Lebara Saudi Arabia.763 
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7.2.4 IMPROVING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COMPETITION 
POLICY  
It was noted in Chapter Five that among the commitments made by the KSA to accede 
to the WTO was the enactment of a competition legislation. Such a law was necessary 
to supports the regulatory framework in industries such as the telecommunications 
industry. However, it is argued here that the competition legislation that was enacted 
to assuage the fears of investors of key WTO Member States was problematic.  The 
scope and nature of the Law is affected by wide policy attributes, including the 
encouragement of FDI through the Foreign Investment Law, and the application of the 
privatisation policy which has as its main aim the enhancement of participation of the 
private sector in the domestic economy. Thus, in assessing a complaint or report, the 
Competition Council may take note of the positive effect of the anti-competitive 
agreement or conduct of a foreign investor on employment and infrastructure in the 
KSA. The Council may also take note of the effect on the privatisation policy. However, 
from a legal perspective, it is objectionable that the Council is required to prioritise 
economics in the competition analysis in such a subjective manner that makes it 
difficult to predict how the Law will be applied in any given circumstance. 
With the introduction of the Competition Law and its implementing regulations and 
rules,764 the main goal of the Saudi government was to promote fair competition, 
combat monopolistic practices and increase consumer surplus and welfare.765 It aimed 
to do this by prohibiting agreements between businesses that restrict commerce or 
competition, preventing businesses from acquiring dominant market positions, and 
creating laws that would make the abuse of a dominant market position by a business 
illegal.766 Put differently, the ultimate goal of competition policy is to improve overall 
market performance by prioritizing fairness and efficiency. These legal provisions 
are particularly important because they embody the notion of fairness that underpins 
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all Islamic business transactions.767 
he principles of fairness are manifested in two ways under the Competition Law. First, 
the Competition Law applies to all firms doing business in the KSA, whether domestic 
or foreign.768 The only current exception to the Competition Law’s applicability relates 
to wholly-owned, government subsidiaries. This ensures that all companies owned by 
private firms are subject to the same sets of rules and restrictions and are treated 
equitably before the law. Second, the principles of fairness are again at the centre of 
the Competition Law through its provisions that prohibit one business from benefiting 
to the detriment of another, a principle again derived from Sharia law. The Competition 
Law combats such anticompetitive activities by prohibiting agreements aimed at 
restricting commerce or competition, preventing firms from obtaining dominant market 
positions, and condemning abuses of dominant market positions.769 
Turning specifically to the telecommunications sector, the KSA had enacted sector-
specific regulation prior to the establishment of the Competition Law in the form of the 
Telecommunications Act of 2001.770 The goals of the Competition Lawt closely 
mirrored those of this Act. Under Article 3, the stated objectives of the 
telecommunications sector regulation are to provide advance and adequate services 
at affordable prices; create a favourable atmosphere that promotes and encourages 
fair competition in all aspects of the telecommunications sector; ensure principles of 
equality are followed; and safeguard the public interest.771 The CITC derived these 
objectives from the general Sharia principles underlying all aspects of Saudi society 
and reconciled them with the needs facing the telecommunications sector at  a global 
and economic level. In addition to the objectives stated in Article 3, the CITC also 
stated that it sought to comply with the principles of openness, transparency, fairness 
and equality among all relevant parties, such as service providers, investors, the 
government, and individual and corporate users.772 
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Chapter Six in its discussion of Articles 24 through 26 specifically addressed how the 
KSA would work to achieve these goals through a separate competition legislation. 
Specifically, any actor within the telecommunications sector is bound by the objectives 
and policies set out in the law and is prohibited from obtaining or abusing dominant 
market positions to the detriment of free market competition or general consumers. 
These provisions, while specific to the telecommunications sector, were much 
narrower in scope than the framework set out in the Competition Law. They 
prescriptively addressed specific instances of anticompetitive behaviour within the 
sector, such as requiring approval before purchasing a stake of five percent or more 
of the shares of another operator.773 However, the limited scope of the 
Telecommunications Act’s competition rules means that not all possible forms of 
anticompetitive activity are covered. Such gaps demonstrate the importance of the 
Competition Law, which together with the Telecommunications Act can form a 
comprehensive competition policy.774 Yet, despite the enactment of the Competition 
Law more than a decade ago, the Telecommunications Act has yet to be revisited in 
light of the requirements of the Competition Law. 
Notwithstanding, the legislative objective behind each of these attempts at competition 
regulation is to ensure that the telecommunications market functions efficiently and 
effectively in such a way that benefits both firms and consumers, whether such 
objectives are achieved through the establishment of competition policy, through 
sector-specific regulation or, as this section advocates, a combination of the two. 
When markets are set up to operate to their fullest potential, firms are able to provide 
consumers with higher quality services, lower prices and more choices. Such a 
scenario has become ideal for social market economies in the twenty-first century.775 
7.3   LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE 
COMPARATIVE MODELS 
A pervasive question within competition policy and regulation of the 
telecommunications sector is whether a broad general competition policy provides 
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sufficient oversight or whether additional statutory and institutional framework 
elements are needed to effectively promote and regulate competition within the 
sector.776 Historically, competition regimes were focused on final-output pricing and 
this was identified as the primary purpose of statutory oversight. However, as 
competition policy has evolved, the introduction of competition itself into a designated 
sector has proven to be a better method for consumer protection than any state 
attempt to artificially cap prices.777 Acknowledging this necessary function of market 
competition within an industry sector thus necessitated a supporting statutory regime 
that would reflect the unique needs of the sector and successfully promote competitive 
practices and restrict anti-competitive arrangements.778 The challenge then became a 
question of what the ideal competition regime would look like.  
7.3.1  UNDERSTANDING WHY EXCLUSION IS NOT IDEAL 
As illustrated in Chapter Six, some competition laws like the one implemented in the 
UAE have specifically excluded the telecommunications sector from their scope. In 
such instances, these explicit exclusions are premised on the notion that the sector is 
already regulated by another set of legislation and authority. In the case of the UAE, 
this would be the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority whose authority stems 
from the UAE Telecommunications Law of 2003. 
When evaluating the development of the telecommunications sector in the UAE, the 
sector-specific regulatory regime was put in place nearly a decade before the 
Competition Law was introduced. Thus, when contemplating the scope of the 
Competition Law, it was easier to simply exclude the telecommunications sector rather 
than reconcile how these two pieces of legislation would operate in harmony with one 
another. While at the time this may have temporarily eased the legislative burden, in 
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the long run these fragmented pieces of legislation have created a precarious situation 
for one of the nation’s largest sectors. By failing to reconcile the two pieces of 
legislation, there is no broad, gap-filling competition law that can remedy the 
shortcomings of sector-specific regulation. Thus, each law must be completely self-
sufficient and self-contained with regard to both ex ante prohibitions against anti-
competitive conduct and ex post enforcement activities. 
7.3.2   A HARMONIZED MODEL AS THE WAY FORWARD 
Competition law and sector-specific regulation have become intrinsically entwined as 
two interrelated areas of regulatory competition policy. These two important pieces of 
legislative infrastructure are designed to correct market failures and address 
weaknesses within the sector. When used in a complementary fashion, competition 
policy coupled with regulation play a key role in the efficient regulation of competitive 
markets within a given sector, contributing to overall economic health and consumer 
welfare within a particular nation. 
In countries like Qatar and the US which have adopted competition policy alongside 
sector-specific regulation, there has been a paradigm shift in the public policy toward 
the telecommunications industry. This has been marked by three important changes 
that are manifested in the telecommunications sector: a tendency to privatise the 
services previously provided solely by state-owned companies; opening up the 
telecommunications industry to competition; and reorienting regulatory oversight by 
shifting focus away from final output prices and instead toward the promotion of 
healthy competition in all respects within the telecommunications sector.779 This policy 
shift recognised that state-owned monopolies were failing to make use of new 
technological opportunities, which in turn disadvantaged consumers and endangered 
the competitiveness of businesses as they relied on the provision of 
telecommunications services from these monopolistic players.780 
The shift to sector-specific regulation in the telecommunications sector reflects a 
change in approach to the basic tenets of competition policy. Rather than an attempt 
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to prevent abuse in final output prices to protect consumers, regulation of the 
telecommunications industry is now focused on promoting the development of healthy 
competition in the sector, including competition between networks and in downstream 
markets and complementary services.781 
To understand how both competition law and sector-specific regulation are essential 
components of a comprehensive telecommunications competition policy, it is 
important to first consider the objectives each is intended to achieve. 
7.4   ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION 
LAW 
There is no denying that effective competition is a key element to the success of any 
market. Competition laws form a crucial part of competition policy, which ensures the 
health of the market. Competition laws serve to prevent anticompetitive actions that 
reduce market competition or swiftly bring an end to abuses of power that thrive to the 
detriment of competitor firms and consumers. 
At the most basic level, the primary objective of competition policy, as exemplified 
through the enactment of competitions laws, is to maintain and protect effective 
competition. Competition laws are specifically designed to protect a properly 
functioning market, allowing firms to engage in healthy competition to meet economic 
supply and demand. For competition laws and the resulting competition policy to be 
effective, firms within the market sector must be able to freely enter and exit the 
market, be incentivized to provide high quality services while remaining competitive 
on pricing and product availability, and not be hindered by unfair regulations or 
dominant firms acting in an abusive manner with the goal of reducing competition. 
As a result, competition policy is not simply a lofty ideal attributable to a utopian market 
concept but a concrete mechanism designed to address a particular market failure – 
monopolies.782 When monopolies are permitted to dominate, the market as a whole 
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suffers. What has become apparent is that the only way to adequately address the 
monopoly issue is to implement anticompetitive prohibitions and behavioural restraints 
on incumbent firms within a market sector through effective competition policy. This 
stops them from either illegitimately acquiring market power or from exercising such 
excessive power in the case where a monopoly has already been achieved. 
Competition laws are, by their nature, generic and widely applicable. They are 
characterised by their ex post intervention on a proscriptive basis. These generic 
competition laws apply broadly to the economy. A nation’s competition law should 
ideally have very few exceptions to its applicability and any exception should be 
adequately justified. It is contentious whether competition laws should apply only to 
the private sector or whether they should encompass public firms and state-owned 
entities, but unequivocally they should apply to both domestic and foreign market 
players. By minimising the number of exceptions, a general competition law 
significantly decreases the possibilities for differential treatment among market 
players. As a result of the law having broad and consistent applicability, this eliminates 
the need for the creation of ad hoc solutions to sector-specific issues or market 
failures, instead ensuring that all market players are subjected to consistent and fair 
treatment. This is particularly important in KSA legislation which has largely been 
codified on an as-needed basis to address specific contemporary legal situations. 
Additionally, competitive markets reduce the potential for corruption. Sectors become 
regulated by market forces as opposed to the decisions of policy-makers that may 
encompass an alternative agenda. The existence of competition law further extends 
this transparency by providing a mechanism for the assessment and investigation of 
alleged anticompetitive practices. Enforcement can be undertaken by the competition 
authority directly or complaints can be made by consumers or market players. In either 
instance, the alleged misconduct is then assessed in light of the prohibited and 
permissible conduct under the competition law. 
Finally, the integration of competition into markets through the enactment of 
competition laws forces companies to become more innovative and efficient. They 
continue to find ways to improve their product, reduce costs and increase productivity, 




7.4.1 ESTABLISHING THE GOALS OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC 
REGULATION 
Having established that competition law is a crucial aspect of competition policy, one 
may then wonder why regulation is also a necessary element in this equation. Sector-
specific regulation serves a number of purposes that cannot otherwise be achieved 
through competition laws alone. While competition laws can do away with market 
monopolies, one cannot rely on the individual enforcement of competition rules to 
govern the activities of an entire sector. In order to preserve an environment that will 
allow both incumbent players and new entrants to thrive, complementary sector 
regulation is also essential. 
The goal of sector-specific regulation, from a competition perspective, is to create an 
environment that encourages free market competition. The way to achieve this in 
practice is to enact statutory provisions that address market failures within the 
particular economic sector. The goal of statutory regulation is to recreate the market 
conditions that would exist in an effectively competitive environment absent these 
market failures. Sector-specific regulations often accomplish this by creating means 
of access for additional players to the previously monopolised market, such as through 
licensing. In particular, the issuance of operational licenses has been a key growth 
factor in the telecommunications industry.783 
Unlike competition law, which generally has the limited aim of prohibiting 
anticompetitive practices at a broad level, sector-specific regulations often have 
multiple objectives.784 While a competition authority established by a competition law 
may focus solely on market efficiency by reducing anticompetitive behaviour, the 
introduction of multiple goals for sector regulation allows for a government to balance 
concerns over market efficiency with other strategic objectives, such as increasing 
foreign investment or strengthening political ties. For example, regulatory supervision 
can function to balance the correction of market failures with broader systemic 
outcomes. A regulation may be necessary to protect consumers from an imminent 
detrimental action, but in remedying that market failure there may be a ripple effect 
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throughout the market beyond those immediately affected. It is then up to the 
regulatory regime to address such concerns. 
While in some instances there will inevitably be overlap in the goals and means used 
to achieve the objectives of both competition law and sector regulations, the 
introduction of multiple objectives at the sector level may lead to inherent conflict and 
contradictions. For instance, sector regulation primarily concerns itself with three 
things: the promotion of effective competition similar to the goals of the competition 
law; the internal market dynamics; and the market players’ interests.785 
The interplay of the concerns may give rise to conflicts when the regulation imposes 
conditions on the incumbent firms, such as establishing barriers to entry or creating 
behavioural restrictions, for the sake of advancing the competitive environment. 
However, just as these competing objectives may be at odds, they can also result in 
a certain degree of complementarity when protection of the market players’ interests 
through the creation of standards for fair competition furthers the goals of promoting 
effective competition within the marketplace. 
7.4.2 HARMONIZING THE TWO INTO AN EFFICIENT, 
COMPLEMENTARY REGIME 
The telecommunications sector serves as a prime example for how competition law 
and sector-specific regulation can work in a concerted way. The telecommunications 
industry by its nature requires a degree of ex ante regulation to complement and 
support competition enforcement. This has manifested itself in the existing legislative 
regime in the KSA. 
There are two facets of the competition policy that concern telecommunications in the 
KSA: the Competition Law and the sector-specific Telecommunication Act. The 
Competition Law serves as the broadly applied anticompetitive or antitrust statute, 
equivalent to the Sherman Act in the US or the Competition Law in Qatar, while the 
Telecommunications Act serves as the regulatory sector statute with provisions that 
were pre-emptively modelled on anticompetitive principles prior to the enactment of 
the Competition Law, which would be akin to the Telecommunications Act in the US 
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and telecommunications statutes of Qatar. The evolution of these laws is uniquely 
interesting because in many ways they seek to achieve the same outcome, albeit 
through their own devices, which begs the question of what is the optimal coordination 
of the two? This section explores why both the general competition law and sector 
specific regulations are essential to a comprehensive framework that will effectively 
protect market integrity and consumer welfare. 
7.4.3  COMPETITION POLICY COHERENCE 
Competition policy is generally applicable across all markets unless the sector is 
expressly or impliedly exempted. Regulation on the other hand is enacted on a sector-
by-sector basis. For example, the regulation for one sector does not affect the 
functioning or operation of the other sectors. For there to be a fully coherent 
competition policy regime within the KSA telecommunications sector, it is essential 
that both the Competition Law and Telecommunications Act exist and operate 
harmoniously. 
As legislatures have searched for the ideal regulatory conditions that can 
accommodate progress and innovation in the telecommunications sector, policy- 
makers have attempted to unleash market dynamics by engaging in the strategic 
choice of sector deregulation while maintaining an overarching competition law 
framework. As this model has evolved over time, it has become accepted as the most 
appropriate means of regulating the telecommunications sector because it effectively 
combines sector-specific regulation with general competition law policy, both of which 
are put into effect by entities that are independent of market players.786 
As the legislatures attempted to strike this delicate balance between the specific and 
the general, it became apparent a balance also had to be struck between encouraging 
innovation and fair competition. In outlining an ideal regulation framework, there 
needed to be a competition policy that was technology-neutral and embodied the 
necessary prohibitions against anticompetitive practices in a broad manner, which 
then served to facilitate the existence of various markets. Those markets, such as the 
telecommunications sector, then required sector specific regulation that was narrowly 
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tailored to its subject matter, created to be flexible and adaptable to market trends. 
This sector-specific regulation would work to prescriptively limit anticompetitive 
behaviours, thereby allowing the market to exist with minimal public intervention to 
pursue technological and economic advancement. The sector-specific regulation 
would delineate the boundaries of permissible activity while the competition law acts 
as the invisible hand, waiting to intervene when market players fall foul of the 
competition regime. This is aptly phrased by Broumas who states that this ‘legal 
flexibility and market competitiveness can only be achieved through a deregulatory 
approach based on competition law principles, applied through the combination of 
generic competition law and sector-specific regulation’.787 
This is the approach followed by the US and, to a certain extent, Qatar. In the US, the 
Sherman Act and its associated statutes function as the general competition law. It is 
not tied to any particular industry or economic sector but outlines the anticompetitive 
behaviours that will not be tolerated within the free market economy of the country. 
The telecommunications sector is then regulated by a combination of legal instruments 
and regulatory bodies, including the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal 
Communications Commission, that together comprise the sector-specific 
telecommunications legislation for the US. The telecommunications legislation 
functions as the guiding law for activities that are permissible and prohibited and the 
competition law comes into play when the boundaries of the sector-specific regulations 
are exceeded. This dual regulatory system combining general competition law with 
sector specific regulation operates to guarantee effective competition in the liberalised 
communications market. 
What is notable about the US’s harmonised approach is that it has stood the test of 
time. As noted in Chapter Six, the Sherman Act has been referred to as the bedrock 
competition law worldwide and has formed the basis for many competition laws around 
the globe enacted over the past century. While the competition framework in the US 
has grown and adapted along with technology and the market, its basic principles still 
remain firmly in place. This Act represents the epitome of strong competition law. Its 
general applicability has made it adaptable to the various needs of an evolving society 
but it is also able to operate in tandem with sector-specific regulations. In fact, sector-
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specific regulations such as those governing the telecommunications sector were 
developed with the intention of being part of this hybrid system.  
Unlike in the KSA, in which the Telecommunications Act was enacted first, followed 
by the Competition Law, the Sherman Act predated the vast majority of modern sector-
specific regulation. Thus, as regulations were developed, they were done so under the 
working assumption that the Sherman Act stood firm in the background as the 
overarching check on anticompetitive practices, allowing the sector-specific regulation 
to deal with the substance of a particular market sector. The laws, through their 
express provisions, were created to work in tandem. The Telecommunications Act 
specifically subjected itself to the overarching antitrust laws. This framework allows for 
the easy adaptation of sector-specific regulations with changes in technology or 
market economies without jeopardising the established competition regime. 
A hybrid system of tandem competition and telecommunications laws was more 
recently taken up within the GCC by Qatar. However, unlike in the US and similar to 
the KSA, Qatar first enacted its Telecommunications Act, followed by its Competition 
Law. Yet, the Qatar legislature recognised the need for these laws to work in concert 
to create an effective competition regime within the telecommunications sector. To 
reconcile these two pieces of legislation, Qatar issued a policy document that 
addressed the applicability of the Competition Law to the telecommunications sector 
and asserted that the telecommunications policies should be read with the established 
competition laws. 
In both these instances, the laws were ultimately reconciled to create a singular 
competition policy framework to govern the telecommunications sector. It is this 
coherence among various legislations that the KSA should be aiming for as it 
continues to streamline its competition policy with regard to telecommunications. 
7.4.3.1 PROCEDURAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE 
As discussed above, the general competition law and sector-specific regulations have 
different objectives and ultimately serve different functions in practice within the 
telecommunications sector. To understand their respective goals and functions, each 
will be considered in turn. 
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Generic competition laws have proven to be an invaluable regulatory tool in markets 
that have a natural tendency toward monopolisation, such as the telecommunications 
sector. They serve an inherently procedural function by prohibiting those practices that 
are detrimental to market competition across the board. By operating on a broad basis 
and with an unrestricted scope, they inherently cover all aspects of anticompetitive 
behaviour within a country’s economy beyond the intricacies of any particular market 
sector. Further, by establishing a set of general competition principles, a broad 
competition law establishes a framework for interpreting the anticompetitive provisions 
of a sector-specific regulatory provision. However, it is this broad and generic nature 
of competition law that makes it insufficient on its own to regulate the 
telecommunications sector. Competition laws are characterized by their general and 
vague nature and lack the specificity and coherence of sector-specific regulations. 
Conversely, sector-specific regulation serves a more specific and substantive function. 
It necessarily addresses the technical and economic aspects of sector regulation. The 
provisions contained in a telecommunications regulation, for instance, would address 
aspects of standard settings to be adopted by firms and address economic aspects 
such as price regulation. While embodying the spirit of competition policy, these 
provisions are inherently specific to the sector and market for which the law is enacted 
and would not otherwise be governed by a broad competition law. By establishing a 
separate set of sector-specific regulations, the law can be easily amended to reflect 
changes in technology and market development within the telecommunications sector 
without affecting or compromising the competition law regime. 
7.4.3.2 EX ANTE AND EX POST ENFORCEMENT 
Another advantage to having both a competition law and sector-specific regulation 
governing the telecommunications sector is that they can address anticompetitive 
behaviour on both ex ante and ex post bases. With the exception of merger review 
and approval, competition laws generally operate on an ex post basis. This means 
that competition law enforcement occurs after the anticompetitive actions have taken 
place and harm to the market has already occurred. Ex post competition rules have 
generally been characterised as backward-looking; narrowly viewed and driven 
primarily by demand; focused on exploitative abuses rather the fostering cooperation 
between firms; fact specific; best enforced through the civil courts; and result in 
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remedies that are rather declaratory in nature.788 
Conversely, sector regulation relies on an ex ante approach. Ex ante rules aim to 
prescriptively guide business conduct by making clear why types of activities are 
permissible and what activities are restricted. The aim of such regulations is to take a 
proactive approach to fostering a competitive environment. Sector-specific ex ante 
rules are characterised as forward-looking in that they aim to regulate future 
behaviours; define markets in broader terms than competition laws; focus on 
addressing market failures through making changes to industry structure; are not fact-
specific; provide specific, prescriptive remedies; are best enforced through 
independent, sector-specific regulators as opposed to the courts; and are 
characterised by detailed remedies that account for the broader considerations of 
consumer welfare and investment incentives.789 
By utilising both competition law and sector regulation together, a competition policy 
framework is created that allows for both ex ante enforcement by guiding market 
practices and ex post enforcement by regulating anticompetitive behaviours. This 
creates a system in which market players understand that there are consequences to 
their actions and have a clear picture of what actions they may take without falling foul 
of the competition regime.  
7.4.3.3 INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR ENFORCEMENT 
Following on from the ex ante versus ex post enforcement debate is the information 
that is needed about a market player’s activity to adequately enforce competition 
policy. Ex ante enforcement is not fact-specific and will not require any particular 
information because the events have not yet occurred. The exception to this is a 
proposed merger or acquisition of a significant stake in a market firm. In such 
instances, sufficient information must be provided to allow the competition authority to 
evaluate the implications of the proposed course of action in light of competition policy. 
This often requires the regulator to engage in significant fact-finding to allow for the 
accurate evaluation of the impact and effects on the market of the proposed conduct. 
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Conversely, ex post competition enforcement has a clear informational advantage 
because, by its nature, such enforcement takes place after the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct has occurred. In such circumstances, the competition authority is vested with 
sufficient information to determine the nature and detrimental effect of the 
anticompetitive action and appropriately sanction the infringing party. This ensures 
that market balance is restored and players are put back into a substantially similar 
position they were in prior to the investigated conduct. 
7.4.3.4 NATURE OF ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES 
Another important area of convergence between competition law and sector regulation 
relates to the different types of remedies imposed depending on the law governing the 
anticompetitive conduct. Remedies under competition law are intended to address the 
specific conduct or anticompetitive behaviour of a firm in the market. As such, the 
remedies imposed when a violation is found are often declaratory and structural in 
nature. Mergers can be used as an example. When a merger is proposed, the 
competition law’s application requires evaluating what remedy will resolve the 
competition problem and preserve the competitive nature of the market. If such a 
merger would create market dominance, the request for approval of the merger will be 
denied. Other alternatives constituting structural remedies could include 
reorganization of the firms, the sale of certain assets by the firms or the creation of 
new competitor firms through licensing arrangements.  
Unlike the primarily structural remedies of competition law, the remedies of sector 
specific regulation are designed to correct a specific market failure and are a form of 
behavioural remedy. Behavioural sector regulation remedies are designed to directly 
address the conduct itself, such as setting pricing levels, lifting barriers to entry or 
asserting conditions that mandate the provision of particular services. These remedies 
often include sanctions, injunctive relief or other deterrents that would prevent a party 
from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour or impose consequences if the 
detrimental activity is not rectified. Ideally, these remedies are designed to correct the 
market’s failures and address issues before they rise to the level of anticompetitive 
behaviours under the competition law. However, if used appropriately, they can also 
promptly address more minor anti-competitive behaviours before structural remedies 
become necessary. As such, these two forms of remedies work hand in hand to 
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preserve an environment of effective competition in the market. 
7.5   CHALLENGES FOR THE SAUDI COMPETITION 
REGIME IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
One of the primary challenges facing GCC states like the KSA is how to effectively 
implement and enforce national competition laws alongside sector-specific regulation 
while at the same time keeping the powerful and continuously growing private sector 
businesses content.790 In reality, this is not entirely possible. Many of these 
businesses, such as the STC, achieved near monopolistic status prior to the 
competition legal reforms in the early 2000s through arrangements that are no longer 
permissible. These large players relied heavily on barriers to market entry to maintain 
their positions; barriers that the competition regime now seeks to eliminate. For 
example, Article 4(4) of the Saudi Competition Law expressly prohibits ‘preventing any 
firm from exercising its right to enter or move out of the market at any time or 
hampering the same’.791 
7.5.1 JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS 
Additionally, the telecommunications sector in the KSA is currently subject to two 
different sets of regulations, resulting in businesses facing uncertainty on enforcement 
related issues. As it currently stands, there are competing jurisdictions and forums for 
the enforcement of competition provisions related to the telecommunications sector. 
Under the Telecommunications Act, the CITC has jurisdiction over competition-related 
matters whereas under the Competition Law the Competition Council has similar 
authority. Thus, both authorities are permitted to regulate and enforce statutory 
competition provisions against anti-competitive behaviours including anti-competitive 
agreements, merger control procedures and abuses of dominant positions within the 
market. As a result of the fragmented development of Saudi competition policy in the 
sector, there is no established hierarchy between the two authorities, leaving all firms, 
both domestic and international, operating in the telecommunications sector within the 
KSA subject to the enforcement authority of both. 
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In resolving such jurisdictional conflicts, the competition regime should allocate the 
power to deal with competition issues within the particular sector. There are three 
primary ways this could be addressed. First, the sector regulator under the 
Telecommunication Act could be granted the exclusive power to oversee competition 
issues arising within the sector. Second, both the sector regulation and the competition 
authority as empowered by the Competition Law could maintain concurrent, respective 
powers to handle enforcement matters. However, in such circumstances it is 
necessary for the boundaries of their respective powers to be clearly defined in order 
to maintain the efficiency of the competition regime. Further, to the extent that there is 
any overlap between enforcement powers, there should be an ultimate hierarchy of 
authority as to which enforcement authority has priority. Finally, the competition 
authority empowered by the Competition Law could maintain exclusive jurisdiction for 
handling enforcement matters within the telecommunications sector. 
When multiple authorities are competent to oversee or enforce the same subject 
matter, jurisdictional conflicts may occur and could potentially result in parallel actions 
before different authorities. Such duplicative jurisdiction in the absence of a clear 
hierarchy of authority can lead to inefficient allocation of resources and leaves open 
the potential for contradictory enforcement decisions. Thus, it is important that any 
revisions to the legislative frameworks or attempts to reconcile the existing pieces of 
legislation pre-emptively resolve such jurisdictional conflicts. Ultimately, to resolve 
these issues, the KSA needs to establish a hierarchy of authority between the 
respective bodies to determine which will have the duty or right to engage in 
enforcement efforts. 
7.5.2  SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
When dealing with two pieces of legislation that predominantly address the same 
subject matter, two substantive issues in the application of these laws may arise. First, 
both the competition law and the sector-specific regulation rely on legal norms that 
use the same terminology, and second, both sets of laws are applied to the same 
industry. However, the KSA has been relatively proactive in this regard by clearly 
defining the relevant terms in the context of preliminary articles of each piece of 
legislation. This has yet to be an issue with the enforcement of competition policy in 
the KSA but it is worth noting as a possible area for future attention as the sector 
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continues to grow and develop. 
While the future of the telecommunications sector in the KSA is unpredictable, what is 
clear is the need for the KSA to introduce measures and policies that will increase and 
encourage participation and growth by both foreign and domestic players in the private 
sector of its economy. The KSA has taken an important step forward by aligning itself 
with the WTO and implementing a competition law regime. These actions demonstrate 
that the government is committed to transforming semi-stagnant and monopolised 
domestic economic sectors into thriving ones that are attractive to foreign investment. 
However, to continue to reap the benefits of such forward progress, the KSA must 
continue to rethink and refine its approach by harmonising its various pieces of 
legislation and encouraging transparency and accountability in the enforcement of 
competition policy. 
The general competition law and sector-specific regulations must be complementary 
in nature and function in harmony. As it currently stands, the Competition Law applies 
to all economic activity with only very few exceptions. Article 3 of the Competition Law 
provides that the ‘[p]rovisions of this Law shall apply to all firms working in Saudi 
markets except public corporations and wholly-owned state companies’.792 Unlike 
other nations that have exempted certain industry sectors from the purview of the 
general competition law, such as the UAE, the KSA approach is one of broad 
applicability with only certain firms excepted. As, as a result, the competition policies 
of the KSA apply to all industries, including regulated industries, and there are no 
particular sectors that are immune from competition policy or exempted from its 
application. 
7.6 PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
First and foremost, if the KSA is going to continue to utilise both a general competition 
law and a sector-specific regulation to govern competition in the telecommunications 
sector, these two pieces of legislation need to be harmonised. The 
Telecommunications Act was enacted prior to the establishment of the Competition 
Law and thus makes no mention of the law. Given that the competition provisions are 
                                               




much more detailed in the Competition Law, it would make sense that the four articles 
comprising Chapter Six of the Telecommunications Act become subject to and 
interpreted in accordance with the Competition Law. 
7.6.1 CHANGES TO THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 
To formalise this relationship between the two pieces of legislation, the KSA should 
take action to assert that any communications laws, including the Telecommunications 
Act, are subject to the principles embodied in the Competition Law. There are two 
ways that this could be done in practice. The first is to amend the Telecommunications 
Act and include a provision specifically referencing the Competition Law and outlining 
that the competition provisions of the Act are to be interpreted in compliance with and 
are subject to the provisions of the Competition Law. This is akin to the reconciling of 
the US telecommunications legislation with the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
Alternatively, the KSA could follow the approach of Qatar and issue a policy document 
that reconciles the laws. This approach would be the least burdensome and would 
require the issuance of a binding decree that interprets how the two laws are intended 
to work together and perform complementary functions. This would be akin to the 
implementing regulations that are issued in the KSA after a new law is enacted. These 
provisions would detail the hierarchy of the laws and preemptively resolve any 
jurisdictional conflicts. 
7.6.2 CHANGES TO THE COMPETITION LAW 
In addition to the changes to the Telecommunications Act outlined above that would 
reconcile the coexistence of the two pieces of legislation, there are additional changes 
that could be made to further strengthen the Competition Law and its applicability in 
the telecommunications sector. 
First, the Competition Law should not permit the creation of intentional monopolies of 
any kind. While market+ dominance alone is not per se unlawful, the driving intent and 
economic impacts that stem from a monopoly fall foul of the provisions of the 
Competition Law. For instance, there can be dominance in the market without an 
intentional monopoly, such as with a new service or technology. However, when this 
dominance becomes a market power that ventures into monopolistic territory is when 
the company engages in anti-competitive behaviours to prevent the entry of other 
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competitors. A company that uses its dominant position to restrict the options available 
in the market and maintain its position as the sole provider of the goods or services 
has a significant impact on both society and the economy. Additionally, there are 
currently certain permissible monopolies. For example, wholly-owned state companies 
are excepted from the rules against monopolies in the marketplace. These state 
companies do not face regulation or consequences for their monopolistic practices. 
This allows the state to maintain a position of power with regard to certain aspects of 
the telecommunications sector, potentially to the detriment of consumers. 
To reconcile these concerns, the language of the Competition Law should be amended 
to prevent companies from obtaining or maintaining a dominant position through anti-
competitive means. This also would mean repealing Article 3 of the Competition Law 
so that public and wholly-owned state companies are no longer excepted. This would 
bring the Competition Law fully in line with Sharia principles and place all commercial 
telecommunications providers, both currently existing and to be developed in the 
future, on an equal footing. 
Second, the breadth of the Council of Competition Protection, the competition authority 
empowered by the Competition Law, should be expanded to explicitly encompass ex 
post enforcement efforts for anticompetitive activities in all sectors, including the 
telecommunications sector. Ex post measures are those taken after anti-competitive 
actions have occurred. Examples of ex post measures would include sanctions, 
revocation of business licenses, injunctions against anti- competitive activities and 
other suitable remedies in law or equity to counter a company’s anti-competitive 
behaviours. Ex ante authority to address issues prior to the anti-competitive actions 
would remain the purview of sector-specific authority. A classic example of ex ante 
authority is requiring companies to submit their merger and acquisition plans for review 
and approval prior to taking action. Such pre-emptive regulation minimises the number 
of anti-competitive activities that are effectuated and reduces the burden of ex post 
enforcement authorities. While often in a regulatory structure, the same entity is 
responsible for both ex ante and ex post enforcement, the telecommunications sector 
in the KSA implicates multiple competition regulation authorities, including the broad 
competition authority and the sector-specific CITC. 
It is essential that the regulatory actions and enforcement goals of these authorities 
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are complementary, and their actions are coordinated to further the goals of the 
Kingdom’s competition policies. In light of this coordinated enforcement regime, the 
empowering legislation should also be amended to include provisions that explicitly 
address cooperation between the CCP and sector-specific authorities. These 
provisions should detail the respective enforcement authority and responsibilities of 
each authority while emphasising the shared goals of furthering competitive practices 
in the market. Further, there should be provisions that address the need for 
cooperation between competition authorities as not all situations can be resolved 
solely on an ex ante or ex post basis. This cooperation would include sharing 
resources and support personnel when needed and sharing investigative information 
to further enforcement efforts. 
Finally, the CCP should adopt additional guidelines to clearly articulate how 
anticompetitive activities are assessed and provide clear examples of prohibited 
activities under the competition framework and the potential penalties for engaging in 
such conduct. As it currently stands, the law contains broad prohibitions against anti- 
competitive behaviours. However, it provides little in the way of how such behaviours 
are identified; how investigations are conducted; how proposed actions are evaluated; 
what behaviours it ultimately deems to be anti-competitive; and what the penalties are 
for engaging in such activities. To remedy this, the guidelines should be more specific 
about how the competition authorities will operate within their assessment and 
enforcement capacity. 
For instance, most competition analyses start with the competition authority evaluating 
the impact that the pending action will have on consumers and the economy. The 
guidelines should provide additional insight into what factors they consider in 
evaluating this impact and what methodologies the authorities should use in making 
their assessments of activities. Further, the guidelines should highlight illustrative 
examples of sanctionable anti-competitive activities, such as mergers that result in 
monopolies, price-fixing agreements and actions that artificially drive up the consumer 
costs for goods or services. Identifying these examples will put companies on notice 
of what behaviours are prohibited and will serve as a deterrent to parties for utilising 
similar tactics. Finally, the guidelines should expressly state penalties for engaging in 
such behaviours. For instance, the guidelines could list merger denial, monetary 
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sanctions, revocation of business licenses, injunctive relief and other possible ex ante 
and ex post activities that could be taken to prevent or remedy anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
7.6.3  DEREGULATION AND RE-REGULATION 
As the telecommunications sector, among other notable markets, continues to become 
more liberalised and globalised, it is important for the KSA to embrace the process of 
deregulation and re-regulation. As touched on in Chapter Six, the ongoing 
developments in the telecommunications industry require a certain degree of flexibility 
within the governing regulations. Although at first glance it may seem counter-intuitive 
to engage in a certain degree of deregulation of the telecommunications sector under 
the Telecommunications Act, this may be a necessary step to building a coherent and 
functional competition regime. 
The goal of deregulation is to reduce the extent of explicit sector-specific regulation, 
instead relying on increased competition to meet public policy objectives. The driving 
force behind the deregulation trend has been an increased recognition of the benefits 
of competition for a particular industry sector. However, deregulation should not be 
construed to mean the abolishment of all sector-specific regulation. Instead, it is a step 
in the process that allows for a relaxation in the sector-specific regulation to evaluate 
the extent to which competition introduced by way of the developing competition policy 
assists with achieving the desired outcomes. Once the effects of competition are 
determined, the KSA can then revisit the sector-specific regulations to engage in a 
period of re-regulation to preserve the balance achieved by the introduction of 
competition into the sector. 
As with any type of legislative sector reform, some degree of trial and error is 
necessary to find the most efficient approach to protecting the business interests of 
private firms and the general welfare of consumers.67 In practice, this requires the 
Kingdom to adopt an approach of phasing out regulations that no longer serve their 
purpose and replacing them with regulations that reflect the current state of the 
market.68 
7.6.4 COORDINATED LEGISLATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
Under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Competition Law and the Telecommunications 
 
243 
Act, the competition authority, the Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology, the CITC, and the Council of Ministers are all involved in some way with 
the legislation and enforcement of various competition provisions.793 For example, the 
CITC is an independent administrator of the Telecommunications Act but any licenses 
issued by it pursuant to the Act must be sanctioned by the Council of Ministers. 
Further, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology oversees the 
planning and implementation of all of the government’s strategies and policies within 
the telecommunications sector, but it does not have sole legislative authority to amend 
the Telecommunications Act and its supporting rules and regulations to further these 
goals. 
As the KSA works to reconcile the coexistence of the Competition Law and 
Telecommunications Act, it will also need to coordinate legislative and enforcement 
efforts. Specifically, the Kingdom needs to delineate which bodies will be responsible 
for the development and applicability of the general Competition Law to the 
telecommunications sector and what the process will be for amending the 
Telecommunications Act as changes are made to the KSA’s competition regime. 
Additionally, a hierarchy needs to be established to determine what entities will hear 
different types of enforcement actions. Ideally, the civil courts are best positioned to 
hear enforcement actions on an ex post basis and the independent regulator under 
the Telecommunications Act is the ideal forum for the resolution of ex ante concerns.  
7.6.5 INCREASED TRANSPARENCY 
In addition to reconciling the overlapping areas of legislative and enforcement 
jurisdiction, the KSA should promote competition in the telecommunications sector by 
encouraging transparency in the duties and powers of the competition authority and 
telecommunications regulator. This includes clearly delineating the hierarchy of 
authority between the competition authority and sector regulator; providing expeditious 
decision-making processes; promptly removing any unjustified regulatory restrictions 
on competition; limiting regulation to measures intended to create or maintain market 
incentives; engaging in sound competition analysis when defining or assessing 
markets; periodically reviewing regulations to ensure that they continue to serve their 
purpose; and providing reasoned decisions based on sound competition principles 
                                               
793 See Sections 4.2 and 5.4. 
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when engaging in enforcement actions. 
One possible means of doing this would be to establish a committee that includes 
personnel from both entities. While there is not currently any overlap between those 
who serve as part of the competition authority and as part of the telecommunications 
regulator, their jobs often mirror each other and require addressing many of the same 
issues. Creating a two-way dialogue between the broad competition authority, whose 
goal is to promote competition policy in all sectors and to support the Saudi economy 
as a whole, and the sector-specific telecommunications regulator, whose role is to 
ensure that competition policies are being implemented and enforced specifically 
within the telecommunications sector, will open up the possibilities for coordinated and 
cohesive action. The competition authority can keep the telecommunications regulator 
informed of its overall mission and vision for Saudi society and its economy as a whole, 
and the telecommunications regulator can identify sector-specific challenges and 
obstacles that would be better addressed at an overarching, hierarchical level by the 
competition authority. By not only delineating the respective roles of these two 
authorities but also finding ways for them to operate in concert, the KSA can set itself 
up for success in this sector and in the future by utilising this model as other sector-
specific regulations arise. 
7.6.6 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
One additional exercise that may be useful for the KSA as it goes through the process 
of deregulation and re-regulation is conducting regulatory impact analyses on a regular 
basis.794 According to research conducted in the US, regulation is more apt to create 
negative externalities if there is not a designated body to actively supervise the sector. 
Thus, incumbent market players, when left to their own devices without oversight, will 
continue to engage in conduct designed to exclude the competition. As a result, it is 
imperative the government or the department or agency to which it delegates its 
authority of overseeing these sectors evaluates the impact of existing regulations and 
                                               
794 Given that regulation has several impacts, the analyses provides a comprehensive appraisal of the 
potential impacts of new regulation and helps to determine whether the regulation may achieve the 
expected goals. See Jacobo Torriti and Ragnar E Lofstedt, ‘The First Five Years of the EU Impact 
Assessment System: A Risk Economics Perspective on Gaps between Rationale and Practice’ (2012) 
15(2) Journal of Risk Research 169, 169-186; Romano R Reyes and CE Sottilotta, ‘Regulatory Impact 




their effects, both positive and negative, on telecommunications sector competition.795 
7.7 THE FUTURE OF THE KSA’S COMPETITION POLICY 
IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
As has been discussed at length in this section, both competition law and sector- 
specific regulation are essential components in a comprehensive and effective 
competition policy. Once such a competition policy is appropriately established, this 
infrastructure will allow for the proactive identification of anti-competitive behaviours 
and practices in the telecommunications sector. By understanding the patterns that 
these behaviours follow and the effects that they produce, the KSA can also pre-
emptively take remedial action to further constrain these behaviours going forward. 
Furthermore, by taking a firm stance against such anti-competitive behaviours in the 
telecommunications sector and garnering publicity from enforcement activities, the 
KSA is able to further reinforce the underlying goals of the Competition Law and the 
nation’s overall competition policy. 
The next step for the KSA is to engage in some measure of legislative streamlining as 
outlined in this chapter. To effectively promote competition in the telecommunications 
sector, there must be some harmonisation between the fragmented pieces of 
legislation. Whether this takes the form of continued legislative reform resulting in 
amended versions of the existing laws or a decree reconciling them and clearly 
articulating how they will be articulated in tandem, attention needs to be paid to 
bridging the gap between these two areas of applicable competition regulation. 
However, reform does not simply stop there. This period of deregulation and re- 
regulation in the KSA is just beginning and there will need to be continued reform 
efforts as the KSA finds it footing in the telecommunications sector. One of the ongoing 
struggles within the legislative framework of the KSA generally is the lack of available 
information with regard to the legislative history, intent, interpretation and enforcement. 
In order to identify market failures and areas for continued improvement, the Saudi 
legislature must continue to investigate the aspects of competition policy in the 
telecommunications sector. As the market continues to grow and expand, this means 
                                               
795 OECD, ‘Introductory Handbook for Undertaking Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)’ (2008) 
<https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44789472.pdf> accessed 8 July 2017. 
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gathering information about attempts at anticompetitive agreements, obtainments and 
abuses of dominant positions, attempted mergers, and enforcement activities. By 
collecting data on anticompetitive behaviours, both those that are being deterred 
through ex ante enforcement and those prosecuted through ex post prosecution, the 
KSA will hopefully have sufficient data to continue to refine its competition regime 
moving forward. 
Additionally, the KSA should track, to the extent possible given the civil nature of its 
legal system, the interpretations of competition policy used for rendering enforcement 
decisions and civil court judgments. By analysing judicial applications of the general 
competition law to telecommunications cases, the legislature will be able to continue 
to shape substantive sector-specific policy to pre-emptively address market failures. 
Further, to the extent that the judiciary struggles to enforce competition law principles 
in the telecommunications sector, this will allow for the development of amendments 
to increase the effectiveness of the Competition Law. 
7.8  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Although identifying the most appropriate model for competition regulation within the 
telecommunications sector is an important step in the evolution of the KSA’s 
competition law regime, it represents only a threshold issue. Once an appropriate 
model is chosen, the legislative work for the Kingdom is just beginning and the 
legislations and implementing regulations must be amended to accommodate the 
choice of model. Further doctrinal research should be done on the legislative language 
that similarly modelled systems have used to harmonise competition laws and 
telecommunications laws. This language, along with the proposals contained in this 
thesis, could be used to model legislative reforms within the Kingdom or provide the 
basis for generating a new decree that would reconcile the two laws. 
Additionally, empirical research should be conducted with the objective of determining 
the effectiveness of the current competition regulation of the telecommunications 
sector. It is especially important to determine the extent to which the current 
competition regulation prevents vertical agreements that restrict competition. This may 
help to determine which vertical agreements are prohibited in the KSA. The findings 
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could then be used as a basis for comparison once changes are made to the system. 
As with any type of regulatory development, there will be a certain necessary degree 
of trial and error. As the KSA goes through this process, assessing its progress will 
help to identify notable improvements and lessons that can be applied to other sectors. 
Finally, research should be done on the KSA’s approach to competition law generally 
in light of the competition trends taking hold in the rest of the world. The KSA is unique 
as a Muslim country that integrates Sharia into all aspects of its legal system. As such, 
the Kingdom is often limited in how it can adopt global trends into its domestic legal 
system. However, competition law is one area in which Sharia may be even more 
restrictive in principle than most competition regimes and may serve as a model from 
which non-Muslim countries can learn. 
7.9 CONCLUSION 
The concept of competition law is relatively new to the Middle East. The KSA, as one 
of the early adopters in the region, is positioned to serve as a model for how 
competition law will apply to developing telecommunications sectors in the region. Not 
long ago, the KSA struggled against codifying its laws and is now in a period of 
necessary legislative reform. At present, the KSA is faced with two pieces of separate 
legislation—the Competition Law and the Telecommunications Act—that must be 
reconciled in order for the telecommunications sector to continue to grow and 
ultimately thrive. 
This study has undertaken the task of dissecting the current state of competition policy 
in the Saudi telecommunications sector and addressing how it can be improved to 
align with global competition law trends. Chapter Two focused on how Sharia has 
affected the development of competition policy within the KSA and introduced the 
practical problems created by the STC’s effective monopoly of the telecommunications 
sector and the lack of a hospitable environment for foreign investment. Chapter Three 
focused on the background of the telecommunications sector in the KSA, tracking the 
development of the Act and the CITC. Chapter Four then illustrated how market 
players in the telecommunications sector abused their dominant positions and how 
this detrimentally impacted the free market economy. Chapter Five then explored the 
development of the competition policy in the KSA and the Kingdom’s accession to the 
WTO. Chapter Six proceeded to compare the current state of Saudi 
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telecommunications competition policy with the prevailing models of two other GCC 
states, along with that of the highly-developed US which serves as an aspirational 
model for a harmonised competition law structure. Finally, this chapter concluded with 
an in-depth discussion of why harmonisation of the Competition Law and the 
Telecommunications Act is important for a sustainable telecommunications market in 
the KSA and provided specific recommendations for how the Kingdom can move 
forward. 
For the KSA to develop a telecommunications market that will both continue to serve 
as a thriving economic sector as well as enhance the welfare of its citizens, it is 
necessary for it to implement a solid and modern regulatory framework to govern 
competition in the sector. In practice, this requires the existence of complementary 
statutory provisions that can work in harmony to create a solid legislative framework, 
as well as the support of the institutions involved through their acceptance of their 
regulatory responsibilities. It is only through cooperation between the legislative and 
enforcement aspects of competition regulation that the KSA will be able to meet the 
challenges that lie ahead for this developing sector. 
Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and introduction of competition into 
the market should function as an objective but not the ultimate goal—they are a means 
to an end. What competitive markets allow for is the continued growth of the sector in 
such a way that it will support the national economic objectives of the KSA. Among the 
desirable outcomes are attracting new investment, particularly foreign investment; 
continuing to improve national infrastructure; expanding the reach of 
telecommunications access to promote citizen welfare; bringing the KSA in line with 
regional and global competition and telecommunications law trends; and encouraging 
both legislative and technological innovation.75 
As the Kingdom continues to address anticompetitive behaviours and challenge 
monopolistic tendencies, it is important that both the government and the regulatory 
agencies each play their part in supporting the market. In practice, this means 
frequently revisiting and reassessing the existing legislative provisions and 
enforcement efforts, along with the respective allocation of powers and responsibilities 
among competition regime authorities. The future success of the telecommunications 
sector rests on the collaboration and cooperation of the various governmental 
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institutions involved in competition regulation. 
While creating a harmonised framework is an essential part of telecommunications 
success, it must be complemented with judiciously exercised enforcement efforts 
aimed at protecting the welfare of both private firms and consumers. Sector success 
is not an isolated effort but rather requires coordinated efforts to consolidate 
competition and combat anticompetitive behaviour at both the general and sector- 
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